標(biāo)題: Titlebook: Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications; Second International Peter Coles,Sanmay Das,Boleslaw Szymanski Conference proceedings 2 [打印本頁] 作者: microbe 時間: 2025-3-21 19:10
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書目名稱Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications讀者反饋學(xué)科排名
作者: 心胸開闊 時間: 2025-3-21 21:16
Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engihttp://image.papertrans.cn/b/image/164957.jpg作者: 彩色的蠟筆 時間: 2025-3-22 01:09
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-30913-7auctions; energy; market design; market mechanisms; prediction markets作者: aspect 時間: 2025-3-22 05:30 作者: 解凍 時間: 2025-3-22 10:43
Market User Interface Designomes. This can be a challenge in markets with a large number of choices, yet traditional economic models do not consider that humans have cognitive costs, bounded time for decision making, and bounded computational resources.作者: Resection 時間: 2025-3-22 13:46
Sharing in BitTorrent Can Be Rationalhe other. Over an infinite number of discrete periods they play a symmetric simultaneous game where they may either help the other a fixed distance up the mountain at some cost, or do nothing. Can these mountaineers climb their mountain?作者: 一加就噴出 時間: 2025-3-22 19:12 作者: regale 時間: 2025-3-22 22:02
Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications978-3-642-30913-7Series ISSN 1867-8211 Series E-ISSN 1867-822X 作者: CROAK 時間: 2025-3-23 03:20 作者: 群島 時間: 2025-3-23 06:22 作者: MAUVE 時間: 2025-3-23 10:10 作者: Bucket 時間: 2025-3-23 15:38 作者: excrete 時間: 2025-3-23 20:10
Claus-Rainer Rollinger,Werner Hornnt complexity excluding non-sophisticated users. Recently researchers proposed the idea of hidden market design which merges the fields of market design with user interface design in order to make complex markets accessible to a broader audience. One way to accomplish that is to simplify the market 作者: 果核 時間: 2025-3-23 23:01
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-73005-4n-experts. As in the previous literature, respondents are overconfident. My innovation is to show that in contrast to the standard method of directly asking respondents to state their confidence, using my method, which induces the respondents to reveal confidence, there is a sizable and statically s作者: 發(fā)酵 時間: 2025-3-24 05:42 作者: 關(guān)節(jié)炎 時間: 2025-3-24 09:19 作者: 疏忽 時間: 2025-3-24 13:45
Context Logic - An Introductionenvironment assumed by the prevailing theory and a dynamic game capturing the salient aspects of real-world search advertising auctions. We find that subjects tend to overbid in both treatments relative to the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves outcome suggested as most plausible by the theory, but that their be作者: 臭了生氣 時間: 2025-3-24 17:34
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-75100-4he other. Over an infinite number of discrete periods they play a symmetric simultaneous game where they may either help the other a fixed distance up the mountain at some cost, or do nothing. Can these mountaineers climb their mountain?作者: 煩憂 時間: 2025-3-24 21:47 作者: heartburn 時間: 2025-3-25 00:50 作者: ENDOW 時間: 2025-3-25 03:24
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-76071-6 algorithms that identify profit-maximizing prices and bundle discounts. We introduce a richer probabilistic valuation model than prior work by capturing complementarity, substitutability, and covariance, and we provide a hybrid search technique for fitting such a model to historical shopping cart d作者: cushion 時間: 2025-3-25 10:30
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-02711-0 Bayesian setting the buyers’ valuations for the goods are drawn from a prior distribution ., which is often assumed to be known by the seller. In this work, we focus on cases where the seller has no knowledge at all, and “the buyers know each other better than the seller knows them”. In our model, 作者: Hallmark 時間: 2025-3-25 14:51 作者: 沖突 時間: 2025-3-25 17:23 作者: Etching 時間: 2025-3-25 23:37 作者: DEMUR 時間: 2025-3-26 01:37 作者: 咒語 時間: 2025-3-26 04:47
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-02711-0in the adoption of school choice mechanisms. Similarly, college admissions in China have gone through many local experimentations, with a rich variety of mechanisms used in various provinces..In this paper, we investigate a family of proposal-refusal school choice mechanisms, including the Boston, S作者: 冥界三河 時間: 2025-3-26 12:27
Jürgen Herrmann,Renate Beckmannres the existence of stable assignment. The characterization of efficient priority structures implies that there is usually a conflict between efficiency and stability. Thus we turn to the problem of finding a constrained efficient assignment, and give an algorithm which solves the problem for any p作者: 大都市 時間: 2025-3-26 14:12
GZ-psycholoog en eigen praktijkneys is limited, the debate has been focused on the effects of the existence of a free market for human organs. Economists as well as medical and legal researchers are divided over the issue. Iran has a unique kidney market which has been in place for over 20 years, frequently reporting surprising s作者: 學(xué)術(shù)討論會 時間: 2025-3-26 19:42
Strategyproofness for “Price Takers” as a Desideratum for Market Designa mechanism may have manipulations that . (second-order manipulations). We say that a non-strategyproof mechanism is . (SP-L) if all of its manipulations vanish with market size; that is, if it is strategyproof for “price takers”. We put “price takers” in quotes because our notion is not limited to 作者: Initiative 時間: 2025-3-26 21:09
