標(biāo)題: Titlebook: Balanced Silverman Games on General Discrete Sets; Gerald A. Heuer,Ulrike Leopold-Wildburger Book 1991 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1 [打印本頁(yè)] 作者: children 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 18:14
書目名稱Balanced Silverman Games on General Discrete Sets影響因子(影響力)
書目名稱Balanced Silverman Games on General Discrete Sets影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Balanced Silverman Games on General Discrete Sets網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度
書目名稱Balanced Silverman Games on General Discrete Sets網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Balanced Silverman Games on General Discrete Sets被引頻次
書目名稱Balanced Silverman Games on General Discrete Sets被引頻次學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Balanced Silverman Games on General Discrete Sets年度引用
書目名稱Balanced Silverman Games on General Discrete Sets年度引用學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Balanced Silverman Games on General Discrete Sets讀者反饋
書目名稱Balanced Silverman Games on General Discrete Sets讀者反饋學(xué)科排名
作者: Hamper 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 22:40
0075-8442 mpletely determined by the diagonal of the matrix, and it is shown how the great majority of these appear to have unique optimal strategies. The work is accessible to all who are familiar with basic noncooperative game theory.978-3-540-54372-5978-3-642-95663-8Series ISSN 0075-8442 Series E-ISSN 2196-9957 作者: aggrieve 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 02:28 作者: GLOSS 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 05:22 作者: ACRID 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 10:01 作者: Eructation 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 14:57
Spezifische Sicherheitskonzepte,educe to 2 by 2 games of type A’, as implied by Theorem 10.2. They are numbers 7, 19, 31 and 48. The four having diagonals — x 0 y +, numbers 24, 28, 41 and 45, reduce to 3 by 3, as implied by Theorem 8.1.作者: micronutrients 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 20:30 作者: 嘴唇可修剪 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 21:37 作者: PRISE 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 02:24
Book 1991and the penalty v > 0. Players I and II independently choose numbers from S I and S II, respectively. The higher number wins 1, unless it is at least T times as large as the other, in which case it loses v. Equal numbers tie. Such a game might be used to model various bidding or spending situations 作者: 宿醉 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 06:54
5 , 5 ,educe to 2 by 2 games of type A’, as implied by Theorem 10.2. They are numbers 7, 19, 31 and 48. The four having diagonals — x 0 y +, numbers 24, 28, 41 and 45, reduce to 3 by 3, as implied by Theorem 8.1.作者: agitate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 11:02
Reduction of balanced games to odd order,reduction for all other diagonals; i.e. those where each of 1, 0 and -1 occur on the diagonal and the middle element is 0. Those which reduce to an odd order game are treated in the present section and those reducing to even order in Section 9.作者: 騙子 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 17:49
Explicit solutions for certain classes,few cases where the diagonal is nearly constant one can still obtain relatively nice explicit formulas. We shall do so here for diagonals which are constant except for the middle element, or constant except for the last element.作者: Exuberance 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 18:08 作者: Entropion 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 22:56
2 , 2 ,games, in the sense that each player has a 2-component optimal mixed strategy. In this section we shall identify all irreducible 2 by 2 Silverman games, and in the next section are some theorems giving conditions under which games reduce to 2 by 2. “Game” hereafter will always mean “Silverman game.”作者: 阻礙 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 02:25 作者: cochlea 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 07:02 作者: Feature 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 11:42 作者: legitimate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 18:06 作者: hedonic 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 19:38
Reduction of balanced games to even order,uced game, corresponding to (A), (B), (C) and (D) in (8.0.4). In our description of these, the first nonzero main-diagonal element is again always -1, and off-diagonal zeros are concentrated in a middle segment of the first subdiagonal. The remainder of th€ matrix is the same in all cases, and may b作者: 顯微鏡 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 02:04
Explicit solutions for certain classes,the diagonal consists entirely of zeros in the symmetric case and entirely of ones in the disjoint case has the effect that the components in the optimal strategy vectors may be described by simple recursions. For nonconstant diagonals these relations among the components are less regular, but in a 作者: 放逐某人 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 05:50
Edward I. Altman Ph.D.,James La Fleurd the penalty ν > 0. Players I and II choose numbers independently from S. and S., respectively. The higher number wins 1, unless it is at least T times as large as the other, in which case it loses ν. If the numbers are equal the payoff is zero.作者: 紀(jì)念 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 11:01
