標(biāo)題: Titlebook: Contract Theory: Discrete- and Continuous-Time Models; Jaeyoung Sung Textbook 2023 The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under [打印本頁] 作者: Auditory-Nerve 時間: 2025-3-21 17:26
書目名稱Contract Theory: Discrete- and Continuous-Time Models影響因子(影響力)
書目名稱Contract Theory: Discrete- and Continuous-Time Models影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Contract Theory: Discrete- and Continuous-Time Models網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度
書目名稱Contract Theory: Discrete- and Continuous-Time Models網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Contract Theory: Discrete- and Continuous-Time Models被引頻次
書目名稱Contract Theory: Discrete- and Continuous-Time Models被引頻次學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Contract Theory: Discrete- and Continuous-Time Models年度引用
書目名稱Contract Theory: Discrete- and Continuous-Time Models年度引用學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Contract Theory: Discrete- and Continuous-Time Models讀者反饋
書目名稱Contract Theory: Discrete- and Continuous-Time Models讀者反饋學(xué)科排名
作者: 優(yōu)雅 時間: 2025-3-22 00:14
Information Asymmetry: Hidden Informationlow) risk firms can appear to overreact (underreact) to hidden news about the quality of project opportunities because they optimally invest more (less) aggressively to good news and more (less) conservatively to bad news than they would do were the news and their project decisions to be public.作者: archenemy 時間: 2025-3-22 03:10 作者: Foreknowledge 時間: 2025-3-22 08:12
Markus Rabe,Sven Spiekermann,Sigrid Wenzelamming method to obtain closed-form solutions to the two interesting cases: namely, a stationary case, and a linear-quadratic case. The former and the latter cases help characterize, respectively, static and dynamic aspects of optimal contracts.作者: 朦朧 時間: 2025-3-22 12:27
Techniken der Verifikation und Validierung, outcome risk, but also the (unconditional) drift risk. However, if the principal is risk neutral, she?takes all alone the drift risk, and the sensitivity of the contract remains unchanged from that of the Holmstr?m–Milgrom case. The second case confirms the same conclusion for the risk-neutral principal.作者: Accommodation 時間: 2025-3-22 16:32
Markus Rabe,Sven Spiekermann,Sigrid Wenzel career concerns than old people do, then their aggregate incentives are the same across all people, and as a result, current contracts for young people provide lower-powered explicit incentives than those for old people do.作者: Accommodation 時間: 2025-3-22 17:50 作者: Embolic-Stroke 時間: 2025-3-23 00:34 作者: 手術(shù)刀 時間: 2025-3-23 05:05
Contracting Under Incomplete Information outcome risk, but also the (unconditional) drift risk. However, if the principal is risk neutral, she?takes all alone the drift risk, and the sensitivity of the contract remains unchanged from that of the Holmstr?m–Milgrom case. The second case confirms the same conclusion for the risk-neutral principal.作者: 牙齒 時間: 2025-3-23 06:05 作者: 詞匯 時間: 2025-3-23 09:45
Contracting Under Ambiguity in?Continuous Timeo share the volatility uncertainty of the outcome. We show that under the optimal contract, the agree-to-disagree issue disappears, as subjective perceptions of the two contracting individuals are symmetrized. We present a closed-form solution to a linear-quadratic case with comparative statics.作者: 發(fā)牢騷 時間: 2025-3-23 14:23
Contracting Under Ambiguity: Introduction between expost realized and exante perceived distributions, and the submartingale property of the realized value function. Then, we illustrate some of those issues by using a simplified discrete-time model.作者: hypnogram 時間: 2025-3-23 18:29 作者: indicate 時間: 2025-3-24 02:01
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-37582-1low) risk firms can appear to overreact (underreact) to hidden news about the quality of project opportunities because they optimally invest more (less) aggressively to good news and more (less) conservatively to bad news than they would do were the news and their project decisions to be public.作者: granite 時間: 2025-3-24 03:26
ooks on discrete- and continuous-time contracting models.Wri.This book provides a self-contained introduction to discrete-time and continuous-time models in contracting theory to advanced undergraduate and graduate students in economics and finance and researchers focusing on closed-form solutions a作者: Metastasis 時間: 2025-3-24 09:50
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-36045-2 between expost realized and exante perceived distributions, and the submartingale property of the realized value function. Then, we illustrate some of those issues by using a simplified discrete-time model.作者: Spinous-Process 時間: 2025-3-24 14:13
Textbook 2023ntracting models..This book is written in a manner that makes complex mathematical concepts more accessible to economists. However, it would also be an invaluable tool for applied mathematicians who are looking to learn about possible economic applications of various control methods..作者: 有雜色 時間: 2025-3-24 16:53
Markus Rabe,Sven Spiekermann,Sigrid Wenzelprove the information content, but by helping reduce the compensation risk. We also discuss the concept of the relative performance evaluation (RPE)?and its role (sometimes its irrelevance) in the presence of financial markets.作者: MIRE 時間: 2025-3-24 21:24
Techniken der Verifikation und Validierung,erial performance metrics which are optimal to the top manager may not necessarily be optimal to the principal. Another numerical example shows that the profit-sharing features of middle managerial contracts can be desirable for a sufficiently large firm, but not for a sufficiently small firm.作者: Simulate 時間: 2025-3-25 01:11 作者: NAUT 時間: 2025-3-25 03:51
