標(biāo)題: Titlebook: Algorithmic Game Theory; 14th International S Ioannis Caragiannis,Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen Conference proceedings 2021 Springer Nature Sw [打印本頁] 作者: 討論小組 時間: 2025-3-21 20:07
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory影響因子(影響力)
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory被引頻次
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory被引頻次學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory年度引用
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory年度引用學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory讀者反饋
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory讀者反饋學(xué)科排名
作者: 出價 時間: 2025-3-21 21:35 作者: 頌揚(yáng)國家 時間: 2025-3-22 01:45 作者: 提升 時間: 2025-3-22 08:32 作者: interrupt 時間: 2025-3-22 10:55 作者: Pcos971 時間: 2025-3-22 13:48 作者: 小卒 時間: 2025-3-22 19:08 作者: 牛的細(xì)微差別 時間: 2025-3-23 00:17
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-47516-0e known from agents’ reports on their connections. In a self-interested setting, agents may strategically hide some connections to make themselves seem to be more important. In this paper, we study the incentive compatible (IC) selection mechanism to prevent such manipulations. Specifically, we mode作者: 火光在搖曳 時間: 2025-3-23 04:37 作者: 跳動 時間: 2025-3-23 06:14
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-26461-4e unknown from the outset, but they are drawn from a known probability distribution. In the standard prophet setting, a single agent makes selection decisions in an attempt to maximize her expected reward. The novelty of our model is the introduction of a competition setting, where multiple agents c作者: Accord 時間: 2025-3-23 12:50
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-26461-4to the actions of the other players. They showed that such games admit .-approximate pure Nash equilibria for certain settings of . and .. They left open, however, the question of how hard it is to find such an equilibrium. In this work, we develop a query-efficient reduction from more general games作者: Initiative 時間: 2025-3-23 14:52
Der Aufbau des M?rtels und des Betonstributions are two-fold: conceptual and computational. We propose a generalization of the model studied by Ito et al., where the input consists of a graph on . vertices representing the set of voters, a set of . candidates ., a weight function . for each voter . representing the preference of the vo作者: 詩集 時間: 2025-3-23 21:54
Zur Anwendung der Erkenntnisse,. This changes fundamental game-theoretic assumptions about rationality since a contract can commit a player to act irrationally in specific subgames, making credible otherwise non-credible threats. This is further complicated by considering the interaction between multiple contracts which can reaso作者: 先鋒派 時間: 2025-3-24 01:21
Der Aufbau des Selbst beim Kindg game is .-hard when . even on bipartite graphs of maximum degree 7. We complement this with partial positive results in the special case where . values are bounded by 2. In particular, we describe an efficient algorithm when a constant number of vertices satisfy . as well as an efficient algorithm作者: 平 時間: 2025-3-24 03:06
Der Aufbau des Selbst beim Kindngestion games, and like these, have exact potential functions that guarantee the existence of pure Nash equilibria (PNE). We prove that the agent’s cost functions for these games can be hard to compute by giving an example of a game for which the cost function is hard for Valiant’s . class, even in作者: sterilization 時間: 2025-3-24 08:42
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7091-3014-8s assigning persons to two-bed rooms. Here, a matching of a given . or . instance is called . if it does not admit any ., that is, a subset?. of agents in which everyone prefers the partner of some other agent in?.. The matching is . if it does not admit any ., that is, an exchange-blocking coalitio作者: Digitalis 時間: 2025-3-24 14:25 作者: 有助于 時間: 2025-3-24 18:31
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-663-04563-2 number of goods, when the preferences are identical and budgets are generic, a 2 approximation of competitive equilibrium (2-.) always exists. By 2-. we mean that every buyer receives a bundle with a value at least half of the value of her most desirable bundle that fits within her budget, and the 作者: 我不重要 時間: 2025-3-24 20:17 作者: CUR 時間: 2025-3-25 00:19 作者: 不能仁慈 時間: 2025-3-25 06:54
