標題: Titlebook: Bounded Rational Behavior in Experimental Games and Markets; Proceedings of the F Reinhard Tietz,Wulf Albers,Reinhard Selten Conference pro [打印本頁] 作者: gingerly 時間: 2025-3-21 18:36
書目名稱Bounded Rational Behavior in Experimental Games and Markets影響因子(影響力)
書目名稱Bounded Rational Behavior in Experimental Games and Markets影響因子(影響力)學科排名
書目名稱Bounded Rational Behavior in Experimental Games and Markets網(wǎng)絡公開度
書目名稱Bounded Rational Behavior in Experimental Games and Markets網(wǎng)絡公開度學科排名
書目名稱Bounded Rational Behavior in Experimental Games and Markets被引頻次
書目名稱Bounded Rational Behavior in Experimental Games and Markets被引頻次學科排名
書目名稱Bounded Rational Behavior in Experimental Games and Markets年度引用
書目名稱Bounded Rational Behavior in Experimental Games and Markets年度引用學科排名
書目名稱Bounded Rational Behavior in Experimental Games and Markets讀者反饋
書目名稱Bounded Rational Behavior in Experimental Games and Markets讀者反饋學科排名
作者: 異端 時間: 2025-3-21 21:51
0075-8442 Overview: 978-3-540-50036-0978-3-642-48356-1Series ISSN 0075-8442 Series E-ISSN 2196-9957 作者: 協(xié)迫 時間: 2025-3-22 01:09
Economic Impact of Lumpy Skin Disease,(1) Is there a learning process towards better predictions? (2) Can the last predictions be explained by a weak form of the Rational Expectations Hypothesis? (3) Can we observe short-term adaptations of the prediction rule and, if so, how do they work? (4) Are there better descriptions of prediction behaviour than Rational Expectations?作者: 助記 時間: 2025-3-22 07:04 作者: 不規(guī)則 時間: 2025-3-22 09:43 作者: Bumptious 時間: 2025-3-22 14:10 作者: 創(chuàng)作 時間: 2025-3-22 18:07
Crater-Hopping: Observing the Moon on Day 4,s of the famous Hall theory of optimal consumption under income uncertainty, and, in particular, to test the proposition (revealed to us in a preliminary pilot study) that behaviour is not optimal in an absolute sense, but that its comparative static implications agree with those of optimality theor作者: 職業(yè) 時間: 2025-3-22 23:55
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-53421-8ut the paper a simple investment task is referred to, which can be interpreted as a multistage betting game. This task is described in section 1, and also a specific operationalization (breeding lizards task). In Section 2 a first coarse analysis of the the general process of dealing with a multista作者: Sarcoma 時間: 2025-3-23 04:46
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-53421-8ferent known outcomes if they mutually cooperate or mutually noncooperate. This context thus addresses dilemmas in general rather than the unlikely but more often studied symmetric dilemma. Observations from a series of studies indicate that, in dilemmas that provide one party with leverage and the 作者: Customary 時間: 2025-3-23 08:06
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-53421-8rent degrees of conflict severity. The variables were recorded with a computer assisted questionnaire and during the initial period of a sequence of games. Results from 106 subjects showed that their social ’motives’ remained essentially stable across the different games. Expectancies and choices we作者: chisel 時間: 2025-3-23 11:09
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-53421-8res for himself. Then player 2 can either accept or reject this proposal which shows that player 2 faces an ultimatum. If 2 accepts player l’s proposal, player 1 gets what he demanded and player 2 the residual amount. In case of rejection by player 2 we follow the experimental procedure of Binmore, 作者: 枯萎將要 時間: 2025-3-23 17:21
Candidate Lunar Intrusive Domese players had the possibility to revise their strategies for a new round. The final strategies formed a special kind of equilibrium which can be interpreted as bounded rational equilibrium. An attempt is made to identify bounded rational behavior with subsets of the set of all strategies. A parametr作者: 現(xiàn)任者 時間: 2025-3-23 22:03
