標(biāo)題: Titlebook: Algorithmic Game Theory; 17th International S Guido Sch?fer,Carmine Ventre Conference proceedings 2024 The Editor(s) (if applicable) and Th [打印本頁] 作者: 倒鉤 時間: 2025-3-21 16:56
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory影響因子(影響力)
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory被引頻次
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory被引頻次學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory年度引用
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory年度引用學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory讀者反饋
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory讀者反饋學(xué)科排名
作者: Mercantile 時間: 2025-3-21 23:31 作者: Aboveboard 時間: 2025-3-22 00:30
The Team Order Problem: Maximizing the?Probability of?Matching Being Large Enoughms. In the competitions which we study, each competitor in a team order plays a match with the corresponding opposing player. The team that wins more matches wins. We consider a problem where the input is the graph of probabilities that a team 1 player can win against the team 2 player, and the outp作者: 領(lǐng)帶 時間: 2025-3-22 08:20 作者: 卡死偷電 時間: 2025-3-22 09:50
Fair Division with?Interdependent Values In our setting, there is a set of goods that needs to be allocated to a set of agents (without disposal). Each agent is given a private signal, and his valuation function depends on the signals of all agents. Without the use of payments, there are strong impossibility results for designing strategy作者: 怕失去錢 時間: 2025-3-22 15:02 作者: 諂媚于性 時間: 2025-3-22 19:52 作者: 榮幸 時間: 2025-3-22 23:05
Agent-Constrained Truthful Facility Location Games to place a number of facilities at different locations chosen from the set of those reported by the agents. Given a feasible solution, each agent suffers an individual cost that is either its total distance to all facilities (sum-variant) or its distance to the farthest facility (max-variant). For 作者: BUOY 時間: 2025-3-23 03:29
The ,-Facility Location Problem via Optimal Transport: A Bayesian Study of?the?Percentile Mechanisms samples of a probability distributed on a line. Our primary contribution is characterising the asymptotic behavior of percentile mechanisms, which varies according to the distribution governing the agents’ types. To achieve this, we connect the .-FLP and projection problems in the Wasserstein space作者: Harass 時間: 2025-3-23 06:14 作者: GRATE 時間: 2025-3-23 13:37 作者: 高調(diào) 時間: 2025-3-23 16:58 作者: Conduit 時間: 2025-3-23 20:35 作者: Salivary-Gland 時間: 2025-3-24 00:54
Edge-Dominance Games on?Graphstes in our game can represent positional advantages in physical conflict such as high ground or camouflage, or product characteristics that lend an advantage over competing sellers in a duopoly. We study the equilibria of the game as a function of the topological and geometric properties of the unde作者: 著名 時間: 2025-3-24 05:59
Playing Repeated Games with?Sublinear Randomnessn that players can randomize arbitrarily is non-trivial, as true randomness might be scarce or costly and humans are known to have difficulty generating truly random sequences. In a repeated game, the assumption that players are unconstrained in their capability to randomize their strategies is part作者: murmur 時間: 2025-3-24 06:36
Lecture Notes in Computer Sciencehttp://image.papertrans.cn/b/image/167384.jpg作者: 含糊 時間: 2025-3-24 14:22
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-71033-9Algorithmic Game Theory; approximation theory; artificial intelligence; auctions and pricing; Computatio作者: exceed 時間: 2025-3-24 17:14
978-3-031-71032-2The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerl作者: acolyte 時間: 2025-3-24 22:01 作者: 孤獨無助 時間: 2025-3-25 01:07 作者: 非實體 時間: 2025-3-25 07:18 作者: GROWL 時間: 2025-3-25 07:46 作者: CRACY 時間: 2025-3-25 14:46 作者: META 時間: 2025-3-25 17:51
Quantification of Nucleic Acidsnded number of objects between two or more agents in order to attain fairness..The paper studies various notions of fairness, such as proportionality, envy-freeness, equitability, and consensus. We analyze the run-time complexity of finding a fair allocation with a given number of sharings under sev作者: Commentary 時間: 2025-3-25 21:44 作者: 瘙癢 時間: 2025-3-26 02:59 作者: 止痛藥 時間: 2025-3-26 06:08 作者: 舉止粗野的人 時間: 2025-3-26 09:40 作者: Leisureliness 時間: 2025-3-26 13:42
Yu Huang,Min Xiong,Hongqiang Huatorship (SD) mechanism the agents act in a particular order and pick their most preferred available item when it is their turn to act. Applying SD using a uniformly random permutation as agent ordering results in the well-known random serial dictatorship (RSD) mechanism. Accurate estimates of the (作者: 蘆筍 時間: 2025-3-26 18:37 作者: Callus 時間: 2025-3-27 00:20
Case history: Taint investigation,g with the classic work of Shapley and Shubik [.] on the assignment game, the cores of several natural games have been characterized using total unimodularity. The purpose of our paper is two-fold: .Our game has only one agent, whose strategy set is all possible ways of distributing her money among 作者: Condescending 時間: 2025-3-27 04:58
