標題: Titlebook: Collective Decision Making; Views from Social Ch Adrian Van Deemen,Agnieszka Rusinowska Book 2010 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010 Al [打印本頁] 作者: 一再 時間: 2025-3-21 18:02
書目名稱Collective Decision Making影響因子(影響力)
書目名稱Collective Decision Making影響因子(影響力)學科排名
書目名稱Collective Decision Making網(wǎng)絡公開度
書目名稱Collective Decision Making網(wǎng)絡公開度學科排名
書目名稱Collective Decision Making被引頻次
書目名稱Collective Decision Making被引頻次學科排名
書目名稱Collective Decision Making年度引用
書目名稱Collective Decision Making年度引用學科排名
書目名稱Collective Decision Making讀者反饋
書目名稱Collective Decision Making讀者反饋學科排名
作者: opalescence 時間: 2025-3-22 00:15
The Impact of Forcing Preference Rankings When Indifference Exists,of the available candidates. Several complications can then arise during the implementation of many voting rules in the presence of such voter indifference. One possible option that can be used to avoid these types of complications is to require that all voters must arbitrarily break any such indiff作者: 激怒 時間: 2025-3-22 03:22
Connections and Implications of the Ostrogorski Paradox for Spatial Voting Models, losing side over a majority of the issues). By doing so, answers to longstanding concerns are obtained; e.g., Kelly conjectured that an Ostrogorski paradox ensures that no candidate can be a Condorcet winner; we prove this is true for any number of issues and establish a connection with McKelvey’s 作者: Infinitesimal 時間: 2025-3-22 07:48 作者: 材料等 時間: 2025-3-22 11:45
Extremal Restriction, Condorcet Sets, and Majority Decision Making,icult to interpret. By using a constructive method, we investigate which preference configurations are excluded by ER from the domain of majority decisions and which configurations are included. This exclusion-inclusion analysis results in an enumeration of all maximal lists of weak orderings over a作者: 是他笨 時間: 2025-3-22 14:12
Rights Revisited, and Limited, introduced the notion of limited rights both in an aggregation function framework and in a social choice function framework. He then proved Sen-type impossibility theorems. In the aggregation function framework an individual has a “right” if whenever she prefers an option (social state), say ., to 作者: 是他笨 時間: 2025-3-22 18:49
Some General Results on Responsibility for Outcomes,cision making process. First, we establish the conditions under which we can be sure that there is at least one member who can thus be held responsible. Formulated differently, we examine the conditions that ensure the absence of “responsibility voids”. Next we focus on the circumstances in which mo作者: 不出名 時間: 2025-3-22 23:41 作者: 有角 時間: 2025-3-23 02:17
Making (Non-standard) Choices,ealed preference. The choices that we discuss and describe axiomatically are, among others, the rational shortlist method which is a two-stage procedure, the choice of the second largest option as the best element, the choice of the median object and choices according to an attention ordering. The v作者: 協(xié)迫 時間: 2025-3-23 06:29 作者: 共同時代 時間: 2025-3-23 12:43
Voting Weights, Thresholds and Population Size: Member State Representation in the Council of the Eouncil of the EU. It shows trade-offs linked to the voting threshold and describes how EU member state representation has developed over time, given cumulative percentages of vote shares as compared to member state population size. This latter development is shown on the basis of Lorenz curves. EU e作者: Exaggerate 時間: 2025-3-23 14:08
Stabilizing Power Sharing,in sequence or simultaneously – and eliminate it with a specified probability. A player that eliminates its opponent without being eliminated itself captures the entire prize, but the prize is damaged over time when there is shooting. Simultaneous shooting, which is more damaging than sequential sho作者: Exonerate 時間: 2025-3-23 21:10
Different Approaches to Influence Based on Social Networks and Simple Games,e has an inclination to choose either the yes-action or the no-action. The agents are embedded in a social network which models influence between them. Due to the influence, a decision of an agent may differ from his preliminary inclination. Such a transformation between the agents’ inclinations and作者: debase 時間: 2025-3-23 23:35
Networks, Information and Choice,acteristics of nodes with their positioning within the network topology. Here, situational awareness is generally understood to mean “knowing what is going on”, implying the possession of knowledge and understanding to achieve a certain goal. Using this feedback model, we are able to identify the co作者: 植物茂盛 時間: 2025-3-24 02:56 作者: 凝視 時間: 2025-3-24 06:57 作者: 粘土 時間: 2025-3-24 10:45
0924-6126 ic. After being confronted with Arrow’s Theorem, Harrie became very interested in social choice theory. In 1986 he took the initiative to start up a group of Dutch scientists for the study of social choice theory. This initiative grew out to a research group and a series of colloquia, which were hel作者: voluble 時間: 2025-3-24 16:13
Tracy J. Vogler,D. Anthony Fredenburga solutions – are characterized by properties describing how the solution outcome changes if the status quo point changes. We show that these solutions are characterized by different subsets of one and the same set of properties. To these results, a brief survey of the ensuing literature is added.作者: 谷類 時間: 2025-3-24 22:28 作者: 漂白 時間: 2025-3-25 02:15 作者: 音樂等 時間: 2025-3-25 04:45 作者: 載貨清單 時間: 2025-3-25 07:54 作者: exhilaration 時間: 2025-3-25 12:34 作者: Accomplish 時間: 2025-3-25 17:53
Hemorrhagic and post-hemorrhagic shock,dictatorial subgroup. In this article we introduce an alternative completely self-contained proof based on the study of the structure of level surfaces of a social welfare function which provides a real-valued representation of the social welfare ordering.作者: Enteropathic 時間: 2025-3-25 20:08