Improved Two Sample Revenue Guarantees via Mixed-Integer Linear Programmingr’s valuation is drawn from a regular distribution . and that the seller has access to . independently drawn samples from .. By solving a family of mixed-integer linear programs (MILPs), the ERM mechanism is proven to guarantee at least .5914 times the optimal revenue in expectation. Using solutions作者: Hemiplegia 時間: 2025-3-25 10:37 作者: faucet 時間: 2025-3-25 13:00
Auctions with Interdependence and SOS: Improved Approximationet al.?recently established that if bidders’ valuation functions are submodular over their signals (a.k.a.?SOS), a truthful 4-approximation to the optimal welfare exists. We show existence of a mechanism that is truthful and achieves a tight 2-approximation to the optimal welfare when signals are bi作者: Clumsy 時間: 2025-3-25 18:23 作者: Dignant 時間: 2025-3-25 19:57
Prior-Free Clock Auctions for Bidders with Interdependent Valuese one of . different values, and her value for the good is a weakly increasing function of all the bidders’ signals. The bidders are partitioned into . expertise-groups, based on how their signal can impact the values for the good, and we prove upper and lower bounds regarding the approximability of作者: 蕁麻 時間: 2025-3-26 03:20 作者: 多嘴多舌 時間: 2025-3-26 06:43
On Tightness of the Tsaknakis-Spirakis Algorithm for Approximate Nash Equilibrium and 0.36, finally the best approximate ratio of 0.3393 by Tsaknakis and Spirakis?(TS algorithm for short). Efforts to improve the results remain not successful in the past 14 years..This work makes the first progress to show that the bound of 0.3393 is indeed tight for the TS algorithm. Next, we ch作者: orient 時間: 2025-3-26 10:09 作者: 駁船 時間: 2025-3-26 14:57
Lower Bounds for the Query Complexity of Equilibria in Lipschitz Gamesto the actions of the other players. They showed that such games admit .-approximate pure Nash equilibria for certain settings of . and .. They left open, however, the question of how hard it is to find such an equilibrium. In this work, we develop a query-efficient reduction from more general games作者: Ceremony 時間: 2025-3-26 18:56 作者: 不透明 時間: 2025-3-27 00:30 作者: ANNUL 時間: 2025-3-27 04:58 作者: Cognizance 時間: 2025-3-27 08:17
Pure Nash Equilibria in a Generalization of Congestion Games Allowing Resource Failuresngestion games, and like these, have exact potential functions that guarantee the existence of pure Nash equilibria (PNE). We prove that the agent’s cost functions for these games can be hard to compute by giving an example of a game for which the cost function is hard for Valiant’s . class, even in作者: Hormones 時間: 2025-3-27 11:44 作者: 拋棄的貨物 時間: 2025-3-27 14:25
Optimal Revenue Guarantees for Pricing in Large Markets a central object of study in the last decade. We consider a basic setting where the buyers’ valuations are independent and identically distributed and there is a single unit on sale. It is well-known that this setting is equivalent to the so-called i.i.d. prophet inequality, for which optimal guara作者: PLIC 時間: 2025-3-27 20:10 作者: FILTH 時間: 2025-3-28 00:49
Der Aufbau der Zweistofflegierungen better approximate solutions. However, the new distributed algorithm for approximate Nash equilibrium by Czumaj et al. performs consistently at the same bound of 0.3393. This proves our lower bound instances generated against the TS algorithm can serve as a benchmark in design and analysis of appro作者: 上下倒置 時間: 2025-3-28 03:35
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-26461-4gents that give them high guarantees, independent of the strategies taken by others. In particular, for random tie-breaking, every agent can guarantee herself at least . of the highest reward, and at least . of the optimal social welfare. For ranked tie-breaking, the .th ranked agent can guarantee h作者: corporate 時間: 2025-3-28 08:46
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-26461-4e of interest is the sum of the individual Lipschitz parameters. Finally, we provide an exponential lower bound on the . query complexity of finding .-approximate . equilibria of .-player, .-action, .-Lipschitz games for strong values of ., motivating the consideration of explicitly randomized algor作者: FAR 時間: 2025-3-28 12:29
