作者: 永久 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 21:07
expenditure and size described above is due to size dependent differences in the quality of the R&D labor force or in the factor proportions of R&D..The regression of the spending for different types of innovation (e.g. product and/or process innovations) on the size variables produced again a prop作者: medium 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 03:20
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-10478-8stribution skewed towards small enterprises presumably reflects a continuing process of entry into industries and not necessarily the survival of such small and suboptimal enterprises over a long period of time.作者: AVOID 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 07:56
Slice Regular Functions: Analysis, collapse in demand; (c) the fall in union density in the 1980s has increased profitability despite a fall in concentration. We also find tentative evidence suggesting that collusion is pro-cyclical as in Green and Porter (1984).作者: 老人病學(xué) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 11:01 作者: 越自我 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 15:12 作者: 揉雜 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 20:19 作者: Microgram 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 23:17 作者: 種子 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 02:57
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-6395-0competition; growth; industrial organization; labour; Monopol; organization; organizations; productivity; re作者: compassion 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 08:39
978-90-481-4452-5Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 1994作者: 合同 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 12:55 作者: Assignment 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 14:41
been marked by the conflict between the deductive and the inductive approaches. During the 1950s and 1960s, empirical research was dominant; the hypotheses under investigation were derived in a rather loose way from microeconomic theory, or from casual or even anecdotical evidence. If a theory exist作者: 雄偉 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 21:00
ant developments this paper addresses three questions: (1) To what extent does R&D activity drive productivity growth, (2) how do alternative measures of productivity affect the conclusions and (3) how did the oil price shocks and the increased openness of the U.S. economy affect productivity growth作者: Carcinoma 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 01:50
e of the effects of innovation on corporate performance, one needs to know how such effects occur. We have contrasted two views of the effect of innovation — “the product view” and “the process view” — and have provided some evidence to suggest that both effects are evident in the data. Although it 作者: 污點(diǎn) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 04:47
lts for Austria. The regression of R&D expenditure and innovation expenditure on size variables (employment and sales) produced a proportional relationship. This relationship holds uniformly true if the firms are regrouped around five industrial sectors. If we look at the results from a technology p作者: Isthmus 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 06:32
sses, of considerable value to the development of both the theoretical and empirical aspects of the subject. The general message emerging from the market-level experiments is that the existence of, and convergence to, the (market) equilibrium of neoclassical theory is, in general, well-supported by 作者: glowing 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 12:14
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-10478-8in an industry are not only very small, but also sufficiently small so that they are operating at a sub-optimal scale of output, and (2) entrepreneurs are apparently not deterred from starting new firms even in industries where scale economies play an important role. A dynamic view of the process of作者: 補(bǔ)助 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 15:13 作者: 夸張 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 19:36 作者: 細(xì)節(jié) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 01:11 作者: Lucubrate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 03:42
Slice Regular Functions: Analysis, series of extensions of the widely-used Cowling and Waterson (1976) model. Our extensions incorporate demand shocks, varying competition and collusion, and the role of unions. The resulting model encompasses Cowling/Waterson, the Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) varying competition model and the Green a作者: AUGUR 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 10:37
Slice Regular Functions: Algebra,ls (‘the new story’). In supergames the feasibility of collusion (and to some degree also actual profits) depends on relative profitability of defection versus that of collusion. The determinants for this evaluation — the time discount proper, riskiness of markets, exit probability and lags — can be作者: 很是迷惑 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 11:48 作者: 圓柱 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 18:00 作者: 用不完 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 22:56 作者: lattice 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 01:28 作者: 可互換 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 04:36
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-60766-4ry into a market, which exhibits properties of a “natural monopoly”. If the subsidy promise is sufficiently high, the monopolist is led to increase output and lower price at no cost of regulation. The assumption that the monopolist always honors his pre-entry commitment has been shown to be crucial 作者: 加花粗鄙人 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 08:43 作者: FEMUR 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 14:55
