標題: Titlebook: Applied Game Theory; Proceedings of a Con S. J. Brams,A. Schotter,G. Schw?diauer Conference proceedings 1979 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelb [打印本頁] 作者: 嚴厲 時間: 2025-3-21 17:54
書目名稱Applied Game Theory影響因子(影響力)
書目名稱Applied Game Theory影響因子(影響力)學科排名
書目名稱Applied Game Theory網(wǎng)絡公開度
書目名稱Applied Game Theory網(wǎng)絡公開度學科排名
書目名稱Applied Game Theory被引頻次
書目名稱Applied Game Theory被引頻次學科排名
書目名稱Applied Game Theory年度引用
書目名稱Applied Game Theory年度引用學科排名
書目名稱Applied Game Theory讀者反饋
書目名稱Applied Game Theory讀者反饋學科排名
作者: faucet 時間: 2025-3-21 22:40 作者: Intrepid 時間: 2025-3-22 03:09
Christine Markarian,Abdul Nasser El-Kassared and yet his percentage of the voting power increased when power is measured by either the Banzhaf or Shapley-Shubik power index. This type of result is proven to be inevitable for . ≥ 6 in the Banzhaf case and . ≥ 7 in the Shapley-Shubik case..Finally, this result is illustrated by observing the 作者: Vo2-Max 時間: 2025-3-22 07:37
Murali Thiyagarajah,B. John Oommen’ standards were well within the prediction of the bargaining set; one quartet supported the power model. Analysis of the patterns of coalition structure and rudimentary analyses of the bargaining processes indicate that the central concept of standards of fairness underlying the power model is appr作者: 退潮 時間: 2025-3-22 08:54
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-41501-6applied mathematics; computation; computer science; economics; game theory; mathematics; theory; Vienna作者: 戲服 時間: 2025-3-22 15:17 作者: BRIDE 時間: 2025-3-22 19:21
On Persistent Implications of?E2E Testinglows: the amount of power of . over . is related to the level of achievement of .’s objectives in the interaction .. As for the origin of power, it is taken as related to the strategies available to both parties in their interaction (such as rewards, punishments, etc.)..The development of these idea作者: organism 時間: 2025-3-23 01:17
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-08965-7et of entrepreneurial organizing agents. Assuming a market of price takers, this game of competitive self-valuation always has an equilibrium price solution. Every core imputation in the original game constitutes a set of equilibrium prices. If there is no core the entrepreneurs can exploit the coal作者: 替代品 時間: 2025-3-23 04:44
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-08965-7hich can be modelled as simple games. The properties of the Banzhaf, Coleman, and Shapley/Shubik indices of power have been thoroughly discussed elsewhere. The properties of the first two are compared in detail with the properties of two measures of satisfaction, the Zipke index defined here and a m作者: vascular 時間: 2025-3-23 08:57
Christine Markarian,Abdul Nasser El-Kassar that arises, however, is how bad a proxy are they?.In other words, if we were to increase (or decrease) a voter’s voting weight within a voting body, would his resulting power within the organization always increase (or decrease), but possible not in proportion to the increase in his weight, or cou作者: tattle 時間: 2025-3-23 12:04
Murali Thiyagarajah,B. John Oommenas necessarily a member of any coalition that could form. The 16 games were four repetitions each of four game types, arranged in a 2 × 2 design depending on (i) whether or not the grand coalition of all four players was allowed to form and (ii) whether or not the monopolist players were symmetric. 作者: Enliven 時間: 2025-3-23 15:55
Américo Lopes Azevedo,Cesar Toscanos developed. Using the two candidate contest for the 1976 Republican nomination as a prototype, interest centers on the effects of variations in the institutional context in affecting candidate strategy. Variables studied include the dates of the primaries, their size, the rules translating votes in作者: 和音 時間: 2025-3-23 19:30
Murali Thiyagarajah,B. John Oommenty of winning the election. If the candidates have equal budgets it is locally optimal for them to allocate in proportion to the Banzhaf power index of each voter in the electorate. When this result is applied to the United States Electoral College, it is seen that the disparity in the power between作者: 性行為放縱者 時間: 2025-3-24 01:57 作者: 喪失 時間: 2025-3-24 05:02
