標(biāo)題: Titlebook: Control and Game-Theoretic Models of the Environment; Carlo Carraro,Jerzy A. Filar Conference proceedings 1995 Springer Science+Business M [打印本頁] 作者: 文化修養(yǎng) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 18:38
書目名稱Control and Game-Theoretic Models of the Environment影響因子(影響力)
書目名稱Control and Game-Theoretic Models of the Environment影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名
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書目名稱Control and Game-Theoretic Models of the Environment網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Control and Game-Theoretic Models of the Environment被引頻次
書目名稱Control and Game-Theoretic Models of the Environment被引頻次學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Control and Game-Theoretic Models of the Environment年度引用
書目名稱Control and Game-Theoretic Models of the Environment年度引用學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Control and Game-Theoretic Models of the Environment讀者反饋
書目名稱Control and Game-Theoretic Models of the Environment讀者反饋學(xué)科排名
作者: 名字 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 20:47
978-1-4612-6917-5Springer Science+Business Media New York 1995作者: CEDE 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 01:38
Control and Game-Theoretic Models of the Environment978-1-4612-0841-9Series ISSN 2474-0179 Series E-ISSN 2474-0187 作者: 步兵 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 08:14
Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Gameshttp://image.papertrans.cn/c/image/237324.jpg作者: 敵手 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 11:49
Ergebniszusammenfassung und Ausblick, of their own economic processes but have to achieve jointly a common environmental management goal. The paper is organized in two parts treating of modeling issues related to process dynamics and players interactions respectively. In the first part we discuss the control theoretic approach for repr作者: relieve 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 14:19
Rankings statt Stellenordnungen?s it is generally assumed that the assimilation function of nature is linear (Nordhaus, 1982). At the same time there is quite some uncertainty on the general form of this function outside a specific range of values. In this paper, we look at different (non-linear) specifications of the assimilation作者: relieve 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 20:41
Rankings statt Stellenordnungen?e consumption externalities through the action on the stock of the environmental good, which enters the utility function. It is shown that the noncooperative solution of the dynamic model is characterized, in the steady state, by suboptimally low levels of environment and consumption, and that such 作者: 圣歌 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 00:47 作者: 爆米花 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 03:10 作者: Accolade 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 06:45
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-17974-8s may react both by changing output and by adopting a new, environment-friendly technology Conditions under which the latter option is firms’ optimal choice are provided. The paper shows that firms’ innovation decisions are not simultaneous even when firms are identical (there exists diffusion). Mor作者: burnish 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 11:10
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-17974-8n. Environmental quality is modelled in two different ways: (i) as a given stock which is damaged by a flow of pollution; and (ii) as a renewable resource which is used as an input in production. After a brief discussion of pollution, taxation and the cost of public funds, attention is focused on re作者: 我怕被刺穿 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 16:20
Verdachtsarbeit im Kinderschutz of these products by choosing their output-emission ratios. Cleaner products are assumed to be more costly to develop than dirty products. Using an extension of the expanding variety product of Helpman and Grossman, we investigate and compare the effects of emission taxes and technological standard作者: Entropion 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 18:09 作者: Substitution 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 22:25
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-18261-8he firms have access to a technology which allows one to regulate the quality of capital instantaneously through a lump-sum maintenance expenditure which applies only when the state variable hits a predetermined minimum quality standard. In a partial equilibrium framework (single firm and a long-run作者: 預(yù)知 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 05:14 作者: AVERT 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 06:33
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-18341-7er 1992 the establishment of an intergovernmental U.N. Conference on Highly Migratory and Straddling Stocks, which was scheduled to hold its first full session in July 1993. The conference is to address a critical issue in the management of transboundary fishery resources, namely the management of f作者: 顛簸地移動(dòng) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 12:59
Algebra: K?rper- und Galois-Theorie government imposes a tax and uses the tax proceeds for pollution abatement operations. The feedback of pollution on capital accumulation and the effect of the level of pollution on the natural rate of decay are incorporated in the model. We solve for the (subgame perfect) feedback Nash equilibrium 作者: 大喘氣 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 17:52
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-18449-0imposes environmental levies on the polluters whose economic activity, otherwise beneficial for the region, results in pollution of the stream. The model for the problem of effluent management is formulated as a dynamic game between the . and the polluters. The game is “played” in discrete time. The作者: superfluous 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 21:04
Differential Game Models of Global Environmental Management of their own economic processes but have to achieve jointly a common environmental management goal. The paper is organized in two parts treating of modeling issues related to process dynamics and players interactions respectively. In the first part we discuss the control theoretic approach for repr作者: 領(lǐng)先 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 23:42 作者: 天真 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 04:04 作者: nephritis 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 08:15 作者: 琺瑯 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 14:55 作者: 規(guī)范要多 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 18:22 作者: 剝皮 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 21:40 作者: CYN 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 03:42
