標(biāo)題: Titlebook: Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications; First International Sanmay Das,Michael Ostrovsky,Boleslaw Szymanksi Conference proceed [打印本頁] 作者: Debilitate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 19:37
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作者: 結(jié)束 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 00:07 作者: ironic 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 02:48
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4842-0382-8 by AFPs (since they bear most of the risk) or efforts to block disability claims. Since the price of this insurance is hidden in the fees charged by AFPs for the administration of individual accounts and pension funds there was lack of price transparency. Since new AFPs have no history of members’ 作者: 旋轉(zhuǎn)一周 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 07:32
ATN — Steuerung Durch Kasusrahmenr aggregate belief over time. This gives us the precise moments in conversations where the target’s response caused a significant shift in the aggregate belief, indicating that the response was decidedly human or unhuman. An additional benefit is that (we believe) the game is more enjoyable to parti作者: Debate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 11:46 作者: Blasphemy 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 13:13
Effects of Suboptimal Bidding in Combinatorial Auctions,e same properties for general valuations. In many situations, however, one cannot assume bidders to bid straightforward and it is not clear from the theory how these non-linear personalized price auctions (NLPPAs) perform in this case. Robustness of auctions with respect to different bidding behavio作者: Cumbersome 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 20:19 作者: CRASS 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 01:03 作者: 無表情 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 03:19
Turing Trade: A Hybrid of a Turing Test and a Prediction Market,r aggregate belief over time. This gives us the precise moments in conversations where the target’s response caused a significant shift in the aggregate belief, indicating that the response was decidedly human or unhuman. An additional benefit is that (we believe) the game is more enjoyable to parti作者: 有危險(xiǎn) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 08:25
A Market-Based Approach to Multi-factory Scheduling,nformation and their own preferences. Using a simple (zero-intelligence) bidding strategy, we empirically demonstrate that our market-based approach achieves a lower bound efficiency of 84%. This represents a trade-off between a reasonable level of efficiency (compared to a centralised approach) and作者: ACTIN 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 11:00
Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their ApplicationsFirst International 作者: 錯(cuò)誤 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 15:41 作者: 是突襲 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 18:24
1867-8211 ings, ranged from fundamental theory on auctions and m- kets to empirical design and analysis of matching mechanisms, peer-to-peer-systems, and prediction marke978-3-642-03820-4978-3-642-03821-1Series ISSN 1867-8211 Series E-ISSN 1867-822X 作者: LIEN 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 22:23
Effects of Suboptimal Bidding in Combinatorial Auctions,auction designs. Several promising ascending auction formats have been developed throughout the past few years based on primal-dual and subgradient algorithms and linear programming theory. Prices are interpreted as a feasible dual solution and the provisional allocation is interpreted as a feasible作者: Arthritis 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 05:11 作者: 爆米花 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 10:34 作者: 宇宙你 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 11:19 作者: 難解 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 15:08
A Centralized Auction Mechanism for the Disability and Survivors Insurance in Chile,ivors (D&S) Insurance that covers recent contributors among the more than 8 million participants in the mandatory private pension system. This paper is intended as a case study presenting the main distortions found in the decentralized operation of the system that led to this reform and the challeng作者: Cultivate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 19:25
Information Feedback and Efficiency in Multiattribute Double Auctions,le polynomial-time clearing and information feedback operations, we restrict the bidding language to a form of multiattribute OR-of-XOR expressions. We then consider implications of this restriction in environments where bidders’ preferences lie within a strictly larger class, that of complement-fre作者: 諷刺滑稽戲劇 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 02:43
Impact of Misalignment of Trading Agent Strategy across Multiple Markets,ents show that a simple change to pricing policy can create market performance effects that traditional adaptive trading agents are unable to recognize or capitalize on, but that market-policy-aware trading agents can generally obtain. This suggests as parameterized and tunable markets become more c作者: angiography 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 07:10 作者: paleolithic 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 08:43
School Choice: The Case for the Boston Mechanism, districts, Boston has concentrated a lot of attention. The formerly called Boston Mechanism (BM) that was applied since 2000 has been widely criticized. Finally in 2005, the Boston Public School authority decided to replace this mechanism with the so-called Deferred Acceptance (DA) algorithm. The p作者: 放肆的我 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 12:14 作者: 彩色 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 19:54 作者: Ibd810 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 23:52 作者: Limousine 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 03:19 作者: 骨 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 05:44
