標(biāo)題: Titlebook: Auction Theory; Introductory Exercis Pak-Sing Choi,Felix Munoz-Garcia Textbook 2021 The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under [打印本頁(yè)] 作者: culinary 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 18:07
書目名稱Auction Theory影響因子(影響力)
書目名稱Auction Theory影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Auction Theory網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度
書目名稱Auction Theory網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Auction Theory被引頻次
書目名稱Auction Theory被引頻次學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Auction Theory年度引用
書目名稱Auction Theory年度引用學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Auction Theory讀者反饋
書目名稱Auction Theory讀者反饋學(xué)科排名
作者: 招人嫉妒 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 22:44 作者: vertebrate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 02:01 作者: GLOOM 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 05:02 作者: NADIR 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 10:22
Second-Price Auctions, first approximation to bidding behavior for non-technical readers. Examples of this auction format include eBay sales, auctioning radio spectrums, and the pricing that search engines, such as Google, Bing, or Yahoo, use to sell keyword-based advertising.作者: 浮雕寶石 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 12:55
Third-Price Auctions, ,th-Price Auctions, and Lotteries,pays the second-highest bid. A similar argument applies to the third-price auction, where .?=?3, as the winning bidder pays the third-highest bid, and, more generally, to any other auction format where .?>?3.作者: minimal 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 19:24 作者: FRET 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 23:42
?z—adapted graphs in different formscan also find this type of auctions being used by internet sellers such as ., which requires bidders to purchase tokens/points before an auction starts, and then submit their token bids, which cannot be recovered regardless of the outcome of the auction.作者: 細(xì)節(jié) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 05:25 作者: 名字 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 07:26
Common-Value Auctions,ion, but they have imprecise and potentially different signals of the amount of oil barrels in the reservoir (as they receive different engineering reports) and, as a consequence, hold different estimates of the oil lease’s profitability.作者: foppish 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 13:28
Textbook 2021ook offers over 80 exercises that predict bidders’ equilibrium behaviour in different auction formats, along with the seller’s strategic incentives to organize one auction format over the other. The book emphasizes game-theoretic tools, so students can apply similar tools to other auction formats. A作者: 外貌 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 16:06
Introducing graphical representationion, but they have imprecise and potentially different signals of the amount of oil barrels in the reservoir (as they receive different engineering reports) and, as a consequence, hold different estimates of the oil lease’s profitability.作者: 指數(shù) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 20:41
Second-Price Auctions,econd-highest bid. This auction format is relatively easy to analyze, requiring limited mathematical steps, and thus we believe that it can serve as a first approximation to bidding behavior for non-technical readers. Examples of this auction format include eBay sales, auctioning radio spectrums, an作者: 輕率看法 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 23:26 作者: 確認(rèn) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 05:03 作者: cancer 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 07:34
All-Pay Auctions and Auctions with Asymmetrically Informed Bidders,bmitting the highest bid wins the object. However, as opposed to other auctions where only the winning bidder must pay for the object (either the highest or second-highest bid), in the all-pay auction . must pay the bid that he submitted. As expected, this makes bidders less aggressive in their bids作者: Lymphocyte 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 13:56
Third-Price Auctions, ,th-Price Auctions, and Lotteries,mplies that in the first-price auction, we have that .?=?1, as the winning bidder pays the highest bid; and in the second-price auction, .?=?2, as he pays the second-highest bid. A similar argument applies to the third-price auction, where .?=?3, as the winning bidder pays the third-highest bid, and作者: 心神不寧 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 15:03 作者: 出來(lái) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 21:17
Common-Value Auctions,ct’s true valuation. Instead, every bidder privately observes a noisy signal about the object’s value and, based on this signal, submits a bid. This model is typically used to analyze the auctioning of oil leases, as firms exploiting the oil reservoir would earn a similar profit if they win the auct作者: formula 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 02:52 作者: 放肆的你 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 04:19 作者: Nuance 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 09:50
2192-4333 t-price auctions, all-pay auctions, third-price auctions, the Revenue Equivalence principle, common-value auctions, multi-unit auctions, and procurement auctions. Exercises in each chapter are ranked according 978-3-030-69577-4978-3-030-69575-0Series ISSN 2192-4333 Series E-ISSN 2192-4341 作者: 徹底明白 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 13:43 作者: seroma 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 17:41
Introducing graphical representationIn this chapter we introduce the reader to auctions where the seller offers more than one unit (multi-unit auctions).作者: 克制 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 20:32 作者: 安撫 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 01:48 作者: Frequency-Range 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 06:13 作者: 令人心醉 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 09:54
Pak-Sing Choi,Felix Munoz-GarciaPresents 83 worked-out exercises on auction theory.Provides algebra support and step-by-step calculations.Includes exercises based on foundational journal articles.Ranks exercises according to difficu作者: 改革運(yùn)動(dòng) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 15:04 作者: Negligible 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 19:18 作者: Angioplasty 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 00:28 作者: 排斥 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 02:40
The Revenue Equivalence Principle,t, Exercise 6.1 considers the first-price, second-price, third-price, and all-pay auctions from the previous chapters, evaluating the expected revenue that each of them generate, and showing that the expected revenue coincides.作者: Ambulatory 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 07:14
Procurement Auctions,settings. In these auctions, firms compete to be awarded the service delivery contract, privately observe their costs, and bid to a social planner who seeks to award the contract to the most efficient firm (lowest cost).作者: 母豬 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 11:43
Auction Theory978-3-030-69575-0Series ISSN 2192-4333 Series E-ISSN 2192-4341 作者: textile 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 16:52 作者: 預(yù)感 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 18:50
Labeling and ordering the paths we measure the seller’s expected revenue in this auction format when bidders draw their valuations from a generic distribution function and then evaluate this expected revenue in the case that bidders’ valuations are uniformly distributed.作者: terazosin 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 22:15
Labeling and ordering the pathst, Exercise 6.1 considers the first-price, second-price, third-price, and all-pay auctions from the previous chapters, evaluating the expected revenue that each of them generate, and showing that the expected revenue coincides.作者: WAG 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 03:52 作者: 共棲 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 08:17 作者: Bravado 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 11:04 作者: Irritate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 15:40
Labeling and ordering the paths we measure the seller’s expected revenue in this auction format when bidders draw their valuations from a generic distribution function and then evaluate this expected revenue in the case that bidders’ valuations are uniformly distributed.作者: aqueduct 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 20:54
?z—adapted graphs in different formsbmitting the highest bid wins the object. However, as opposed to other auctions where only the winning bidder must pay for the object (either the highest or second-highest bid), in the all-pay auction . must pay the bid that he submitted. As expected, this makes bidders less aggressive in their bids作者: Reservation 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 23:03 作者: 犬儒主義者 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 06:24 作者: 定點(diǎn) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 07:50 作者: 高度表 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 13:44 作者: 夸張 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 16:49
Visualization of restricted model spacessettings. In these auctions, firms compete to be awarded the service delivery contract, privately observe their costs, and bid to a social planner who seeks to award the contract to the most efficient firm (lowest cost).作者: 取回 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 21:19 作者: Commission 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 02:07
Translations and the Spectrum Condition,ed a renewed willingness to describe the very worst humanitarian atrocities in the most extreme moral terms; that is, to describe both the acts, and in some instances their perpetrators, not simply in terms of their criminality, but to designate them as “evil.”