Environmental Pollution and Endogenous Growth of these products by choosing their output-emission ratios. Cleaner products are assumed to be more costly to develop than dirty products. Using an extension of the expanding variety product of Helpman and Grossman, we investigate and compare the effects of emission taxes and technological standard作者: 異端 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 07:56
Rate-of-Return Regulation, Emission Charges and Behavior of Monopolye to environmental policy by undertaking investment in pollution abatement equipment, along with investment in output production. In this context, over- or undercapitalization effects have a direct influence on the monopoly’s emissions. This paper analyzes two related issues. The first is the direct作者: Morphine 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 09:59 作者: Vulnerable 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 14:37
Pollution, Renewable Resources and Irreversibilitynconvexities in dynamic models. There may exist two locally optimal solutions: an optimal infinite horizon solution (sustainable) and an optimal finite horizon solution. In general, the choice between these optimality candidates must be made by comparing the present values of both policies. However,作者: Encumber 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 20:37 作者: 吸引力 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 23:10
Pollution-Induced Business Cycles: A Game Theoretical Analysis government imposes a tax and uses the tax proceeds for pollution abatement operations. The feedback of pollution on capital accumulation and the effect of the level of pollution on the natural rate of decay are incorporated in the model. We solve for the (subgame perfect) feedback Nash equilibrium 作者: 可忽略 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 01:19 作者: Cryptic 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 09:08
Sustainable International Agreements on Greenhouse Warming — A Game Theory Studynor, and in the other coalition we may have countries that suffer from the global warming. The greenhouse problem is modelled as an economic infinite-horizon differential game. The players negotiate an agreement among Pareto efficient programs. Since the costs of one player will be reduced in cooper作者: 詞匯 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 11:02
Taxation and Environmental Innovation (time of innovation, innovation subsidy) such to induce firms to behave optimally The proposed policy-mix (environmental tax and innovation subsidy) is shown to reduce emissions more, and to reduce output less, than environmental policies based on a single policy instrument.作者: llibretto 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 16:34
Christopher Dorn,Veronika Tackenor, and in the other coalition we may have countries that suffer from the global warming. The greenhouse problem is modelled as an economic infinite-horizon differential game. The players negotiate an agreement among Pareto efficient programs. Since the costs of one player will be reduced in cooper作者: ADAGE 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 20:20
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-17974-8 (time of innovation, innovation subsidy) such to induce firms to behave optimally The proposed policy-mix (environmental tax and innovation subsidy) is shown to reduce emissions more, and to reduce output less, than environmental policies based on a single policy instrument.作者: Missile 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 23:12
Conference proceedings 1995ature and economic agents and among economic agents themselves, as well-described in Vrieze‘s introductory chapter. Fur- thermore, all papers use this careful modelling framework to provide policy prescriptions to the public agencies authorized to regulate emission dy- namics. Several diverse proble作者: GLIDE 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 02:52
The ESS Maximum Principle as a Tool for Modeling and Managing Biological Systems作者: deface 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 08:07
Control and Game-Theoretic Models of the Environment作者: BILIO 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 11:49
2474-0179 s use this careful modelling framework to provide policy prescriptions to the public agencies authorized to regulate emission dy- namics. Several diverse proble978-1-4612-6917-5978-1-4612-0841-9Series ISSN 2474-0179 Series E-ISSN 2474-0187 作者: magnanimity 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 15:30 作者: Reservation 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 20:34
Polluter’s Capital Quality Standards and Subsidy-Tax Programs for Environmental Externalities: A Com competitive industry) the paper investigates the relationship between the optimal firm’s barrier policy comprising the capital’s minimum quality standard and the use of a subsidy/tax program for decreasing pollution emissions by those who generate externalities.作者: Compatriot 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 01:06
Pollution, Renewable Resources and Irreversibility the study shows that there are special cases where the choice can be made on a priori grounds. Including the pollution problem in the renewable resource model changes the ordinary “optimal extinction” results.作者: Ventricle 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 05:29 作者: 者變 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 09:30
Rankings statt Stellenordnungen?erative solution of the dynamic model is characterized, in the steady state, by suboptimally low levels of environment and consumption, and that such phenomenon increases with the rate of time preference in a nonlinear way which depends on the structure of the economy.作者: Accommodation 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 11:28 作者: 你正派 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 17:23 作者: Factual 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 19:49 作者: neuron 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 00:30
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-18261-8 competitive industry) the paper investigates the relationship between the optimal firm’s barrier policy comprising the capital’s minimum quality standard and the use of a subsidy/tax program for decreasing pollution emissions by those who generate externalities.作者: 委派 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 07:43 作者: Fraudulent 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 09:52
Rankings statt Stellenordnungen?ariations in the assimilation function can result in a dramatic change in the steady state values. Besides, neither multiple equilibria nor the absence of non-zero production steady states can be excluded. This will be shown with the use of simulations in a simple model of the Greenhouse Effect.