Market User Interface Designomes. This can be a challenge in markets with a large number of choices, yet traditional economic models do not consider that humans have cognitive costs, bounded time for decision making, and bounded computational resources.作者: aesthetic 時間: 2025-3-27 03:52 作者: adhesive 時間: 2025-3-27 06:28
Expectations: Point-Estimates, Probability Distributions, Confidence, and Forecastsn-experts. As in the previous literature, respondents are overconfident. My innovation is to show that in contrast to the standard method of directly asking respondents to state their confidence, using my method, which induces the respondents to reveal confidence, there is a sizable and statically s作者: 賭博 時間: 2025-3-27 12:22 作者: Indecisive 時間: 2025-3-27 13:36 作者: HPA533 時間: 2025-3-27 19:55 作者: 善于騙人 時間: 2025-3-28 01:37
Sharing in BitTorrent Can Be Rationalhe other. Over an infinite number of discrete periods they play a symmetric simultaneous game where they may either help the other a fixed distance up the mountain at some cost, or do nothing. Can these mountaineers climb their mountain?作者: 浪費(fèi)時間 時間: 2025-3-28 03:53 作者: 誰在削木頭 時間: 2025-3-28 08:44
Efficiency, Auctioneer Revenue, and Bidding Behavior in the Combinatorial Clock Auctionction has recently been used for spectrum sales in a number of countries. In this study we experimentally analyze the performance of the CCA in comparison to the Simultaneous Multi-Round Auctions (SMRA), which was used for spectrum sales worldwide for more than 15 years..The study highlights behavio作者: 形容詞詞尾 時間: 2025-3-28 13:07 作者: 異常 時間: 2025-3-28 18:11
Crowdsourced Bayesian Auctions Bayesian setting the buyers’ valuations for the goods are drawn from a prior distribution ., which is often assumed to be known by the seller. In this work, we focus on cases where the seller has no knowledge at all, and “the buyers know each other better than the seller knows them”. In our model, 作者: 埋葬 時間: 2025-3-28 20:47
Approximation of Large Games with Applications to Uniform Price Auctionsheoretic models. We demonstrate continuity requirements on the economic primitives sufficient for the equilibrium strategies of the two models to converge as the number of participants in the large finite game approaches infinity. We apply our analysis framework to show that the equilibrium of a lar作者: 文件夾 時間: 2025-3-29 02:54 作者: 補(bǔ)助 時間: 2025-3-29 04:24 作者: ELUC 時間: 2025-3-29 08:17 作者: 沙文主義 時間: 2025-3-29 15:23 作者: Nonconformist 時間: 2025-3-29 17:30
Stability and Efficiency in the General-Priority-Based Assignmentres the existence of stable assignment. The characterization of efficient priority structures implies that there is usually a conflict between efficiency and stability. Thus we turn to the problem of finding a constrained efficient assignment, and give an algorithm which solves the problem for any p作者: Calculus 時間: 2025-3-29 21:17
The Regulated Market for Kidneys in Iranneys is limited, the debate has been focused on the effects of the existence of a free market for human organs. Economists as well as medical and legal researchers are divided over the issue. Iran has a unique kidney market which has been in place for over 20 years, frequently reporting surprising s作者: 工作 時間: 2025-3-29 23:58
Instructor Rating Markets the liquidating dividends by raters. The markets are also a laboratory for comparing different microstructures and the resulting price dynamics, and we show how they can be used to compare market making algorithms.作者: visual-cortex 時間: 2025-3-30 06:30
Hierarchical Package Bidding: Computational Complexity and Bidder Behaviorhe OR bidding language of HPB can cause exposure problems as in a simultaneous auction with complementary valuations, and similar equilibrium strategies apply as in SMR. So far, the analysis of HPB is limited to a set of laboratory experiments conducted by Goeree and Holt..We extend this analysis in作者: incredulity 時間: 2025-3-30 09:09
Efficiency, Auctioneer Revenue, and Bidding Behavior in the Combinatorial Clock Auctionction setting of many countries and (ii) in a multi-band setting resembling an environment in which different spectrum bands are sold simultaneously. To account for the high levels of bidder preparation in spectrum auctions in the field and to improve the external validity of our experiments we also作者: curriculum 時間: 2025-3-30 15:01
A Framework for Automated Bundling and Pricing Using Purchase Datayer, and the economy as a whole. One of our main findings is that, in contrast to products typically suggested by recommender systems, the most profitable products to offer bundle discounts on appear to be those that are occasionally purchased together and often separately.作者: Negligible 時間: 2025-3-30 17:04 作者: 男生如果明白 時間: 2025-3-31 00:26 作者: STYX 時間: 2025-3-31 04:05 作者: MORPH 時間: 2025-3-31 05:42
Problem Solver Control Over the ATMS the liquidating dividends by raters. The markets are also a laboratory for comparing different microstructures and the resulting price dynamics, and we show how they can be used to compare market making algorithms.作者: TOM 時間: 2025-3-31 12:26 作者: overwrought 時間: 2025-3-31 15:29 作者: Volatile-Oils 時間: 2025-3-31 18:07 作者: Defraud 時間: 2025-4-1 01:02