Innovation and Evolution as a Dynamic Game with Rational Behaviourproach even defines itself by the separation of the neo-classical approach. In this paper the two methods or philosophies are linked in a simple duopolistic model. It will be shown, that the strategic maximising behaviour of innovating firms leads in a dynamic model to routine decisions as equilibrium strategies.作者: tic-douloureux 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 17:01
Portfolio Choice, Transactions Costs and Monopoly Powerking empirical evidence that pertains to West German industries. It thus appears that a capitalist economy is characterized by a built-in-mechanism stabilizing macroeconomic activity. This mechanism, however, is attenuated by monopoly power. That provides an additional rationale for competition policy.作者: 乞丐 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 22:17 作者: 借喻 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 03:06 作者: CLEAR 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 08:16
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-67070-5king empirical evidence that pertains to West German industries. It thus appears that a capitalist economy is characterized by a built-in-mechanism stabilizing macroeconomic activity. This mechanism, however, is attenuated by monopoly power. That provides an additional rationale for competition policy.作者: chastise 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 13:25
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-67070-5uality. Econometric analysis reveals that private sector organisations differ from their public sector counterparts in the selection procedures of contractors. Moreover, significant differences emerge in the apparent efficacy of a range of regulatory instruments in assuring contractual performance.作者: 思想 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 14:13
cal implications from theoretical models, but otherpapers start from empirical evidence and construct a theory. Threemajor topics are explored: the role of innovation, the evolution ofmarket structure and firms, and the determinations of performance. Asthe central force of market economies, innovati作者: STENT 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 20:33 作者: 異端邪說(shuō)下 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 00:22
Variational Methods for Eigenvalue Problems,ities in firm size do not influence the price level directly but are shown to have an impact on the sensitivity of prices to demand and cost changes. Cost (demand) changes are less (more) fully transmitted into prices in concentrated industries.作者: hauteur 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 04:15 作者: 秘密會(huì)議 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 08:41
Market Structure and Pricing Behaviour in Austrian Manufacturingities in firm size do not influence the price level directly but are shown to have an impact on the sensitivity of prices to demand and cost changes. Cost (demand) changes are less (more) fully transmitted into prices in concentrated industries.作者: conservative 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 11:04 作者: 專(zhuān)心 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 18:32 作者: Intrepid 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 19:54
he process by which profitability and growth are generated differs noticeably between the two types of firms. Perhaps the clearest of these differences is that innovating firms seem to be much less sensitive to cyclical shocks than non-innovating firms are.作者: TEN 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 23:04 作者: 不連貫 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 06:12 作者: Infirm 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 10:58
The Indicator of Growth Theorem, more asymmetric (symmetric) the interfirm transactions are Finally, this result was compared with the Williamsonian governance structure approach which overestimates the likelihood of the evolution of the vertically integrated firm, because Williamson does not differentiate between symmetric and asymmetric specific transactions.作者: notion 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 15:05 作者: 作繭自縛 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 19:23
Innovation, Profitability and Growth Over the Business Cyclehe process by which profitability and growth are generated differs noticeably between the two types of firms. Perhaps the clearest of these differences is that innovating firms seem to be much less sensitive to cyclical shocks than non-innovating firms are.作者: gruelling 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 20:09
New Experiments in Industrial Organisationg rather than theory-testing, and ones that are more ill-defined than those carried out to date. There is a need to shed some light on how people tackle extremely complicated ill-defined problems as opposed to experiments confined to testing well-defined theories of simple problems with complicated solutions.作者: Negligible 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 01:16 作者: 特征 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 06:00 作者: Gingivitis 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 09:25 作者: 開(kāi)玩笑 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 15:29 作者: 痛苦一下 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 17:28 作者: 灰姑娘 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 22:22
Collusion, Concentration and Profitsdence depends on the variables chosen to proxy the ‘relevant time discount’. Its value is limited as any evidence for game theoretical models supplied by cross section aggregate data. We followed Sutton (1991) to test robust predictions and Schmalensee (1989) to investigate the robustness of the results.作者: packet 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 01:47
On the Scope of Indirect Regulation of Monopolies in the Presence of Large Entry Costt cannot be inforced. It then turns out that no commitment on behalf of the incumbent can be credible that deters entry by choosing an output (capacity) at a level in excess of the monopoly output after successful entry deterrence. This represents an additional constraint for the regulator’s behavior.