Fair Package Assignment,ly allocated to agents with quasi-linear utilities. A fair assignment is one that is efficient and envy-free. We consider a model where bidders have superadditive valuations, meaning that items are pure complements. Our central result is that core outcomes are fair and even coalition-fair over this 作者: 蝕刻術(shù) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 11:18 作者: Enteropathic 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 15:50 作者: Panacea 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 20:04 作者: 無力更進(jìn) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 23:12 作者: 陰謀 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 04:00
A Parallel Connection Graph Proof Proceduree or capitalize on, but that market-policy-aware trading agents can generally obtain. This suggests as parameterized and tunable markets become more common, trading strategies will increasingly need to be conditional on each individual market’s policies.作者: monogamy 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 07:16 作者: Landlocked 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 13:19 作者: 話 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 16:33 作者: CLEAR 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 20:33
Impact of Misalignment of Trading Agent Strategy across Multiple Markets,e or capitalize on, but that market-policy-aware trading agents can generally obtain. This suggests as parameterized and tunable markets become more common, trading strategies will increasingly need to be conditional on each individual market’s policies.作者: 亞當(dāng)心理陰影 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 00:12
School Choice: The Case for the Boston Mechanism,ed. Finally in 2005, the Boston Public School authority decided to replace this mechanism with the so-called Deferred Acceptance (DA) algorithm. The present paper argues that replacing BM might not be recommendable in every case, hence providing rationale to its persistence in other municipalities such as Cambridge, MA, Denver and Minneapolis.作者: Urgency 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 04:20 作者: 躲債 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 10:15 作者: certitude 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 10:44 作者: 哎呦 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 17:42
Auctions with Dynamic Populations: Efficiency and Revenue Maximization,reserve price. We construct equilibrium bidding strategies in this indirect mechanism where bidders reveal their private information in . period, yielding the same outcomes as the direct mechanisms. Thus, the sequential ascending auction is a natural institution for achieving either efficient or optimal outcomes.作者: growth-factor 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 21:57 作者: goodwill 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 02:40 作者: 潔凈 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 05:40
Fair Package Assignment,ymous-price competitive equilibrium. Our results are analogs of core equivalence results for linear prices in the standard assignment model, and for nonlinear, non-anonymous prices in the package assignment model with general valuations.作者: 善辯 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 09:12
Running Out of Numbers: Scarcity of IP Addresses and What to Do about It,rcity, while obtaining price discovery and allocative efficiency benefits of market transactions... I advise ARIN’s counsel on matters pertaining to v4 exhaustion, v6 transition, and possible revisions to ARIN policy. This paper expresses only my own views – not the views of ARIN or of those who kindly discussed these matters with me.作者: set598 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 11:56
Burton F. Dickey,Lutz Birnbaumersingly, in certain circumstances it is possible for sybils to make all agents better off. While collusion is generally bad, in the context of scrip systems it actually tends to make all agents better off, not merely those who collude. These results also provide insight into the effects of allowing agents to advertise and loan money.作者: 藕床生厭倦 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 18:23 作者: 永久 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 19:58 作者: DEAF 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 00:15 作者: 鋪?zhàn)?nbsp; 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 06:13
Information Feedback and Efficiency in Multiattribute Double Auctions,anguage restriction. We further introduce a metric characterizing the degree to which valuations violate the substitutes condition, theoretically known to guarantee efficiency, and present experimental evidence that the actual efficiency loss is proportional to this metric.作者: 相一致 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 08:50
Market Design for a P2P Backup System,opose a hybrid P2P architecture where all backup data is transferred directly between peers, but a dedicated server coordinates all operations and maintains meta-data. We achieve high reliability guarantees while keeping our data replication factor low by adopting sophisticated erasure coding technology (cf., [2]).作者: epidermis 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 12:53
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-78345-6dent of the oil market, while being highly correlated to the Saddameter. The results obtained appear to suggest that the Saddam Security prediction market may be noisy or overlooking some political factors which are instead considered by Saddameter and the oil market.作者: Bumptious 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 19:40 作者: 堅(jiān)毅 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 21:56 作者: Irrigate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 03:46 作者: laxative 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 09:04 作者: FLACK 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 11:56
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-78267-1n be used to study how an organization processes information. We show that market participants are not typical of Google’s workforce, and that market participation and success is skewed towards Google’s engineering and quantitatively oriented employees..We document a number of biases in Google’s mar作者: Facet-Joints 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 17:25
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-78345-6ciations among probabilities because they encompass both linear and non linear relationship among variables. We apply the proposed methodology to three actual prediction markets, the Saddam Security, the market of oil spot prices and the Saddameter. We find that the Saddam Security is nearly indepen
