標題: Titlebook: Analysis of Environmental Policy in the Power Sector; Equilibrium Methods Yihsu Chen,Afzal S. Siddiqui,Makoto Tanaka Book 2020 Springer Na [打印本頁] 作者: hormone-therapy 時間: 2025-3-21 17:34
書目名稱Analysis of Environmental Policy in the Power Sector影響因子(影響力)
書目名稱Analysis of Environmental Policy in the Power Sector影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Analysis of Environmental Policy in the Power Sector網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度
書目名稱Analysis of Environmental Policy in the Power Sector網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Analysis of Environmental Policy in the Power Sector被引頻次
書目名稱Analysis of Environmental Policy in the Power Sector被引頻次學(xué)科排名
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書目名稱Analysis of Environmental Policy in the Power Sector年度引用學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Analysis of Environmental Policy in the Power Sector讀者反饋
書目名稱Analysis of Environmental Policy in the Power Sector讀者反饋學(xué)科排名
作者: Intrepid 時間: 2025-3-21 21:06
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-34111-4This chapter next illustrates a decentralized way of solving the model by formulating it as a complementarity problem. We conclude this chapter by pointing out how the models can be extended to study other energy and environmental policies such as renewable portfolio standards and tradable performance-based standards.作者: 檢查 時間: 2025-3-22 03:24
Environmental Policies in the Power Sector,aligned with firms’ profit-maximization principles in a deregulated market place while facilitating the minimization of the system’s pollution-abatement cost through proper pricing of the pollution externality. This chapter reviews various forms of regulation, discusses regional experiences, and highlights the challenges going forward.作者: Exclaim 時間: 2025-3-22 06:57
Analysis of Power System Operations with Non-Dominant Firms,This chapter next illustrates a decentralized way of solving the model by formulating it as a complementarity problem. We conclude this chapter by pointing out how the models can be extended to study other energy and environmental policies such as renewable portfolio standards and tradable performance-based standards.作者: stroke 時間: 2025-3-22 11:58
Book 2020investment decisions in imperfectly competitive electricity markets as well as transmission planning and policy design. Given this context, this book synthesizes equilibrium and bi-level modeling to address challenging research questions such as:?? How are power-plant operations affected by carbon p作者: ADAGE 時間: 2025-3-22 13:55 作者: Adenocarcinoma 時間: 2025-3-22 20:06
Introduction,ration need to be taken into account by policymakers when proposing environmental control. In this chapter, we provide an overview of environmental externalities?in the power sector, briefly discuss the deregulated nature of the power sector, outline the structure of this book, and mention the topics that are within the scope of this book.作者: anagen 時間: 2025-3-22 22:43
0884-8289 operations and long-term investments.Considers the consequeThis book covers game-theoretic approaches to analyzing policies for environmental regulation in the power sector. The scope includes operational and investment decisions in imperfectly competitive electricity markets as well as transmissio作者: IRK 時間: 2025-3-23 01:53 作者: 動作謎 時間: 2025-3-23 07:32
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-44866-0Environmental Policy; Power Sector; Power System Operations; Power Plants; Bi-Level Modeling; MPEC/MILP; P作者: 鞏固 時間: 2025-3-23 10:25
978-3-030-44868-4Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020作者: STYX 時間: 2025-3-23 17:05 作者: Eclampsia 時間: 2025-3-23 18:21 作者: fodlder 時間: 2025-3-24 01:45
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-27929-5es to incentivize investment in and operation of renewable energy (RE) technologies?such as hydro, solar, and wind?power. Given the power sector’s contribution to GHG emissions, facilitating a transition to less-polluting forms of electricity generation is a promising pathway to a socially desirable作者: 廣口瓶 時間: 2025-3-24 04:42
Empirische Studien zur Parteienforschung to various forms of regulation in order to reduce or to limit its pollution. The regulation evolves from traditional command-and-control policies?such as technology or performance standards based on engineering solutions or best-available technologies earlier to more recent implementations of marke作者: Omnipotent 時間: 2025-3-24 09:31
Empirische Analyse: Vorbereitende Schritte, electricity. Basic information about the behavior of these participants is summarized in the demand and supply functions (curves). We describe how individual participants make their decisions by maximizing consumer or producer surplus. We next show the aggregated outcome of individually heterogenou作者: 敲詐 時間: 2025-3-24 10:52 作者: Polydipsia 時間: 2025-3-24 15:45