Der Aufbau des M?rtels und des Betons be .-complete even if ., ., and . is either a complete bipartite graph (in fact ., i.e., partitions of size 2 and .) or a complete graph. Moreover, recently we and Bentert et al. [WG 2021], independently, showed that the problem is NP-hard for paths. This means that the search for . algorithms need作者: 軍械庫 時間: 2025-3-28 16:31 作者: headway 時間: 2025-3-28 22:38 作者: NUL 時間: 2025-3-29 00:35
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-663-04563-2 this setting Kennedy and Kertz [Ann. Probab. 1991] breaks the 0.745 fraction achievable in general with a dynamic threshold policy. We prove that this large market benefit continue to hold when using fixed price PPMs, and show that the guarantee of 0.632 actually improves to 0.712. We then move to 作者: 時間等 時間: 2025-3-29 06:54
On Tightness of the Tsaknakis-Spirakis Algorithm for Approximate Nash Equilibrium better approximate solutions. However, the new distributed algorithm for approximate Nash equilibrium by Czumaj et al. performs consistently at the same bound of 0.3393. This proves our lower bound instances generated against the TS algorithm can serve as a benchmark in design and analysis of appro作者: surmount 時間: 2025-3-29 09:17
Prophet Inequality with Competing Agentsgents that give them high guarantees, independent of the strategies taken by others. In particular, for random tie-breaking, every agent can guarantee herself at least . of the highest reward, and at least . of the optimal social welfare. For ranked tie-breaking, the .th ranked agent can guarantee h作者: Agility 時間: 2025-3-29 11:35
Lower Bounds for the Query Complexity of Equilibria in Lipschitz Gamese of interest is the sum of the individual Lipschitz parameters. Finally, we provide an exponential lower bound on the . query complexity of finding .-approximate . equilibria of .-player, .-action, .-Lipschitz games for strong values of ., motivating the consideration of explicitly randomized algor作者: 謙卑 時間: 2025-3-29 18:38
Gerrymandering on Graphs: Computational Complexity and?Parameterized Algorithms be .-complete even if ., ., and . is either a complete bipartite graph (in fact ., i.e., partitions of size 2 and .) or a complete graph. Moreover, recently we and Bentert et al. [WG 2021], independently, showed that the problem is NP-hard for paths. This means that the search for . algorithms need作者: 設(shè)想 時間: 2025-3-29 21:16 作者: synovial-joint 時間: 2025-3-29 23:57
On (Coalitional) Exchange-Stable Matchingsearch variant of deciding whether a given matching can reach an exchange-stable one after at most .?., where a swap is defined as exchanging the partners of the two agents in an exchange-blocking pair .作者: 注入 時間: 2025-3-30 07:29 作者: 高度 時間: 2025-3-30 09:07
0302-9743 enmark in September 2021..The 26 full papers presented together with 4 abstract papers were carefully reviewed and selected from 73 submissions. In addition, the volume contains abstracts from 3 invited talks and 2 tutorial talks. The papers are organized in topical sections named: auctions and mech作者: 得意人 時間: 2025-3-30 16:25 作者: 休息 時間: 2025-3-30 16:34
Der Aufbau des Selbst beim Kindues are bounded by 2. In particular, we describe an efficient algorithm when a constant number of vertices satisfy . as well as an efficient algorithm for computing the non-simple .-matching nucleolus when ..作者: chastise 時間: 2025-3-30 22:44
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-663-04563-2 we mean that every buyer receives a bundle with a value at least half of the value of her most desirable bundle that fits within her budget, and the market clears. We also present a polynomial time algorithm to obtain a 2-..作者: faucet 時間: 2025-3-31 04:17 作者: 拋棄的貨物 時間: 2025-3-31 07:08 作者: Enthralling 時間: 2025-3-31 11:33
Approximate Competitive Equilibrium with Generic Budget we mean that every buyer receives a bundle with a value at least half of the value of her most desirable bundle that fits within her budget, and the market clears. We also present a polynomial time algorithm to obtain a 2-..作者: Commodious 時間: 2025-3-31 13:38 作者: SHRIK 時間: 2025-3-31 20:48 作者: CURB 時間: 2025-4-1 00:35
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-47516-0ich selects an agent with at least 1/2 of the optimal progeny in expectation under the properties of incentive compatibility and fairness. Fairness requires that two roots with the same contribution in two graphs are assigned the same probability. Furthermore, we prove an upper bound of . for any incentive compatible and fair selection mechanisms.作者: BABY 時間: 2025-4-1 01:52