Jānis Grabis,Kurt Sandkuhl,Dirk Stamerajority rule” when no Condorcet point (core) exists. The games we use in these experiments seek, in particular, to establish as much separation as possible between the predictions of several alternative solution concepts and, thereby, to provide a critical test of these competing theories. Briefly, 作者: 喚醒 時間: 2025-3-24 08:46 作者: 鴕鳥 時間: 2025-3-24 12:50
Leiliane Pereira de Rezende,Stéphane Julia, the relation between value and equilibria; second, the problems of existence and non-existence of value; and third, a new way of defining value for these games, in order to guarantee its existence, which leads to interesting economic interpretations.作者: Fortify 時間: 2025-3-24 17:52
Leiliane Pereira de Rezende,Stéphane Julia finite number of private goods, owned individually, which can be used for the production of the public goods and for exchanges and sidepayments in an overall compromise. The paper defines a noncooperative game for the participants whose outcomes are compromises in the exchange situations. When play作者: 廚師 時間: 2025-3-24 21:54
Tommi K?hk?nen,Andrey Maglyas,Kari Smolander). These situations are studied in the framework of cooperative games with coalition structures, by defining for each player a utility function with two arguments, namely his consumption bundle and the coalition to which he belongs..The optimality analysis brings out a surprising property of the gam作者: inscribe 時間: 2025-3-25 02:10
Semiotics in Digital Visualisationeoretic considerations. More specifically, the only active market in our models is the labor market, and we determine and investigate its Nash equilibrium points. The models vary in the degree of influence that government has in determining the wage of public servants. It should be emphasized that i作者: mendacity 時間: 2025-3-25 04:34 作者: Confirm 時間: 2025-3-25 10:12 作者: Phonophobia 時間: 2025-3-25 12:01 作者: CLAY 時間: 2025-3-25 17:56
Values of Large Market Games, the relation between value and equilibria; second, the problems of existence and non-existence of value; and third, a new way of defining value for these games, in order to guarantee its existence, which leads to interesting economic interpretations.作者: 興奮過度 時間: 2025-3-25 23:36
http://image.papertrans.cn/a/image/159824.jpg作者: APRON 時間: 2025-3-26 01:55
Overview: 978-3-7908-0208-5978-3-662-41501-6作者: 后來 時間: 2025-3-26 05:11
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-29133-8t the extent to which game-theoretic arguments have been a) properly understood by the courts; b) integrated into constitutional and legal analysis; and c) properly applied. We pay particular attention to weighted voting in Nassau County, for which we provide a more detailed historical analysis.作者: faultfinder 時間: 2025-3-26 08:30 作者: 陶器 時間: 2025-3-26 13:32 作者: macabre 時間: 2025-3-26 19:05
Exploitable Surplus in ,-Person Gameset of entrepreneurial organizing agents. Assuming a market of price takers, this game of competitive self-valuation always has an equilibrium price solution. Every core imputation in the original game constitutes a set of equilibrium prices. If there is no core the entrepreneurs can exploit the coal作者: Spinal-Tap 時間: 2025-3-26 22:34 作者: 原告 時間: 2025-3-27 01:15
Voting Weights as Power Proxies: Some Theoretical and Empirical Results that arises, however, is how bad a proxy are they?.In other words, if we were to increase (or decrease) a voter’s voting weight within a voting body, would his resulting power within the organization always increase (or decrease), but possible not in proportion to the increase in his weight, or cou作者: Extemporize 時間: 2025-3-27 07:42 作者: GROUP 時間: 2025-3-27 12:13
A Model of the U.S. Presidential Primary Campaigns developed. Using the two candidate contest for the 1976 Republican nomination as a prototype, interest centers on the effects of variations in the institutional context in affecting candidate strategy. Variables studied include the dates of the primaries, their size, the rules translating votes in作者: 能夠支付 時間: 2025-3-27 15:14 作者: 分期付款 時間: 2025-3-27 21:18
