標(biāo)題: Titlebook: Cooperation; A Philosophical Stud Raimo Tuomela Book 2000 Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2000 Institution.artificial intelligence.com [打印本頁(yè)] 作者: children 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 17:17
書目名稱Cooperation影響因子(影響力)
書目名稱Cooperation影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Cooperation網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度
書目名稱Cooperation網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Cooperation被引頻次
書目名稱Cooperation被引頻次學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Cooperation年度引用
書目名稱Cooperation年度引用學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Cooperation讀者反饋
書目名稱Cooperation讀者反饋學(xué)科排名
作者: 愛花花兒憤怒 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 00:03 作者: 搖晃 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 03:15 作者: infantile 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 06:33
Stadtgestalt und Stadtentwicklung Wien 2005,ct together in weaker and stronger senses. These will be clarified in the present section. In later sections I will discuss plan-based cooperative joint action, which is the fullest kind of cooperation there can be. There is also an appendix discussing Bratman’s account of shared cooperative activit作者: 駁船 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 10:37 作者: Instrumental 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 14:51
Stadtgestalt und Stadtentwicklung Wien 2005,orm in situations of cooperation. In Section II will discuss some such patterns of inference for g-cooperation (cooperation based on a shared collective goal), and to i-cooperation (.., coaction-cooperation). Furthermore, I will apply these considerations to discuss communicative action in the conte作者: Instrumental 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 17:56 作者: Gourmet 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 22:57 作者: 疏忽 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 01:40
Wien, der urbane Brennpunkt Mitteleuropas,ation contexts depend on the correlation of preferences in interaction situations: The more strongly the participants’ initial preferences are correlated the more possibilities of cooperation (and cooperative helping activities) there are. Furthermore, cooperation typically requires that the partici作者: 十字架 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 07:35
Wien, der urbane Brennpunkt Mitteleuropas,y central for the purposes of this book is that the developments resulted also in a concept and measure of the degree of the correlation of preferences — a notion found to be central for the analysis of cooperation. The preferences in question can be either “given” preferences (preferences.) or they作者: LEERY 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 11:13 作者: 方便 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 16:48 作者: CLEFT 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 19:05
Stadtgestalt und Stadtentwicklung Wien 2005,ence to long-term situations. First the possibilities offered by recent game-theoretical results concerning cooperative solutions in the case of rational agents will be considered and evaluated (Section I). Different types of solutions, such as a) “external” versus “internal” and b) “education-based作者: 無瑕疵 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 23:10 作者: Urea508 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 02:21 作者: 合唱隊(duì) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 06:30
978-90-481-5411-1Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2000作者: 得罪人 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 11:25 作者: engrossed 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 17:20 作者: 空氣 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 20:53 作者: 索賠 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 02:08 作者: Bone-Scan 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 05:04 作者: 沒有準(zhǔn)備 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 09:11
Introducing Social Action and Cooperation,vely, selfishly, or even aggressively. These latter kinds of behavior are all in their different ways opposite to cooperation, and people seem also to be disposed to such behaviors. It is surely of interest to investigate deeper the nature of cooperation and especially the conditions and circumstanc作者: larder 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 15:08 作者: 友好關(guān)系 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 18:29
The Components of Social Control and Dependence,ished several years ago (Tuomela, 1984, 1985a). This theory of the components of social control or dependence is a generalization and technical refinement of the theory developed by Kelley and Thibaut (1978). In the next chapter we will see how to connect this account to the theory of cooperation de作者: 無彈性 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 20:15 作者: hauteur 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 04:05 作者: 闡釋 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 07:41
Wien, der urbane Brennpunkt Mitteleuropas,about the presence of a collective goal in cooperation to Chapter 4. The present chapter will be devoted to an analysis of intended collective and joint goals (including ends and purposes), and the rest of the book makes use of these central notions. Section I presents an introductory discussion whi作者: 吃掉 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 11:34 作者: CUB 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 15:36
Wien, der urbane Brennpunkt Mitteleuropas,ior while long-term rationality taking into account collective reasons can lead to full cooperation. There are also two appendices, one (Appendix 1) on joint equilibria and another one (Appendix 2) on the rationality of strategic intentions.作者: COLON 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 18:54
