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標(biāo)題: Titlebook: Algorithmic Game Theory; 11th International S Xiaotie Deng Conference proceedings 2018 Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2018 Agents.Auction.C [打印本頁(yè)]

作者: 傷害    時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 19:29
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory影響因子(影響力)




書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度




書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory被引頻次




書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory被引頻次學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory年度引用




書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory年度引用學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory讀者反饋




書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory讀者反饋學(xué)科排名





作者: botany    時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 21:38

作者: 常到    時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 02:26

作者: 煞費(fèi)苦心    時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 07:13
,Die Brücke zwischen Chemie und Physik,dual questions. . . These questions are investigated through parameterized complexity, focusing on budget constraints such as the number of exchanges an agent may be involved in or the total duration of the process.
作者: Compassionate    時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 09:00

作者: 結(jié)束    時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 13:25

作者: LAP    時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 20:44

作者: Measured    時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 01:11

作者: 配置    時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 03:22

作者: 專橫    時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 08:15

作者: agitate    時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 11:12

作者: hemoglobin    時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 15:01

作者: membrane    時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 18:20

作者: Lamina    時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 01:57

作者: abysmal    時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 05:00
Conference proceedings 2018ke-cutting, cooperative games, voting games, multi-agent scheduling, price of stability, various mechanism design problems: online-dynamics and multi-stages as well as revenue maximization and resource allocation and applications..
作者: 滔滔不絕地說(shuō)    時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 07:50

作者: Concerto    時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 13:37
0302-9743 China,?in September 2018..The 19 full papers presented together with 6 short papers and 5 plenary talks were?carefully reviewed and selected from 54 submissions. The papers?cover various important aspects of algorithmic game theory?including market equilibrium, auctions and applications, two sided m
作者: START    時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 18:53
Frank H. Mader,Herbert Wei?gerberstributions of equilibrium strategies and a quadratic time algorithm for computing mixed strategies given the margins. The characterization allows us to establish a number of interesting qualitative features of equilibria.
作者: WAX    時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 21:55

作者: 柔軟    時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 23:17

作者: 細(xì)微差別    時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 05:28
Die Auszubildende in der Praxis,e show that our protocol is asymptotically the fastest possible by giving a matching lower bound. Finally, we turn to irrational demands and solve the proportional cake cutting problem by reducing it to the same problem with integer demands only. All results remain valid in a highly general cake cutting model, which can be of independent interest.
作者: 取之不竭    時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 07:41
Assistenzarzt in der Inneren Abteilung, every minimal winning coalition has size?2, computing . is .-hard, but polynomial-time solvable if the underlying graph is bipartite. Moreover, we show that for every graphic simple game, deciding if . is polynomial-time solvable for every fixed ..
作者: FEMUR    時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 15:27

作者: 青石板    時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 18:13

作者: Fibrin    時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 23:28

作者: compel    時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 01:05

作者: defenses    時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 05:07

作者: Monocle    時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 08:37

作者: 粗俗人    時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 14:03
On Revenue Monotonicity in Combinatorial Auctions, been raised and studied. In particular, is it true that the seller can always extract more revenue from a market where the buyers value the items higher than another market? In this paper we obtain such a revenue monotonicity result in a general setting. Precisely, consider the revenue-maximizing c
作者: 玩笑    時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 20:26
Restricted Preference Domains in Social Choice: Two Perspectives,known ways to circumvent this difficulty is to assume that voters’ preferences satisfy a structural constraint, such as, e.g., being single-peaked. Indeed, under this assumption many impossibility results in social choice disappear. Restricted preference domains also play an important role in comput
作者: 箴言    時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 21:39
The Complexity of Cake Cutting with Unequal Shares,eous and divisible resource, the cake, among . players who value pieces according to their own measure function. The goal is to assign each player a not necessarily connected part of the cake that the player evaluates at least as much as her proportional share..In this paper, we investigate the prob
作者: 松馳    時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 03:21
A Near Optimal Mechanism for Energy Aware Scheduling,mportant question is how the operator of a server should deal with combining energy-efficiency and the particular interests of the users. Consider a cloud server, where clients/agents can submit jobs for processing. The quality of service that each agent perceives is given by a non-decreasing functi
作者: STALE    時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 06:26

作者: cylinder    時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 13:08

作者: 輕打    時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 15:24

作者: 容易做    時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 21:38

作者: COLIC    時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 23:05

作者: 向外    時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 03:55
A Truthful Mechanism for Interval Scheduling,ier completion times. In our model, completing a job provides a benefit equal to its present value, i.e., the value discounted to the time when the job finishes. Users submit job requirements to the cloud provider who non-preemptively schedules jobs to maximize the social welfare, i.e., the sum of p
作者: EWER    時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 09:15
On Revenue-Maximizing Mechanisms Assuming Convex Costs,tance, in procurement auctions for energy, and when bidders borrow money at non-linear interest rates. We provide a 1?/?16. approximation guarantee for a prior-free randomized mechanism when bidders’ values are drawn from MHR distributions, and their costs are polynomial. Additionally, we propose tw
作者: peptic-ulcer    時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 10:36

