標(biāo)題: Titlebook: Algorithmic Game Theory; 6th International Sy Berthold V?cking Conference proceedings 2013 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013 advertise [打印本頁(yè)] 作者: HAVEN 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 18:53
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory影響因子(影響力)
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory被引頻次
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory被引頻次學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory年度引用
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory年度引用學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory讀者反饋
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory讀者反饋學(xué)科排名
作者: carotenoids 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 21:22 作者: Overthrow 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 01:56 作者: 過份好問 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 05:11
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-03746-8sponding candidacy game, where candidates choose strategically to participate or not, has been studied in very few papers, mainly by Dutta et al. [5,6], who showed that no non-dictatorial voting procedure satisfying unanimity is candidacy-strategyproof, or equivalently, is such that the joint action作者: 拾落穗 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 12:00 作者: 刪除 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 15:49 作者: ICLE 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 17:57
Der Arbeitsmarkt für Ingenieure interest for every player to follow. In this paper, we present a mediator that implements the best correlated equilibrium for an extended El Farol game with symmetric players. The extended El Farol game we consider incorporates both negative and positive network effects..We study the degree to whic作者: 使糾纏 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 01:11
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7643-8160-8 in settings where agents are neither so myopic as to consider only the benefit they derive from their immediate neighbors, nor do they consider the effects on the entire network when forming connections. Instead, we consider games on networks where a node tries to maximize its utility taking into a作者: 內(nèi)閣 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 03:00
,Ma? und Zahl in der Architektur,cifically, some machines are added or removed. Each job’s cost is the load on the machine it is assigned to; thus, when machines are added, jobs have an incentive to migrate to the new unloaded machines. When machines are removed, the jobs assigned to them must be reassigned. Consequently, other job作者: Aromatic 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 07:50 作者: syncope 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 11:42 作者: MENT 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 17:41 作者: Gratulate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 20:58
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-19149-8ively, strictly stable colorings in graphs. We characterize the cases when such colorings exist and when the decision problem is NP-hard. These correspond to finding pure strategy equilibria in the anti-coordination games, whose price of anarchy we also analyze. We further consider the directed case作者: 打算 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 23:07
Systemtheoretischer Architekturreview,tices. A flow satisfying these requests is said to be at Nash equilibrium if every path which carries a positive amount of flow is a shortest path between its source and sink. The goal of MCND is to find a subgraph . of . such that the flow at Nash equilibrium in . is optimal. While this has been sh作者: installment 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 04:50
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-01659-2n particular, the fundamental social dilemmas such as the Traveler’s dilemma, the Prisoner’s dilemma, and the Public Goods game demonstrate high rates of deviation from the unique Nash equilibrium, dependent on the game parameters or the environment in which the game is played. These results inspire作者: 你不公正 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 08:19 作者: 真 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 12:50
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-42132-8in social welfare due to fairness. Previous work has been done on this so-called price of fairness, concerning fair division of cakes and chores with non-connected pieces and of cakes with connected pieces. We provide tight or nearly tight bounds on the price of fairness in situations where each pla作者: 高爾夫 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 15:04
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-80503-5dual preferences. An assignment is called popular if there is no other assignment that is preferred by a majority of the agents. Popular assignments need not exist, but the minimax theorem implies the existence of a popular . assignment. In this paper, we study the compatibility of popularity with o作者: Control-Group 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 21:17 作者: 袖章 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 23:16
Gesichts- und Kieferverletzungen, However, the performance of these games at equilibrium may be very bad. This motivates the adoption of mechanisms for inducing a socially optimal state. Many settings are naturally dynamical and thus we believe it is worth to consider the design of incentive compatible best-response mechanisms (Nis作者: Interdict 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 04:51 作者: 蛙鳴聲 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 10:18
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-41392-6advertisement auction; influence maximization; nash equilibria; network robustness; weighted voting game作者: N斯巴達(dá)人 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 15:13 作者: 聲音刺耳 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 15:53
The Complexity of Fully Proportional Representation for Single-Crossing Electoratesant’s rule and Monroe’s rule. Winner determination for these rules is known to be NP-hard for unrestricted preferences. We show that for single-crossing preferences this problem admits a polynomial-time algorithm for Chamberlin–Courant’s rule, but remains NP-hard for Monroe’s rule. Our algorithm for作者: 易于交談 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 21:49
New Results on Equilibria in Strategic Candidacysponding candidacy game, where candidates choose strategically to participate or not, has been studied in very few papers, mainly by Dutta et al. [5,6], who showed that no non-dictatorial voting procedure satisfying unanimity is candidacy-strategyproof, or equivalently, is such that the joint action作者: Ptosis 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 01:03 作者: Osteons 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 06:43 作者: Atheroma 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 11:03 作者: Condescending 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 14:50 作者: 刺耳的聲音 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 20:37