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-34111-4ble to price manipulation by strategic generating companies. Particularly, a dominant firm, often a large incumbent generator, may exert market power not only in electricity markets but also in related markets such as emission permit markets. This chapter extends the models without any dominant firm作者: Arctic 時間: 2025-3-24 19:53 作者: 使長胖 時間: 2025-3-25 00:28 作者: VEN 時間: 2025-3-25 04:40
Isabelle Gauger,Tobias Nagel,Marco Hubers in the power sector. While a central planner who internalizes GHG emissions?via a Pigouvian tax?to curb consumption may yield a first-best policy, decentralized mechanisms are typically deployed in OECD?countries’ power sectors in order to align the incentives of private power companies with those作者: 新星 時間: 2025-3-25 07:58 作者: sterilization 時間: 2025-3-25 13:59
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-34111-4we discuss the model of Stackelberg leader–follower oligopoly in the context of electricity markets. The structure of a Stackelberg leader firm with other follower firms that behave à la Cournot is represented by a bi-level problem. It is then recast as a mathematical program with equilibrium constr作者: Immunoglobulin 時間: 2025-3-25 17:00 作者: meditation 時間: 2025-3-25 23:34
Thorsten Reckelkamm,Jochen Deusetor (TSO), whereas generation expansion and operations are carried out by profit-maximizing power companies. Thus, a credible assessment of policy proposals requires a suitable framework that models this distinction between decision makers’ motives directly. Toward that end, we propose a bi-level mo作者: BLAND 時間: 2025-3-26 03:32
Isabelle Gauger,Tobias Nagel,Marco Huberincentives in mitigation of GHG emissions?since consumption is not curbed to the same extent as under the first-best policy. Consequently, “too much” renewable energy (RE)?investment takes place. This distortion is less pronounced when power companies behave à la Cournot because the exercise of mark作者: Foreknowledge 時間: 2025-3-26 06:43 作者: 阻撓 時間: 2025-3-26 12:02 作者: MEAN 時間: 2025-3-26 16:15 作者: 遠地點 時間: 2025-3-26 20:37 作者: 無思維能力 時間: 2025-3-26 23:57
Analysis of Power System Operations with a Dominant Firm and an Oligopolistic Industry,we discuss the model of Stackelberg leader–follower oligopoly in the context of electricity markets. The structure of a Stackelberg leader firm with other follower firms that behave à la Cournot is represented by a bi-level problem. It is then recast as a mathematical program with equilibrium constr作者: FLAGR 時間: 2025-3-27 02:00
Investment in New Power Plants Under Environmental Policies,onal decisions for two reasons. First, the solutions of open-loop and closed-loop formulations have been shown to be equivalent under perfect competition. Second, a long-run equilibrium under perfect competition market entails the notion of the zero-profit condition unless there are significant entr作者: 異端 時間: 2025-3-27 08:58 作者: 懶洋洋 時間: 2025-3-27 11:56 作者: 委派 時間: 2025-3-27 14:46
Introduction,es to incentivize investment in and operation of renewable energy (RE) technologies?such as hydro, solar, and wind?power. Given the power sector’s contribution to GHG emissions, facilitating a transition to less-polluting forms of electricity generation is a promising pathway to a socially desirable作者: extinct 時間: 2025-3-27 19:14
Environmental Policies in the Power Sector, to various forms of regulation in order to reduce or to limit its pollution. The regulation evolves from traditional command-and-control policies?such as technology or performance standards based on engineering solutions or best-available technologies earlier to more recent implementations of marke作者: hermitage 時間: 2025-3-28 00:06
Features of Power Sectors, electricity. Basic information about the behavior of these participants is summarized in the demand and supply functions (curves). We describe how individual participants make their decisions by maximizing consumer or producer surplus. We next show the aggregated outcome of individually heterogenou作者: 思鄉(xiāng)病 時間: 2025-3-28 05:35 作者: Lucubrate 時間: 2025-3-28 06:40
Analysis of Power System Operations with a Dominant Firm and an Oligopolistic Industry,ble to price manipulation by strategic generating companies. Particularly, a dominant firm, often a large incumbent generator, may exert market power not only in electricity markets but also in related markets such as emission permit markets. This chapter extends the models without any dominant firm作者: garrulous 時間: 2025-3-28 11:54