,Kurzfassung und überblick für Eilige,games, in the sense that each player has a 2-component optimal mixed strategy. In this section we shall identify all irreducible 2 by 2 Silverman games, and in the next section are some theorems giving conditions under which games reduce to 2 by 2. “Game” hereafter will always mean “Silverman game.”作者: receptors 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 13:50 作者: inchoate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 19:06 作者: 非實(shí)體 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 20:42 作者: Antimicrobial 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 00:54 作者: 暫時(shí)中止 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 06:18
Spezifische Sicherheitskonzepte,uced game, corresponding to (A), (B), (C) and (D) in (8.0.4). In our description of these, the first nonzero main-diagonal element is again always -1, and off-diagonal zeros are concentrated in a middle segment of the first subdiagonal. The remainder of th€ matrix is the same in all cases, and may b作者: Blatant 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 11:41
https://doi.org/10.37307/b.978-3-503-21129-6the diagonal consists entirely of zeros in the symmetric case and entirely of ones in the disjoint case has the effect that the components in the optimal strategy vectors may be described by simple recursions. For nonconstant diagonals these relations among the components are less regular, but in a 作者: 違法事實(shí) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 14:53
Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systemshttp://image.papertrans.cn/b/image/180447.jpg作者: 合并 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 16:59
Introduction,d the penalty ν > 0. Players I and II choose numbers independently from S. and S., respectively. The higher number wins 1, unless it is at least T times as large as the other, in which case it loses ν. If the numbers are equal the payoff is zero.作者: notion 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 23:09
2 , 2 ,games, in the sense that each player has a 2-component optimal mixed strategy. In this section we shall identify all irreducible 2 by 2 Silverman games, and in the next section are some theorems giving conditions under which games reduce to 2 by 2. “Game” hereafter will always mean “Silverman game.”作者: 籠子 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 03:50
3 , 3 , W?. and W?. are already the essential sets. The nine diagonals and the solutions of the corresponding 3 by 3 games are given below. We abbreviate the diagonal elements -1 and +1 by - and +, respectively. P = (p., p.,p.) is the optimal strategy for Player I, Q = (q.,q.,q.) that for Player II. V is the game value.作者: DOSE 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 06:46
Reduction of balanced games to even order,uced game, corresponding to (A), (B), (C) and (D) in (8.0.4). In our description of these, the first nonzero main-diagonal element is again always -1, and off-diagonal zeros are concentrated in a middle segment of the first subdiagonal. The remainder of th€ matrix is the same in all cases, and may be described by the diagram in Figure 9.作者: genuine 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 09:29 作者: HAVOC 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 15:39 作者: Blood-Vessels 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 18:33 作者: 樹上結(jié)蜜糖 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 00:08
Karl Jousten,Uwe Friedrichsen,Erik LippeltWe conclude with brief remarks about the evidence that the reduced games obtained in Sections 8 and 9 are not further reducible. (Those in Sections 10 and 11 clearly are not.)作者: obstinate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 05:31
Games with saddle points,The theorems in [7] dealing with classes 1A, 2A and 2B do not depend on the strategy sets being disjoint, and include all Silverman games where at least one player has an optimal pure strategy, except the symmetric 1 by 1 case:作者: Angioplasty 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 10:12 作者: 戰(zhàn)役 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 11:08
2 , 2 , , = 1,We show now how all of the reduced games in Sections 8 and 9 reduce further, if . = 1, to 2 by 2 games with matrix ..作者: 大火 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 17:51
Concluding remarks on irreducibility,We conclude with brief remarks about the evidence that the reduced games obtained in Sections 8 and 9 are not further reducible. (Those in Sections 10 and 11 clearly are not.)作者: 內(nèi)向者 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 20:14
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-95663-8Bidding/Spending Models; Noncooperative Game Theory; Optimierungstheorie; Optimization Theory; Silverman作者: bourgeois 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 01:26
978-3-540-54372-5Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1991作者: 巨頭 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 04:36 作者: laparoscopy 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 07:50
Edward I. Altman Ph.D.,James La Fleurd the penalty ν > 0. Players I and II choose numbers independently from S. and S., respectively. The higher number wins 1, unless it is at least T times as large as the other, in which case it loses ν. If the numbers are equal the payoff is zero.作者: Munificent 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 11:53 作者: Instrumental 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 18:35
Reifegradmodell des Sicherheitsmanagements, W?. and W?. are already the essential sets. The nine diagonals and the solutions of the corresponding 3 by 3 games are given below. We abbreviate the diagonal elements -1 and +1 by - and +, respectively. P = (p., p.,p.) is the optimal strategy for Player I, Q = (q.,q.,q.) that for Player II. V is the game value.