Hierarchical Contracting: A Mean-Volatility Control Problemerial performance metrics which are optimal to the top manager may not necessarily be optimal to the principal. Another numerical example shows that the profit-sharing features of middle managerial contracts can be desirable for a sufficiently large firm, but not for a sufficiently small firm.作者: 我還要背著他 時間: 2025-3-25 10:57
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-34397-4ement in various forms. We briefly review the history of modern contract theory and discuss basic issues in contracting decisions which eventually boil down to tradeoffs between risk/uncertainty sharing and incentives.作者: 無政府主義者 時間: 2025-3-25 14:34 作者: Incisor 時間: 2025-3-25 16:09 作者: 真實(shí)的你 時間: 2025-3-25 23:58
P. F. Cavagnaro,C. R. Galmarini moral hazard, the optimal contract decision is a tradeoff between the benefit of improving the agent’s work incentives and the cost of sacrificing the risk-sharing efficiency, and that the optimal performance metric for the optimal contract is a combination of the outcome and relevant signals which作者: GRIN 時間: 2025-3-26 04:12 作者: 墻壁 時間: 2025-3-26 04:52 作者: 機(jī)制 時間: 2025-3-26 12:06
Techniken der Verifikation und Validierung,e study effects of learning?on the optimal contract. In particular, we examine two cases: (1) a parameter is an unknown constant and (2) it is an unknown BM process with a linear drift. The first case extends the Holmstr?m–Milgrom model by allowing the information about the unknown parameter to be u作者: 公豬 時間: 2025-3-26 13:29 作者: Arthropathy 時間: 2025-3-26 19:55 作者: perimenopause 時間: 2025-3-26 22:55 作者: Acetaldehyde 時間: 2025-3-27 03:52 作者: 盡管 時間: 2025-3-27 07:22
Kinematics of Multibody Systems,es. Each contracting party with a maxmin utility chooses the distribution of the outcome from a family of probability measures which can be either singular or absolutely continuous with respect to each other. The outcome under ambiguity is described by two different processes: one is exante subjecti作者: 租約 時間: 2025-3-27 12:06
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-37582-1l contract is affected by not only the well-known outcome risk, but also a hidden information risk as well. As a result, the compensation-risk premium consists of two parts: the usual outcome-risk-sharing premium and a hidden-parameter-risk-sharing premium. Moreover, we argue that managers of high (作者: 善辯 時間: 2025-3-27 16:29 作者: murmur 時間: 2025-3-27 17:56
http://image.papertrans.cn/c/image/237112.jpg作者: 魯莽 時間: 2025-3-28 00:26
Incentive Problemsement in various forms. We briefly review the history of modern contract theory and discuss basic issues in contracting decisions which eventually boil down to tradeoffs between risk/uncertainty sharing and incentives.作者: 壓倒性勝利 時間: 2025-3-28 06:02 作者: 馬籠頭 時間: 2025-3-28 06:55 作者: labyrinth 時間: 2025-3-28 14:24
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-35282-2In this chapter, we study the weak formulation of the model with a general drift-controlled non-Markovian outcome process, and recover all results of Chap.?..作者: 強(qiáng)壯 時間: 2025-3-28 14:50
Markus Rabe,Sven Spiekermann,Sigrid WenzelWe briefly introduce an alternative contracting model with time-additive preferences. We study a case that can produce a closed-form solution, and then compare it with the time-multiplicative preference model.作者: Minatory 時間: 2025-3-28 20:06 作者: antidepressant 時間: 2025-3-29 00:16
Contracting in Continuous Time: Time-Additive PreferencesWe briefly introduce an alternative contracting model with time-additive preferences. We study a case that can produce a closed-form solution, and then compare it with the time-multiplicative preference model.作者: 奴才 時間: 2025-3-29 05:31
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-5487-2Discrete-time Contracting; Mathematical Structures of Contracting Problems; Adverse Selection and Mora作者: 騷動 時間: 2025-3-29 09:00 作者: 修飾 時間: 2025-3-29 12:41
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-34397-4ement in various forms. We briefly review the history of modern contract theory and discuss basic issues in contracting decisions which eventually boil down to tradeoffs between risk/uncertainty sharing and incentives.作者: 假裝是我 時間: 2025-3-29 16:23
Variétés différentielles et analytiques in the first-best contracting such as property right and optimal risk-sharing rule, and the participation constraint, and those of the second-best contracting such as nonverifiability of the agent’s actions and the incentive compatibility condition.作者: Loathe 時間: 2025-3-29 20:14
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-34397-4and second-best solutions are affected by risk aversion of the two parties, and by such constraints as participation, incentive compatibility, and limited liability. We also learn that the principal expectedly pays the risk-averse agent in the second best more than she does in the first best.作者: exophthalmos 時間: 2025-3-30 00:22
Incentive Problemsement in various forms. We briefly review the history of modern contract theory and discuss basic issues in contracting decisions which eventually boil down to tradeoffs between risk/uncertainty sharing and incentives.作者: deciduous 時間: 2025-3-30 04:54 作者: SKIFF 時間: 2025-3-30 09:38
Discrete-Time Formulation Iand second-best solutions are affected by risk aversion of the two parties, and by such constraints as participation, incentive compatibility, and limited liability. We also learn that the principal expectedly pays the risk-averse agent in the second best more than she does in the first best.作者: 帽子 時間: 2025-3-30 13:10
Discrete-Time Formulation II moral hazard, the optimal contract decision is a tradeoff between the benefit of improving the agent’s work incentives and the cost of sacrificing the risk-sharing efficiency, and that the optimal performance metric for the optimal contract is a combination of the outcome and relevant signals which作者: 可互換 時間: 2025-3-30 16:48 作者: 護(hù)身符 時間: 2025-3-31 00:38
