標題: Titlebook: Algorithmic Game Theory; 5th International Sy Maria Serna Conference proceedings 2012 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012 adwords.econom [打印本頁] 作者: 代表 時間: 2025-3-21 16:27
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory影響因子(影響力)
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory影響因子(影響力)學科排名
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度學科排名
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory被引頻次
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory被引頻次學科排名
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory年度引用
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory年度引用學科排名
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory讀者反饋
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory讀者反饋學科排名
作者: Thrombolysis 時間: 2025-3-21 23:48 作者: 清晰 時間: 2025-3-22 01:53
Basic Network Creation Games with Communication Interests,mall subset only. Our model incorporates these (communication) . explicitly..Given peers with interests and a communication network forming a tree, we prove several results on the structure and quality of equilibria in our model. We focus on the MAX-version, i.e., each node tries to minimize the max作者: 改革運動 時間: 2025-3-22 07:46 作者: Patrimony 時間: 2025-3-22 12:37 作者: 偏離 時間: 2025-3-22 15:02 作者: 準則 時間: 2025-3-22 20:30 作者: 立即 時間: 2025-3-23 01:01
On the Hardness of Network Design for Bottleneck Routing Games,is NP-hard not only to recognize instances suffering from the paradox, but also to distinguish between instances for which the Price of Anarchy (PoA) can decrease to 1 and instances for which the PoA is Ω(.) and cannot improve by edge removal. Thus, the network design problem for such games is NP-ha作者: Patrimony 時間: 2025-3-23 02:24
,Die Brücke zwischen Chemie und Physik,mall subset only. Our model incorporates these (communication) . explicitly..Given peers with interests and a communication network forming a tree, we prove several results on the structure and quality of equilibria in our model. We focus on the MAX-version, i.e., each node tries to minimize the max作者: 是比賽 時間: 2025-3-23 08:08
,Die Brücke zwischen Chemie und Physik, many player .-coordination games – a generalization of coordination games that we introduce – and common (.,.)-beliefs – a generalization of common .-beliefs that we introduce. We then apply these theorems to two particular signaling structures to obtain novel results.作者: NAG 時間: 2025-3-23 11:13
Der Aufbau der Zweistofflegierungenacitated agents with heterogeneous capacities, where (i) there are only two items; or (ii) the individual item values are binary. Finally, we show that the last existence result does not extend to the stronger notion of . mechanisms, i.e. mechanisms whose allocation and payments correspond to a Walr作者: 性行為放縱者 時間: 2025-3-23 16:23
Der Aufbau der Zweistofflegierungenis a crucial factor in the quality of NE. Specifically, a network topology has a bounded PoA if and only if it is . (SP). Second, we show that the convergence rate of best-response dynamics (BRD) may be super linear (in the number of agents). This is in contrast to the uncapacitated version, where c作者: Affable 時間: 2025-3-23 18:59 作者: SEEK 時間: 2025-3-24 01:54
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-47516-0is NP-hard not only to recognize instances suffering from the paradox, but also to distinguish between instances for which the Price of Anarchy (PoA) can decrease to 1 and instances for which the PoA is Ω(.) and cannot improve by edge removal. Thus, the network design problem for such games is NP-ha作者: 自制 時間: 2025-3-24 04:05 作者: 現(xiàn)暈光 時間: 2025-3-24 07:45 作者: Extemporize 時間: 2025-3-24 10:43
An Optimal Bound to Access the Core in TU-Games,on out of the core to an imputation in the core is at most .???1, where . is the number of players. This bound exploits the geometry of the core and is optimal. It considerably improves the upper bounds found so far by Kóczy [7], Yang [13, 14] and a previous result by ourselves [2] in which the boun作者: instulate 時間: 2025-3-24 18:00
