派博傳思國際中心

標題: Titlebook: Bargaining in Economic and Ethical Environments; An Experimental Stud Marlies Klemisch-Ahlert Book 1996 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1 [打印本頁]

作者: 吸收    時間: 2025-3-21 17:31
書目名稱Bargaining in Economic and Ethical Environments影響因子(影響力)




書目名稱Bargaining in Economic and Ethical Environments影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Bargaining in Economic and Ethical Environments網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度




書目名稱Bargaining in Economic and Ethical Environments網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Bargaining in Economic and Ethical Environments被引頻次




書目名稱Bargaining in Economic and Ethical Environments被引頻次學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Bargaining in Economic and Ethical Environments年度引用




書目名稱Bargaining in Economic and Ethical Environments年度引用學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Bargaining in Economic and Ethical Environments讀者反饋




書目名稱Bargaining in Economic and Ethical Environments讀者反饋學(xué)科排名





作者: ROOF    時間: 2025-3-21 20:22
An Axiomatic Characterization of the Normalized Utilitarian Bargaining Solutionual payoffs for the single players. The property of the utilitarian solution not to respect distributive consequences is also a property of the bargaining solution that is the normalized version of the utilitarian solution. This non-attractive feature of the considered solution is the background for
作者: 花費    時間: 2025-3-22 01:36
Bargaining When Redistribution is Possibleof the game. Nevertheless, there are groups of players, knowing each other, who apply this strategy. Within the given game, they agree to a payoff allocation that maximizes the sums of the payoffs, though the payoffs for the players are very different. They find it fair to distribute this sum equall
作者: 絕食    時間: 2025-3-22 04:37

作者: resilience    時間: 2025-3-22 09:02

作者: itinerary    時間: 2025-3-22 16:02

作者: Genistein    時間: 2025-3-22 17:43

作者: jabber    時間: 2025-3-22 22:39
Medication Compliance in COPD Patients,g is a suitable definition of a status quo that is acceptable from the moral point of view.” Ethical considerations and aspects of fairness and justice play a role in negotiations. How can they be modelled? Redefining the status quo may bring ethical norms into the model. However, it does not enlarge the informational content of the theory.
作者: scotoma    時間: 2025-3-23 02:23

作者: nurture    時間: 2025-3-23 09:27
0075-8442 es and norms the subjects apply and their justifications for these principles are evaluated. The bargaining processes and the resulting agreements are analyzed. In the second part different bargaining theories are presented and the corresponding solutions are axiomatically characterized. A bargainin
作者: 漂亮    時間: 2025-3-23 11:58

作者: 硬化    時間: 2025-3-23 17:13
Norms in Economic and Ethical Environments the bargaining behavior in some of the games we can conclude that envy plays a role. The effect of envy is due to a certain power of the equal payoff principle. In some experiments this principle was not dominated by a collective efficiency principle defined by the strong Pareto efficiency in payoffs.
作者: ingrate    時間: 2025-3-23 19:44
Cultural Capital in Health Promotion, element in .,and if there exists an alternative . with an image . in . such that every person strictly prefers . to x., i.e. s > d. For every bargaining situation a bargaining solution . selects a point . (.,.) in .
作者: Camouflage    時間: 2025-3-24 00:31
Introduction and Organising Ideas,stributive mechanisms on a space of economic environments. We give a short overview on Roemer’s results and we concentrate our description on the comparison between classical bargaining theory and bargaining theory on economic environments. Notations, definitions and theorems of this chapter are modified versions of those Roemer (1988) proposes.
作者: 歡樂東方    時間: 2025-3-24 04:46

作者: generic    時間: 2025-3-24 07:15
Roemer’s Bargaining Theory on Economic Environmentsstributive mechanisms on a space of economic environments. We give a short overview on Roemer’s results and we concentrate our description on the comparison between classical bargaining theory and bargaining theory on economic environments. Notations, definitions and theorems of this chapter are modified versions of those Roemer (1988) proposes.
作者: 燈絲    時間: 2025-3-24 11:40

作者: entreat    時間: 2025-3-24 15:52
0075-8442 g concept with goals that depend on economic and ethical features of the bargaining situation is introduced. Observations from the experimental data lead to the ideas for the axiomatic characterization of a bargaining solution with goals.978-3-540-61048-9978-3-642-46827-8Series ISSN 0075-8442 Series E-ISSN 2196-9957
作者: 粗鄙的人    時間: 2025-3-24 19:36
Introductionn the class of normative solution concepts like the Nash solution, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution (1975) and others. Sen (1970) argues, that the status quo of a bargaining situation may be an inappropriate reference point to select a social alternative by bargaining, because of the possible injustic
作者: 豐滿中國    時間: 2025-3-25 01:22