Cabinet Coalition Formation: A Game-Theoretic Analysisconcepts predict only the alternatives in the solution space and not the coalitions which achieve these alternatives. In order to make coalition predictions, additional ad-hoc assumptions are necessary. The Competitive Solution attaches a coalition structure to each alternative in the solution space作者: conjunctivitis 時間: 2025-3-28 01:54
An Experimental Test of Several Theories of Committee Decision Making Under Majority Ruleajority rule” when no Condorcet point (core) exists. The games we use in these experiments seek, in particular, to establish as much separation as possible between the predictions of several alternative solution concepts and, thereby, to provide a critical test of these competing theories. Briefly, 作者: LEVY 時間: 2025-3-28 06:08 作者: Tremor 時間: 2025-3-28 08:29 作者: Pseudoephedrine 時間: 2025-3-28 11:27 作者: 撫慰 時間: 2025-3-28 17:56 作者: 突襲 時間: 2025-3-28 20:10
An Approach to the Problem of Efficient Distribution of the Labor Forceeoretic considerations. More specifically, the only active market in our models is the labor market, and we determine and investigate its Nash equilibrium points. The models vary in the degree of influence that government has in determining the wage of public servants. It should be emphasized that i作者: 廣告 時間: 2025-3-29 02:43
On Entry Preventing Behavior and Limit Price Models of Entrymand and cost functions, and throughout the paper, noncooperative behavior is assumed. The model has two distinct stages: pre- and post entry. In the pre-entry stage, the monopolist chooses his price and capital stock so as to maximize his discounted profits, noting that his investment decision may 作者: JADED 時間: 2025-3-29 06:44 作者: Ablation 時間: 2025-3-29 07:32
Exploitable Surplus in ,-Person Gamesitions for a profit, i.e., they realize a positive rent for their organizing function. Application is made to determining fair wages to labor, and finding equilibrium prices for legislators selling their votes.作者: 指令 時間: 2025-3-29 11:42
A Model of the U.S. Presidential Primary Campaignto delegate allocations, and variations in each primary’s electorate. Dynamic elements, e.g., “momentum,” are included, a number of propositions produced, and these propositions are tested successfully against the choices made by Reagan and Ford in the 1976 Republican campaign.作者: 不妥協(xié) 時間: 2025-3-29 18:52
Reinsurance as a Cooperative Gametween insurance companies can be formulated as a .-person cooperative game without transferable utilities. The determination of an “optimal reinsurance treaty” is then shown to coincide with the computation of the value of the corresponding game. A complete example is given.作者: 協(xié)議 時間: 2025-3-29 22:04 作者: hematuria 時間: 2025-3-30 00:58 作者: 珠寶 時間: 2025-3-30 04:31
Jānis Grabis,Kurt Sandkuhl,Dirk Stamer the (math) Bargaining Set, . [19761 Ordinal Bargaining Set, M°, and several solutions based on vulnerability. The first section of this essay defines and discusses the various solution theories. Section 2 describes our experimental design, and Sections 3 and 4 review the results of these experiments.作者: 可卡 時間: 2025-3-30 09:04 作者: 捐助 時間: 2025-3-30 13:26 作者: infatuation 時間: 2025-3-30 19:25 作者: white-matter 時間: 2025-3-31 00:21 作者: 惰性氣體 時間: 2025-3-31 03:47 作者: 債務 時間: 2025-3-31 05:03
Tommi K?hk?nen,Andrey Maglyas,Kari Smolanderwo arguments, namely his consumption bundle and the coalition to which he belongs..The optimality analysis brings out a surprising property of the games with hedonic coalitions, namely that transfers among coalitions may be necessary to attain Pareto optimality. Moreover, quite restrictive assumptions are needed to rule out this property.作者: 摘要 時間: 2025-3-31 10:07 作者: 通情達理 時間: 2025-3-31 14:07 作者: ARCH 時間: 2025-3-31 19:55 作者: BAIT 時間: 2025-3-31 22:31 作者: 殘暴 時間: 2025-4-1 05:36 作者: transient-pain 時間: 2025-4-1 07:50