Load Rebalancing Games in Dynamic Systems with Migration Costscifically, some machines are added or removed. Each job’s cost is the load on the machine it is assigned to; thus, when machines are added, jobs have an incentive to migrate to the new unloaded machines. When machines are removed, the jobs assigned to them must be reassigned. Consequently, other job作者: Anthropoid 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 22:35 作者: 蚊子 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 02:13
Congestion Games with Player-Specific Costs Revisited the maximal sets of cost functions that guarantee the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium..For the case that the players are unweighted, we show that it is necessary and sufficient that for every resource and for every pair of players the corresponding cost functions are affine transformations of 作者: 襲擊 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 08:42 作者: 搜尋 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 12:15
Anti-coordination Games and Stable Graph Coloringsively, strictly stable colorings in graphs. We characterize the cases when such colorings exist and when the decision problem is NP-hard. These correspond to finding pure strategy equilibria in the anti-coordination games, whose price of anarchy we also analyze. We further consider the directed case作者: Ataxia 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 17:34 作者: foppish 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 20:00 作者: 招人嫉妒 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 22:04 作者: insurrection 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 02:29
Dividing Connected Chores Fairlyin social welfare due to fairness. Previous work has been done on this so-called price of fairness, concerning fair division of cakes and chores with non-connected pieces and of cakes with connected pieces. We provide tight or nearly tight bounds on the price of fairness in situations where each pla作者: exophthalmos 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 09:40
On Popular Random Assignmentsdual preferences. An assignment is called popular if there is no other assignment that is preferred by a majority of the agents. Popular assignments need not exist, but the minimax theorem implies the existence of a popular . assignment. In this paper, we study the compatibility of popularity with o作者: 淡紫色花 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 13:34
Scheduling a Cascade with Opposing Influencesces. Consider a planner trying to introduce an idea in different parts of a society at different times. How should the planner design a schedule considering this fact that positive reaction to the idea in early areas has a positive impact on probability of success in later areas, whereas a flopped r作者: 愚笨 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 15:19
Designing Budget-Balanced Best-Response Mechanisms for Network Coordination Games However, the performance of these games at equilibrium may be very bad. This motivates the adoption of mechanisms for inducing a socially optimal state. Many settings are naturally dynamical and thus we believe it is worth to consider the design of incentive compatible best-response mechanisms (Nis作者: SSRIS 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 20:22
Inefficiency of Games with Social Contexteory literature. Already for very simple models, it has been shown that altruistic behavior can actually be harmful for society in the sense that the price of anarchy may . as the players become more altruistic. In this paper, we study the severity of this phenomenon for more realistic settings in w作者: considerable 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 00:21
Plurality Voting with Truth-Biased Agentsstructure of equilibrium profiles. These properties demonstrate how the model leads to filtering out undesirable equilibria. We also prove that deciding the existence of an equilibrium with a certain candidate as a winner is NP-hard. We then move on to strong Nash equilibria, where we obtain analogo作者: 從容 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 04:18
Friend of My Friend: Network Formation with Two-Hop Benefit-Hop games which are extensions of well-studied games. While the addition of two-hop benefit changes the properties of these games significantly, we prove that in many important cases good equilibrium solutions still exist, and bound the change in the price of anarchy due to two-hop benefit both the作者: 收養(yǎng) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 09:48 作者: 波動(dòng) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 12:03
Stochastic Congestion Games with Risk-Averse Playersd also admit a potential function if the players have the same risk attitude. On the negative side, we present examples of stochastic games with players of different risk attitudes that do not admit a potential function. As for the inefficiency of equilibria, for parallel-link networks with linear d作者: 輪流 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 16:39
Scheduling a Cascade with Opposing Influencesropagate between every two areas. We generalize previous works by studying the problem when people in different areas have various behaviors..We first prove, independent of the planner’s schedule, influences help (resp., hurt) the planner to propagate her idea if it is an appealing (resp., unappeali作者: bronchiole 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 23:08
Der Arbeitsmarkt für Betriebswirtestructure of equilibrium profiles. These properties demonstrate how the model leads to filtering out undesirable equilibria. We also prove that deciding the existence of an equilibrium with a certain candidate as a winner is NP-hard. We then move on to strong Nash equilibria, where we obtain analogo作者: adj憂郁的 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 03:50
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7643-8160-8-Hop games which are extensions of well-studied games. While the addition of two-hop benefit changes the properties of these games significantly, we prove that in many important cases good equilibrium solutions still exist, and bound the change in the price of anarchy due to two-hop benefit both the作者: aerial 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 05:40 作者: DALLY 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 11:05 作者: 朦朧 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 15:35 作者: fulcrum 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 17:05 作者: spinal-stenosis 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 22:36
Symmetries of Quasi-Valuesll the permutation groups . that are large enough to assure a unique .-symmetric quasi-value, as well as the structure and dimension of the space of all such quasi-values for a general permutation group ...We show how to construct .-symmetric quasi-values algorithmically by averaging certain basic quasi-values (marginal operators).作者: 煤渣 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 01:37 作者: 會(huì)議 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 08:51 作者: OVER 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 09:14
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-19149-8s NP-hard. Our notions also have multiple connections to other combinatorial questions, and our results resolve some open problems in these areas, most notably the complexity of the strictly unfriendly partition problem.作者: Fibrinogen 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 16:08 作者: 政府 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 20:17