作者: 牌帶來    時間: 2025-3-25 04:53

作者: fertilizer    時間: 2025-3-25 09:40

作者: 殘酷的地方    時間: 2025-3-25 15:18

作者: fibroblast    時間: 2025-3-25 18:09
An Axiomatic Characterization of the Normalized Utilitarian Bargaining Solutionon reflects the utilitarian idea to maximize sums of utilities of the two persons, but in this case without using the assumption of interpersonal comparability of utilities. This solution can therefore be interpreted as a normalized version of the utilitarian solution (c.f. Thomson, 1992). The theor
作者: GIDDY    時間: 2025-3-25 20:02

作者: BOGUS    時間: 2025-3-26 02:53

作者: Psa617    時間: 2025-3-26 05:19
Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systemshttp://image.papertrans.cn/b/image/180829.jpg
作者: Exaggerate    時間: 2025-3-26 11:07
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-46827-8Economic Theory; Experimentelle ?konomie; Mathematische ?konomie; Wirtschaftstheorie; economics; experime
作者: 無可非議    時間: 2025-3-26 14:04

作者: 中止    時間: 2025-3-26 17:33

作者: 擔憂    時間: 2025-3-26 21:34

作者: Living-Will    時間: 2025-3-27 04:44

作者: SPURN    時間: 2025-3-27 07:52
Bargaining in Economic and Ethical Environments978-3-642-46827-8Series ISSN 0075-8442 Series E-ISSN 2196-9957
作者: 巧思    時間: 2025-3-27 11:45
A Healthcare Provider Response to MSHToose the basic situations 1 through 9 and the situations 1 * 2.5 through 9 * 2.5, where the payoff tables are multiplied by the factor 2.5. The procedure to estimate the variables is derived from the theory of bargaining solutions with goals of Part II.
作者: DALLY    時間: 2025-3-27 15:54

作者: intrigue    時間: 2025-3-27 19:26
Cultural Capital in Health Promotion,racterize a bargaining solution, the so-called Nash solution. In Nash’s model preferences of the persons over a set . of feasible alternatives are expressed by cardinal v. Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions. Among the alternatives in . there exists a certain alternative x., the alternative of dis
作者: 就職    時間: 2025-3-28 01:16

作者: photopsia    時間: 2025-3-28 05:12
Introduction and Organising Ideas,stead. Concerning the application of bargaining theory to problems of distributive justice he argues: “Bargaining theory admits information only with respect to utilities of the agents once the threat point has been determined, while distributive justice is concerned with issues of rights, needs, an
作者: 宇宙你    時間: 2025-3-28 08:38
,Shaping Health and Safety, 1800–2015,mulation of the goal emerges from the consideration of the economic features of the situation and the application of certain distributive rules which depend on the economic and ethical environment of the bargaining problem. In this chapter we present a two-person model for bargaining problems in whi
作者: kyphoplasty    時間: 2025-3-28 14:20

作者: 宣傳    時間: 2025-3-28 17:14
https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-59715-1s the players reject this principle and do not use it to formulate their aspirations. The reason for this is, that in the given sets of feasible payoff allocations this principle would lead to rather unequal payoffs for the players. Often the players express their regret for the fact, that they are
作者: Panther    時間: 2025-3-28 19:56
A Healthcare Provider Response to MSHToose the basic situations 1 through 9 and the situations 1 * 2.5 through 9 * 2.5, where the payoff tables are multiplied by the factor 2.5. The procedure to estimate the variables is derived from the theory of bargaining solutions with goals of Part II.
作者: 黃油沒有    時間: 2025-3-28 23:55

作者: kidney    時間: 2025-3-29 05:27
Wilhelm Patterson,Wolfgang Standkeint of departure is an understanding that material culture can be connected with a multitude of meanings and values, depending on who is reading it and when. Remains of human activities can be ascribed values if there are actors who want to include them as part of their networks and in a historical
作者: 密切關(guān)系    時間: 2025-3-29 07:51

作者: 圓錐    時間: 2025-3-29 13:07





歡迎光臨 派博傳思國際中心 (http://www.pjsxioz.cn/) Powered by Discuz! X3.5
金山区| 专栏| 长乐市| 班戈县| 西畴县| 通州市| 常德市| 金川县| 松桃| 婺源县| 新沂市| 渝北区| 华阴市| 开原市| 于田县| 祁门县| 拉萨市| 宁海县| 和林格尔县| 正定县| 吉安县| 凌云县| 涞水县| 永福县| 元氏县| 乌兰县| 通渭县| 宜黄县| 万全县| 德保县| 伊通| 郎溪县| 普安县| 都安| 常熟市| 普陀区| 阿拉善右旗| 湖口县| 田东县| 舞钢市| 桂东县|