Stadtgestalt und Stadtentwicklung Wien 2005,ong rationality requirements on actors. This section also discusses the relationship between correlated evolutionary game theory and account of cooperation developed in this book. This chapter will mostly be concerned with i-cooperation.作者: 蜈蚣 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 21:27
Stadtgestalt und Stadtentwicklung Wien 2005,al disposition to cooperate amounts to in various cases. Instead of cooperating, human beings sometimes fight, compete, or just act selfishly without considering others’ welfare (think of collective action dilemmas).作者: 牌帶來 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 04:38
Rational Cooperation and Collective Reasons,ior while long-term rationality taking into account collective reasons can lead to full cooperation. There are also two appendices, one (Appendix 1) on joint equilibria and another one (Appendix 2) on the rationality of strategic intentions.作者: archetype 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 06:52 作者: Receive 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 11:45 作者: 冷漠 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 13:59 作者: 認(rèn)識(shí) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 21:16 作者: 高貴領(lǐng)導(dǎo) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 00:19 作者: ACRID 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 03:41
Cooperation and the Dilemma of Collective Action,ional agents who interact, usually, in view of their i-goals and i-preferences and i-goals. As other agents are present, there can be an element of strategic thinking-something like rational utilization of the interaction situation in question so as to satisfy one’s i-preferences.作者: 恭維 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 06:34 作者: 沒有希望 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 14:08 作者: 表示問 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 17:56
0921-8599 a collective and joint goals, mutual beliefs, collectivecommitments, acting together and acting collectively. The bookanalyzes the varieties of cooperation, making use of the crucialdistinction between .group-mode. and .individual-mode.cooperation. The former is based on collective goals and collec作者: 窗簾等 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 19:03 作者: bleach 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 00:52
Wien, der urbane Brennpunkt Mitteleuropas,ons such as the school, church, government, leadership, and authority are collectively created and maintained. The resulting collectivity and sociality features (ontically: ideas in people’s minds plus their collective activities) characterize the man-maintained parts of the social world.作者: 閑逛 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 05:28
Stadtgestalt und Stadtentwicklung Wien 2005,ional agents who interact, usually, in view of their i-goals and i-preferences and i-goals. As other agents are present, there can be an element of strategic thinking-something like rational utilization of the interaction situation in question so as to satisfy one’s i-preferences.作者: TAIN 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 10:42
Cooperation and Collective Goals,ndividual mode goals. It will be investigated particularly in Chapters 10–12 of the book (recall also the general remarks in Chapter 1). This chapter develops an account of full-blown cooperation (.., g-cooperation) in Sections I and II, and it also discusses other approaches to cooperation as well as some weaker forms of cooperation.作者: 擁護(hù) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 12:37 作者: 山頂可休息 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 15:41 作者: Perineum 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 20:10
Introducing Social Action and Cooperation,“kin-altruism” and “reciprocal altruism” can ground cooperative behavior in animals. Analogously, we think that people are disposed to behave cooperatively at least with respect to their kin and, perhaps by a kind of extension, friends and other close group members and, in the case of moral people, 作者: 邊緣 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 03:20
Collective and Joint Goals,e action itself can be regarded as a collective goal. I will argue in Chapter 3 that plan-based cooperative joint action involves acting towards an intended joint goal — that which the presupposed action-generating joint intention involves. Since plan-based cooperative joint action is not the only c作者: 植物群 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 07:52
Cooperative Joint Action,ct together in weaker and stronger senses. These will be clarified in the present section. In later sections I will discuss plan-based cooperative joint action, which is the fullest kind of cooperation there can be. There is also an appendix discussing Bratman’s account of shared cooperative activit作者: micronized 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 11:38 作者: packet 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 12:36 作者: 客觀 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 16:48 作者: 吞噬 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 20:42 作者: Irritate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 01:04 作者: Favorable 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 05:25
Cooperation and Preferences,y central for the purposes of this book is that the developments resulted also in a concept and measure of the degree of the correlation of preferences — a notion found to be central for the analysis of cooperation. The preferences in question can be either “given” preferences (preferences.) or they