Convergence of Ordered Improvement Paths in Generalized Congestion Games,en strategy and the number of players playing the same strategy, in such a way that fewer such players results in greater payoff. In these games we consider improvement paths. As shown by Milchtaich [2] such paths may be infinite. We consider paths in which the players deviate in a specific order, a作者: CORE 時間: 2025-3-24 22:39
Basic Network Creation Games with Communication Interests,k in a limited way, e.g., by creating or deleting incident links. In doing so, a peer can reduce its individual communication cost. Typically, these costs are modeled by the maximum or average distance in the network. We introduce a generalized version of the . (BNCG). In the BNCG (by Alon et al., S作者: OTTER 時間: 2025-3-24 23:28
Common Knowledge and State-Dependent Equilibria,mmon knowledge and coordination, but the exact relationship has yet to be formalized. Herein, we present such a formalization. We state necessary and sufficient conditions for what we call state-dependent equilibria – equilibria where players play different strategies in different states of the worl作者: 議程 時間: 2025-3-25 05:19
Approximating the Minmax Value of Three-Player Games within a Constant is as Hard as Detecting Planfs, approximating the minmax value within an additive constant smaller than ./2, where ., is not possible by a polynomial time algorithm. This is based on assuming hardness of a version of the so-called planted clique problem in Erd?s-Rényi random graphs, namely that of . a planted clique. Our resul作者: HEDGE 時間: 2025-3-25 08:13 作者: 冰河期 時間: 2025-3-25 11:44 作者: Ornament 時間: 2025-3-25 19:25
Capacitated Network Design Games,h edge is shared equally among its agents. The uncapacitated version of this problem has been introduced by Anshelevich . (2003) and has been extensively studied. We find that the consideration of edge capacities entails a significant effect on the quality of the obtained Nash equilibria (NE), under作者: HAWK 時間: 2025-3-25 23:42 作者: Canyon 時間: 2025-3-26 02:10
On the Hardness of Network Design for Bottleneck Routing Games, fact, a.k.a. Braess’s paradox, gives rise to the network design problem, where we seek to recognize routing games suffering from the paradox, and to improve the equilibrium performance by edge removal. In this work, we investigate the computational complexity and the approximability of network desi作者: 防止 時間: 2025-3-26 05:16 作者: 辯論 時間: 2025-3-26 09:43
Commodity Auctions and Frugality Ratios,wn number of items, and a private cost for supplying those items. Thus a “feasible set” of sellers (a set that is able to comprise the winning bidders) is any set of sellers whose total quantity sums to at least .. We show that, even in a limited special case, VCG has a . of at least .???1 (with res作者: 一瞥 時間: 2025-3-26 13:07 作者: GULP 時間: 2025-3-26 19:24 作者: acolyte 時間: 2025-3-26 23:43
Network Bargaining: Using Approximate Blocking Sets to Stabilize Unstable Instances,in a graph .?=?(.,.) and each edge .?∈?. represents a possible deal between players . and .. We reformulate the problem as a cooperative game and study the following question: . We show that by removing edges in the network that belong to a . we can find a stable solution in polynomial time. This mo作者: Lyme-disease 時間: 2025-3-27 04:52 作者: Talkative 時間: 2025-3-27 09:02 作者: homocysteine 時間: 2025-3-27 11:18 作者: BET 時間: 2025-3-27 14:51 作者: Inferior 時間: 2025-3-27 18:06
On the Communication Complexity of Approximate Nash Equilibria,n be computed for .?=?3/4, while there is a lower bound of slightly more than 1/2 on the lowest . achievable. When the communication is polylogarithmic in ., we show how to obtain .?=?0.438. For one-way communication we show that .?=?1/2 is the exact answer.作者: keloid 時間: 2025-3-27 23:12 作者: PANT 時間: 2025-3-28 05:57
,Die Brücke zwischen Chemie und Physik,al interests and the impact of their decisions on the society as a whole. Our analysis reveals that the selfishness level often provides more refined insights into the game than other measures of inefficiency, such as the price of stability or the price of anarchy.作者: 無表情 時間: 2025-3-28 06:54 作者: 符合國情 時間: 2025-3-28 14:14