Candidate Lunar Intrusive Domesst demand or the conflict threat; on the agreement. A computer simulation shows that the dynamic aspiration balance theory has some semi-normative properties such as the convexity of the payoff profile over the aggressivity of the first demand. This profile is shifted and modified by aggressive thre作者: 怎樣才咆哮 時間: 2025-3-24 01:45 作者: Resection 時間: 2025-3-24 06:21
Radiation Shielding of Lunar Spacecraft, a theory of affiliated auctions (MILGROM/ WEBER, 1982), which predicts expected revenue to be increased by seller’s announcement of public information correlated with the item’s unknown common value..Within-subject ceteris paribus comparisons are obtained by a dual market technique. These within-su作者: 是限制 時間: 2025-3-24 06:45 作者: Foreknowledge 時間: 2025-3-24 12:42
Astrophysics and Space Science Library or three periods of no inflation. Two experiments involved no inflation for twelve periods and then inflation at a constant rate for three periods. In all but three markets, participants were asked to guess the mean price of the upcoming market period before they had any information about the param作者: 有權威 時間: 2025-3-24 18:51 作者: 睨視 時間: 2025-3-24 21:53
978-3-540-50036-0Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1988作者: 精美食品 時間: 2025-3-25 02:02
Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systemshttp://image.papertrans.cn/b/image/190068.jpg作者: 繁忙 時間: 2025-3-25 04:33 作者: Inelasticity 時間: 2025-3-25 10:18
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-53421-8ubsequent games. One main result is that contrary to Binmore et al. the game theoretic solution has nearly no predictive power. Whereas in one round-games the major consideration is to protect an unfair agreement by sufficiently high cost for choosing conflict, limited rationality will require to an作者: pulmonary 時間: 2025-3-25 15:06 作者: Canopy 時間: 2025-3-25 19:10
Ultimatum Bargaining for a Shrinking Cake — An Experimental Analysis —ubsequent games. One main result is that contrary to Binmore et al. the game theoretic solution has nearly no predictive power. Whereas in one round-games the major consideration is to protect an unfair agreement by sufficiently high cost for choosing conflict, limited rationality will require to an作者: 戲服 時間: 2025-3-25 20:41 作者: 捐助 時間: 2025-3-26 01:00
Experimental Economics: A Psychological Perspective作者: 不公開 時間: 2025-3-26 06:50
Bounded Rational Behavior in Experimental Games and MarketsProceedings of the F作者: 悲痛 時間: 2025-3-26 09:59
Experimental Economics: Ways to Model Bounded Rational Bargaining Behaviorvior. Testing hypotheses and constructing theories are the two main tasks of this discipline..A paradigm intensively investigated in experimental economics is the bilateral bargaining situation. Similar to other paradigmata, as the oligopoly or the coalition problem, it was the seeming indeterminate作者: Limousine 時間: 2025-3-26 14:06 作者: inquisitive 時間: 2025-3-26 19:43
Learning to Make Good Predictions in Time Series(1) Is there a learning process towards better predictions? (2) Can the last predictions be explained by a weak form of the Rational Expectations Hypothesis? (3) Can we observe short-term adaptations of the prediction rule and, if so, how do they work? (4) Are there better descriptions of prediction作者: 貿(mào)易 時間: 2025-3-26 21:02
A Preliminary Analysis of a Large-Scale Experimental Investigation into Consumption under Uncertaints of the famous Hall theory of optimal consumption under income uncertainty, and, in particular, to test the proposition (revealed to us in a preliminary pilot study) that behaviour is not optimal in an absolute sense, but that its comparative static implications agree with those of optimality theor作者: DEFER 時間: 2025-3-27 04:43
Mental Representation in Multistage Decision Makingut the paper a simple investment task is referred to, which can be interpreted as a multistage betting game. This task is described in section 1, and also a specific operationalization (breeding lizards task). In Section 2 a first coarse analysis of the the general process of dealing with a multista作者: investigate 時間: 2025-3-27 09:01