H. Bjurstedt,J. C. G. Coleridgearious characterizations show that there is not much of an overlap among the different axiom systems. In other words, non-standard choices do not seem to have a uniform structure. This is due to the fact that the underlying norms can vary considerably.作者: Conspiracy 時間: 2025-3-26 01:30
R. F. Rushmer,R. L. van Citters,D. Franklinnlargement has caused blocking minorities in terms of member state numbers to increase, but latest developments – notably the Lisbon Treaty provisions – allow for a smaller share of EU population to block decisions.作者: Ceramic 時間: 2025-3-26 05:38 作者: 膝蓋 時間: 2025-3-26 11:24 作者: Commonplace 時間: 2025-3-26 16:04 作者: Malfunction 時間: 2025-3-26 17:40 作者: Melanocytes 時間: 2025-3-26 22:30 作者: CRUDE 時間: 2025-3-27 02:33
Some General Results on Responsibility for Outcomes,fairs if, and only if, he made a causal contribution to that realization. Finally, it is shown that the only games in which responsibility always coincides with causal efficacy and in which a person is always either fully responsible or not responsible at all, are dictatorial ones.作者: Yag-Capsulotomy 時間: 2025-3-27 07:51
Stabilizing Power Sharing, with the doctrine of “l(fā)aunch on warning” during the Cold War, and it was strengthened by the development of second-strike capability. Deterring terrorism has proved a different matter, because terrorists are difficult to detect and present few targets that can be damaged.作者: 與野獸博斗者 時間: 2025-3-27 11:01 作者: Deadpan 時間: 2025-3-27 17:37
Maximal Domains for Maskin Monotone Pareto Optimal and Anonymous Choice Rules,re relatively demanding: the restricted domain is such that there is an alternative . that is ordered either best or second best. This domain now only allows for the imputation rule with status quo ..作者: Glaci冰 時間: 2025-3-27 18:48
Extremal Restriction, Condorcet Sets, and Majority Decision Making, triple of alternatives satisfying ER. In addition we provide an interpretation of the condition in terms of conflicting preferences. Finally we investigate systematically all sets of preferences on a triple set leading to a Condorcet paradox.作者: PARA 時間: 2025-3-28 00:30 作者: 意外 時間: 2025-3-28 05:23
Making (Non-standard) Choices,arious characterizations show that there is not much of an overlap among the different axiom systems. In other words, non-standard choices do not seem to have a uniform structure. This is due to the fact that the underlying norms can vary considerably.作者: Insensate 時間: 2025-3-28 09:17
Voting Weights, Thresholds and Population Size: Member State Representation in the Council of the Enlargement has caused blocking minorities in terms of member state numbers to increase, but latest developments – notably the Lisbon Treaty provisions – allow for a smaller share of EU population to block decisions.作者: 我就不公正 時間: 2025-3-28 12:02 作者: Inflated 時間: 2025-3-28 14:52 作者: peritonitis 時間: 2025-3-28 21:50 作者: 男生戴手銬 時間: 2025-3-28 23:01
Connections and Implications of the Ostrogorski Paradox for Spatial Voting Models,re. We firmly establish the long-suspected connection between the Ostrogorski paradox and the lack of a Condorcet winner in paired comparison voting. While providing new supermajority conclusions for the Ostrogorski paradox, we introduce a new class of paradoxes based on when a party can propose issues.作者: 放逐某人 時間: 2025-3-29 05:17 作者: 謙虛的人 時間: 2025-3-29 10:13
Rights Revisited, and Limited,chosen from any set to which . belongs. Salles’s weakening amounts to say that if it happens that . be chosen, then . must be chosen too. In the present paper, we will describe from an intuitive point of view the technical results obtained by Salles in the light of the distinction between possibilit作者: crucial 時間: 2025-3-29 14:51 作者: 錫箔紙 時間: 2025-3-29 15:44
Different Approaches to Influence Based on Social Networks and Simple Games,s. We also define influence indices and determine the relations between these indices and some well-known power indices. Furthermore, we enlarge the set of possible yes/no actions to multi-choice games and investigate the analogous tools related to influence in the multi-choice model.作者: SOB 時間: 2025-3-29 22:29
Book 2010ocial Choice Theory Group started up by Harrie consisted, and still c- sists, of scholars from several disciplines; mostly economics, mathematics, and (mathematical) psychology. It was set up for the study of and discussion about anything that had to do with social choice theory including, and not i作者: POLYP 時間: 2025-3-30 01:33 作者: 糾纏 時間: 2025-3-30 07:19
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-22403-8chosen from any set to which . belongs. Salles’s weakening amounts to say that if it happens that . be chosen, then . must be chosen too. In the present paper, we will describe from an intuitive point of view the technical results obtained by Salles in the light of the distinction between possibilit作者: 捕鯨魚叉 時間: 2025-3-30 12:02 作者: 粘土 時間: 2025-3-30 13:40
Additively Manufactured Cellular Materialss. We also define influence indices and determine the relations between these indices and some well-known power indices. Furthermore, we enlarge the set of possible yes/no actions to multi-choice games and investigate the analogous tools related to influence in the multi-choice model.作者: 密碼 時間: 2025-3-30 18:21
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02865-6Alternative; Coalition Formation; Electoral Systems; Social Choice; Social Choice Theory; Voting Systems; 作者: 樹上結蜜糖 時間: 2025-3-30 23:23 作者: surmount 時間: 2025-3-31 04:27 作者: Osteoporosis 時間: 2025-3-31 07:10 作者: 挑剔小責 時間: 2025-3-31 12:20
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-29767-4of the available candidates. Several complications can then arise during the implementation of many voting rules in the presence of such voter indifference. One possible option that can be used to avoid these types of complications is to require that all voters must arbitrarily break any such indiff