Der Aufbau der Zweistofflegierungenow that for the simple and common mechanisms, namely second price auction with reserve prices, there are instances in which additional data decreases the expected revenue, but this decrease is by at most a small constant factor under a standard regularity assumption.作者: Defiance 時間: 2025-3-28 15:30
Selfishness Level of Strategic Games,al interests and the impact of their decisions on the society as a whole. Our analysis reveals that the selfishness level often provides more refined insights into the game than other measures of inefficiency, such as the price of stability or the price of anarchy.作者: aristocracy 時間: 2025-3-28 20:17
Approximating the Minmax Value of Three-Player Games within a Constant is as Hard as Detecting Planh may be seen as a derandomisation of the former, may be used to argue for hardness of approximating the minmax value based on a hardness assumption about . algorithms. Our technique for derandomisation is general enough to also apply to related work about .-Nash equilibria.作者: 注入 時間: 2025-3-29 00:03 作者: 光滑 時間: 2025-3-29 05:34 作者: 消滅 時間: 2025-3-29 11:10 作者: NAV 時間: 2025-3-29 13:23 作者: 新奇 時間: 2025-3-29 17:26 作者: PAC 時間: 2025-3-29 19:46
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-39683-4tegy that is used with non-zero probability by a player must have payoff at most . less than a best response. A recent algorithm of Kontogiannis and Spirakis shows how to compute a 2/3-WSNE in polynomial time, for bimatrix games. Here we introduce a new technique that leads to an improvement to the worst-case approximation guarantee.作者: Introduction 時間: 2025-3-30 00:01
Der Aufbau der Zweistofflegierungenilibrium is .-complete. Our positive results state that congestion games with capacities are potential games in the well studied singleton case. Polynomial algorithms that compute these equilibria are also provided.作者: SSRIS 時間: 2025-3-30 06:03
Mechanisms for Scheduling with Single-Bit Private Values,ly a single-bit of information..We prove a separation between truthful-in-expectation and universally truthful mechanisms for makespan minimization: We first show how to design an optimal truthful-in-expectation mechanism, and then prove lower bounds on the approximation guarantee of universally truthful mechanisms.作者: 縱火 時間: 2025-3-30 10:20
Convergence of Ordered Improvement Paths in Generalized Congestion Games,nsider improvement paths. As shown by Milchtaich [2] such paths may be infinite. We consider paths in which the players deviate in a specific order, and prove that ordered best response improvement paths are finite, while ordered better response improvement paths may still be infinite.作者: 討好女人 時間: 2025-3-30 14:02
Approximate Well-Supported Nash Equilibria Below Two-Thirds,tegy that is used with non-zero probability by a player must have payoff at most . less than a best response. A recent algorithm of Kontogiannis and Spirakis shows how to compute a 2/3-WSNE in polynomial time, for bimatrix games. Here we introduce a new technique that leads to an improvement to the worst-case approximation guarantee.作者: 重畫只能放棄 時間: 2025-3-30 17:42 作者: 有花 時間: 2025-3-30 23:26 作者: alleviate 時間: 2025-3-31 02:19 作者: EXPEL 時間: 2025-3-31 08:44
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-26462-1on out of the core to an imputation in the core is at most .???1, where . is the number of players. This bound exploits the geometry of the core and is optimal. It considerably improves the upper bounds found so far by Kóczy [7], Yang [13, 14] and a previous result by ourselves [2] in which the boun作者: Insulin 時間: 2025-3-31 11:48 作者: 記憶法 時間: 2025-3-31 17:09 作者: 著名 時間: 2025-3-31 19:12 作者: 現(xiàn)存 時間: 2025-3-31 23:30 作者: 頑固 時間: 2025-4-1 05:13
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-39683-4equilibria, and for what values of . a polynomial-time algorithm exists. An .-. Nash equilibrium (.-WSNE) has the additional requirement that any strategy that is used with non-zero probability by a player must have payoff at most . less than a best response. A recent algorithm of Kontogiannis and S作者: nuclear-tests 時間: 2025-4-1 09:14