Stability and Outcome Tradeoffs in Asymmetric Dilemmas: Conditions Promoting the Discovery of Alternferent known outcomes if they mutually cooperate or mutually noncooperate. This context thus addresses dilemmas in general rather than the unlikely but more often studied symmetric dilemma. Observations from a series of studies indicate that, in dilemmas that provide one party with leverage and the 作者: ventilate 時間: 2025-3-27 13:00
The Influence of Social Orientation and Generalized Expectancies on Decision Making in Iterated Experent degrees of conflict severity. The variables were recorded with a computer assisted questionnaire and during the initial period of a sequence of games. Results from 106 subjects showed that their social ’motives’ remained essentially stable across the different games. Expectancies and choices we作者: PANEL 時間: 2025-3-27 16:14 作者: stroke 時間: 2025-3-27 19:28 作者: eucalyptus 時間: 2025-3-27 23:27 作者: Irritate 時間: 2025-3-28 02:59 作者: 駭人 時間: 2025-3-28 07:37 作者: troponins 時間: 2025-3-28 11:42 作者: 人工制品 時間: 2025-3-28 17:22 作者: 恫嚇 時間: 2025-3-28 19:34
Crater-Hopping: Observing the Moon on Day 4,ary pilot study) that behaviour is not optimal in an absolute sense, but that its comparative static implications agree with those of optimality theory. In total, 128 subjects performed the experiment: 8 for each of 16 parameter sets. Preliminary analysis lends support to our proposition.作者: intrigue 時間: 2025-3-28 22:54 作者: –scent 時間: 2025-3-29 04:27 作者: 令人悲傷 時間: 2025-3-29 07:37 作者: osteopath 時間: 2025-3-29 12:35 作者: LAST 時間: 2025-3-29 17:08
Mental Representation in Multistage Decision Makingwhich is related to the concept of locus of control of reinforcement. In section 5 the function of the mental representation in the definition of goals is discussed. Sections 4 and 5 contain some experimental results.作者: 出來 時間: 2025-3-29 19:44 作者: 我不重要 時間: 2025-3-30 02:22
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92411-3ries of experimental studies the multiattribute utility maximation model was tested and the degree of context influences was examined. A comparison of different individualistic strategies for decision making will be discussed.作者: PLE 時間: 2025-3-30 06:28
Determination of Spectral Propertiesct to predict mediator strategy. In Experiment 1, the model was supported; in Experiment 2, derivative hypotheses were tested about the effects of mediator strategy on bargainer concessions. These hypotheses, which also were supported, suggest that mediator strategies are critical strategic factors in bargaining.作者: 弄臟 時間: 2025-3-30 08:47 作者: Lament 時間: 2025-3-30 16:04
Astrophysics and Space Science Libraryties are compared. Rational expectations models are tested and the structure of forecasts are studied. In general the rational expectations models capture much of what is observed but paradoxes exist in the data and in the application of the models.作者: Initiative 時間: 2025-3-30 18:32
Experimental Economics: Ways to Model Bounded Rational Bargaining Behavior resolution were isolated and new descriptive theories were developed by the explorative method. Some theses regarding what should be taken into consideration in modeling bounded rational behavior are given.作者: 慢慢啃 時間: 2025-3-30 23:18 作者: 異端 時間: 2025-3-31 01:56
Modeling Mediator Behavior in Experimental Gamesct to predict mediator strategy. In Experiment 1, the model was supported; in Experiment 2, derivative hypotheses were tested about the effects of mediator strategy on bargainer concessions. These hypotheses, which also were supported, suggest that mediator strategies are critical strategic factors in bargaining.作者: Adrenal-Glands 時間: 2025-3-31 08:46
Learning in Common Value Auctionst repeat itself. Data from a series of common value auction market experiments indicates that the second of these two learning processes characterizes behavior in these markets as bidders adjust to the “winner’s curse”.作者: oxidant 時間: 2025-3-31 12:50