作者: 軟膏    時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 16:51

作者: Melatonin    時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 20:01

作者: motor-unit    時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 01:39

作者: LIEN    時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 05:57

作者: miracle    時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 10:23
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-99660-8Agents; Auction; Cake-cutting; Communication channels (information theory); Complexity; Computer networks
作者: 樸素    時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 14:39

作者: 低能兒    時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 19:03
Lecture Notes in Computer Sciencehttp://image.papertrans.cn/a/image/152954.jpg
作者: 改正    時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 23:25
Algorithmic Game Theory978-3-319-99660-8Series ISSN 0302-9743 Series E-ISSN 1611-3349
作者: nepotism    時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 01:27
Der Aufbau der Kupfer-ZinklegierungenWe consider the online problem in which an intermediary trades identical items with a sequence of . buyers and . sellers, each of unit demand. We assume that the values of the traders are selected by an adversary and the sequence is randomly permuted. We give competitive algorithms for two objectives: welfare and gain-from-trade.
作者: 一再煩擾    時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 06:14
Online Trading as a Secretary Problem,We consider the online problem in which an intermediary trades identical items with a sequence of . buyers and . sellers, each of unit demand. We assume that the values of the traders are selected by an adversary and the sequence is randomly permuted. We give competitive algorithms for two objectives: welfare and gain-from-trade.
作者: Latency    時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 08:43
Die Personalstruktur der Praxis, been raised and studied. In particular, is it true that the seller can always extract more revenue from a market where the buyers value the items higher than another market? In this paper we obtain such a revenue monotonicity result in a general setting. Precisely, consider the revenue-maximizing c
作者: aplomb    時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 13:48
Die Personalstruktur der Praxis,known ways to circumvent this difficulty is to assume that voters’ preferences satisfy a structural constraint, such as, e.g., being single-peaked. Indeed, under this assumption many impossibility results in social choice disappear. Restricted preference domains also play an important role in comput
作者: 斜坡    時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 17:06
Die Auszubildende in der Praxis,eous and divisible resource, the cake, among . players who value pieces according to their own measure function. The goal is to assign each player a not necessarily connected part of the cake that the player evaluates at least as much as her proportional share..In this paper, we investigate the prob
作者: 嘲弄    時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 23:12
Der Arzthaftungsproze? in der Praxismportant question is how the operator of a server should deal with combining energy-efficiency and the particular interests of the users. Consider a cloud server, where clients/agents can submit jobs for processing. The quality of service that each agent perceives is given by a non-decreasing functi
作者: Vo2-Max    時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 04:53
Zusammenfassung der Untersuchungsergebnisse, private types are often assumed to be common knowledge, information elicitation considers the situation where the players know the distributions better than the decision maker. To weaken the information assumption in Bayesian auctions, we consider an information structure where the knowledge about
作者: Trabeculoplasty    時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 06:25

作者: 壯觀的游行    時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 11:23
Assistenzarzt in der Inneren Abteilung,g subsets and a set . of winning coalitions . with .. Simple games with . are exactly the weighted voting games. Freixas and Kurz (IJGT, 2014) conjectured that . for every simple game (.,?.). We confirm this conjecture for two complementary cases, namely when all minimal winning coalitions have size
作者: CAMEO    時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 14:08
Frank H. Mader,Herbert Wei?gerberuilibria of such games in terms of their unidimensional marginal distributions. We propose a . time algorithm for computing unidimensional marginal distributions of equilibrium strategies and a quadratic time algorithm for computing mixed strategies given the margins. The characterization allows us
作者: Valves    時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 17:52

作者: 音樂等    時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 22:24

作者: GOAT    時(shí)間: 2025-4-1 03:21

作者: 指派    時(shí)間: 2025-4-1 06:58

作者: labyrinth    時(shí)間: 2025-4-1 10:18
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-39684-1uals of different groups can emerge even when all involved individuals are tolerant. Although the model is widely studied, no pure game-theoretic version where rational agents strategically choose their location exists. We close this gap by introducing and analyzing generalized game-theoretic models
作者: outskirts    時(shí)間: 2025-4-1 16:39
Meteorologische Grundtatsachen, decisions and many other scenarios. The idea is to ask the individuals of the same group?to assess the performance of the others. Scores or rankings are then determined based on these evaluations. However, peer assessment can be biased and manipulated, especially when there is a conflict of interes
作者: reception    時(shí)間: 2025-4-1 19:11

作者: 嚴(yán)峻考驗(yàn)    時(shí)間: 2025-4-2 02:12

作者: BRIEF    時(shí)間: 2025-4-2 03:05

作者: 參考書目    時(shí)間: 2025-4-2 10:03
Der Arzthaftungsproze? in der Praxisibrium..We describe and analyze one such mechanism called modAVR, which relies on an adaption of the well-known Average Rate (AVR) algorithm for scheduling the jobs. We prove that modAVR combines the aforementioned properties with a constant Price of Anarchy, i.e., despite the fact that it is based
作者: aquatic    時(shí)間: 2025-4-2 14:50
Meteorologische Grundtatsachen, Moreover, we prove that our two-stage mechanism is asymptotically optimal, since it only needs . queries and we prove an . lower bound on query complexity for any mechanism. Finally, we conduct experiments on several scenarios to demonstrate that the proposed two-stage mechanism is robust.




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