Putting sensory analysis into practice,tes in our game can represent positional advantages in physical conflict such as high ground or camouflage, or product characteristics that lend an advantage over competing sellers in a duopoly. We study the equilibria of the game as a function of the topological and geometric properties of the unde作者: 表示向下 時間: 2025-3-27 08:34
Case History: Mapping of Coffee Products,n that players can randomize arbitrarily is non-trivial, as true randomness might be scarce or costly and humans are known to have difficulty generating truly random sequences. In a repeated game, the assumption that players are unconstrained in their capability to randomize their strategies is part作者: 巡回 時間: 2025-3-27 09:42
Algorithmic Game Theory978-3-031-71033-9Series ISSN 0302-9743 Series E-ISSN 1611-3349 作者: 漂亮才會豪華 時間: 2025-3-27 15:13 作者: Lipohypertrophy 時間: 2025-3-27 19:26 作者: 不給啤 時間: 2025-3-28 01:18
Sweden: Neuroleptic Relapse Preventionimal percentile mechanism for a given agent’s distribution through a system of . equations. Finally, we estimate the optimality loss incurred when the optimal percentile mechanism is derived using an approximation of the agents’ distribution rather than the actual distribution.作者: single 時間: 2025-3-28 03:01
Sweden: Neuroleptic Relapse Prevention’s payment formula for general discrete single-parameter auction settings. Additionally, we prove that total unimodularity of the feasibility space is a sufficient condition to guarantee the optimality of auctions with integral allocation rules. Finally, in the full version of our paper, we demonstr作者: 盲信者 時間: 2025-3-28 10:13
Yu Huang,Min Xiong,Hongqiang Hu agent for an item is equal to the distance of the corresponding points. We show that a (relatively) small number of samples is enough to approximate the expected social welfare of RSD in the value setting and its expected social cost in the metric cost setting despite the #P-hardness of the corresp作者: BILE 時間: 2025-3-28 12:36 作者: 煩躁的女人 時間: 2025-3-28 16:26 作者: 標(biāo)準(zhǔn) 時間: 2025-3-28 19:24
Putting sensory analysis into practice,ia exist under the above assumptions. On the geometric side, we show that strongly connected outerplanar graphs with undirected girth at least . always support some of these types of on-path pure equilibria. Finally, we show that a data structure describing all pure equilibria can be efficiently com作者: 含糊其辭 時間: 2025-3-29 00:24
Case History: Mapping of Coffee Products,andomness, closing an open question posed by Budinich and Fortnow?[.]?(EC?’11) and Hubá?ek, Naor and Ullman?[.]?(SAGT?’15,?TCSys?’16). Moreover, we prove a 0–1 law for randomness in repeated games, showing that any repeated game either has .(1)-randomness . equilibria, or all of its . equilibria req作者: Neuralgia 時間: 2025-3-29 04:00
Fair Division with?Interdependent Valuesir equilibrium with respect to the true signals. We complement this result by showing that, even for very simple cases with binary additive interdependent valuation functions, no allocation mechanism that always admits an equilibrium, can guarantee that all equilibria are fair with respect to the tr作者: Cholagogue 時間: 2025-3-29 10:54 作者: indenture 時間: 2025-3-29 11:59 作者: Demonstrate 時間: 2025-3-29 19:26
Discrete Single-Parameter Optimal Auction Design’s payment formula for general discrete single-parameter auction settings. Additionally, we prove that total unimodularity of the feasibility space is a sufficient condition to guarantee the optimality of auctions with integral allocation rules. Finally, in the full version of our paper, we demonstr作者: 沉默 時間: 2025-3-29 20:33
Estimating the?Expected Social Welfare and?Cost of?Random Serial Dictatorship agent for an item is equal to the distance of the corresponding points. We show that a (relatively) small number of samples is enough to approximate the expected social welfare of RSD in the value setting and its expected social cost in the metric cost setting despite the #P-hardness of the corresp作者: 索賠 時間: 2025-3-30 01:38 作者: CRAFT 時間: 2025-3-30 08:00 作者: CANDY 時間: 2025-3-30 12:03 作者: 言行自由 時間: 2025-3-30 13:57
Playing Repeated Games with?Sublinear Randomnessandomness, closing an open question posed by Budinich and Fortnow?[.]?(EC?’11) and Hubá?ek, Naor and Ullman?[.]?(SAGT?’15,?TCSys?’16). Moreover, we prove a 0–1 law for randomness in repeated games, showing that any repeated game either has .(1)-randomness . equilibria, or all of its . equilibria req作者: Colonoscopy 時間: 2025-3-30 17:01
Conference proceedings 2024ized in topical sections as follows: matching; fair division and resource allocation; mechanism design; game theory and repeated games; pricing, revenue, and regulation; matroid theory in game theory; information sharing and decision making; computational complexity and resource allocation..作者: 機(jī)制 時間: 2025-3-31 00:11 作者: limber 時間: 2025-3-31 02:49
