標題: Titlebook: Algorithmic Game Theory; 4th International Sy Giuseppe Persiano Conference proceedings 2011 Springer-Verlag GmbH Berlin Heidelberg 2011 app [打印本頁] 作者: 鏟除 時間: 2025-3-21 16:05
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory影響因子(影響力)
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory影響因子(影響力)學科排名
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory網絡公開度
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory網絡公開度學科排名
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory被引頻次
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory被引頻次學科排名
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory年度引用
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory年度引用學科排名
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory讀者反饋
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory讀者反饋學科排名
作者: 消滅 時間: 2025-3-21 22:50 作者: inscribe 時間: 2025-3-22 00:58
Stressfaktor #10: Planung & Kontrolle,We first provide a quick background in Game and Economic Theory, and then discuss some fundamental computational questions arising in these areas. We will focus on the interplay between Game Theory and Computer Science, with an emphasis on some of the most challenging open questions.作者: 炸壞 時間: 2025-3-22 05:24
Computational Game TheoryWe first provide a quick background in Game and Economic Theory, and then discuss some fundamental computational questions arising in these areas. We will focus on the interplay between Game Theory and Computer Science, with an emphasis on some of the most challenging open questions.作者: 內行 時間: 2025-3-22 12:46
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-531-90126-8ces are used to determine allocations of indivisible items under the principles of individual optimization and market clearance, based on public knowledge of individual preferences. Alternatively, auction mechanisms have been used with a different set of principles for the determination of prices, b作者: AMOR 時間: 2025-3-22 13:30
Antifaschistische Ideologic der PDS,. Our abstraction has multiple agents biding repeatedly for multiple identical items (such as impressions in an ad auction). The agents are budget limited and have a value for per item. We abstract the repeated interaction as a one-shot game, which we call ., where agents submit a bid and a budget, 作者: 先鋒派 時間: 2025-3-22 19:58 作者: 饒舌的人 時間: 2025-3-22 22:35
Quellen- und Literaturverzeichnis, recently to the pay-per-conversion model. Such models require the ad allocation engine to translate the advertiser’s value per click/conversion to value per impression. This is often done through simple models that assume that each impression of the ad stochastically leads to a click/conversion ind作者: 薄膜 時間: 2025-3-23 05:13
Antifaschistische Organisation der PDS, goal, which has, thus far, received significantly less attention, is to ., ., to ensure that bidders reveal no more information than necessary. We further investigate and generalize the approximate privacy model for two-party communication recently introduced by Feigenbaum .?[8]. We explore the pri作者: 吸氣 時間: 2025-3-23 09:20
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-531-90126-8 the ratio between the optimal outcome and the worst Nash equilibrium. However, this notion is well defined only for games that always possess a Nash equilibrium (NE). We propose the . measure, which is roughly defined as the average inefficiency in an infinite best-response dynamic. Both the price 作者: 可轉變 時間: 2025-3-23 10:59
Quellen- und Literaturverzeichnis,airness requirements may result in a suboptimal division from the social welfare standpoint. Here, we show that in some cases, discarding some of the cake and fairly dividing only the remainder may be socially preferable to any fair division of the entire cake. We study this phenomenon, providing as作者: palpitate 時間: 2025-3-23 15:54 作者: LIMIT 時間: 2025-3-23 21:45 作者: lanugo 時間: 2025-3-23 22:27 作者: Uncultured 時間: 2025-3-24 05:54
Antifaschistische Organisation der PDS,igning housing to college students, and the classic firms and workers market. In all these markets, externalities such as complementarities and peer effects severely complicate the preference ordering of each agent. Further, research has shown that externalities lead to serious problems for market s作者: 舊病復發(fā) 時間: 2025-3-24 07:35 作者: SCORE 時間: 2025-3-24 13:55
Carsten G?tte,Friedrich Graf,Bernhard Klein mechanisms under the assumption that a machine (player) is bound by its reports: when a machine lies and reports value . for a task instead of the actual one .., it will execute for time . if it gets the task—unless the declared value . is less than the actual value .., in which case, it will execu作者: remission 時間: 2025-3-24 18:37 作者: enhance 時間: 2025-3-24 21:19
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-20955-1oblem, each job . has a length .. and each machine . has a private speed ... The running time of job . on machine . is ..... We seek a mechanism that obtains speed bids of machines and then assign jobs and payments to machines so that the machines have incentive to report true speeds and the allocat作者: 伸展 時間: 2025-3-25 03:00
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-19224-2unction that specifies willingness to pay as a function of job due dates. The cloud provider in response allocates a subset of these jobs, taking into advantage the . of allocating resources to jobs in the cloud environment. Focusing on social-welfare as the system objective (especially relevant for作者: 防銹 時間: 2025-3-25 03:48
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-21419-7layer’s payoffs are bounded and independent random variables, not necessarily identically distributed, but with common expectations. We show that the completely mixed uniform strategy profile, i.e. the combination of mixed strategies (one per player) where each player plays with equal probability ea作者: 整理 時間: 2025-3-25 09:31
Hong Yao,Akira Ichinose,Shohei Iwanoc games. These problems ask, given a strategic game, whether or not it admits . a . Nash equilibrium where all probabilities are rational numbers, and . an . Nash equilibrium where at least one probability is irrational, respectively. We are interested here in the complexities of ?. and ?...Towards 作者: 漫步 時間: 2025-3-25 14:53 作者: subacute 時間: 2025-3-25 19:29
978-3-642-24828-3Springer-Verlag GmbH Berlin Heidelberg 2011作者: 山頂可休息 時間: 2025-3-25 22:43 作者: sigmoid-colon 時間: 2025-3-26 03:22 作者: TEM 時間: 2025-3-26 04:51 作者: reserve 時間: 2025-3-26 11:59
Prompt Mechanism for Ad Placement over Timercial breaks are typically of some uniform duration; however, the video ads may have an arbitrary size. Each ad has a private value and should be posted into some break at most once by its expiration date. The player who own the ad gets her value if her ad had been broadcasted by the ad’s expiration作者: PURG 時間: 2025-3-26 13:29 作者: Mercurial 時間: 2025-3-26 16:50
On Communication Protocols That Compute Almost Privately goal, which has, thus far, received significantly less attention, is to ., ., to ensure that bidders reveal no more information than necessary. We further investigate and generalize the approximate privacy model for two-party communication recently introduced by Feigenbaum .?[8]. We explore the pri作者: 農學 時間: 2025-3-26 21:53 作者: DEAWL 時間: 2025-3-27 04:17 作者: aristocracy 時間: 2025-3-27 05:17 作者: addition 時間: 2025-3-27 10:08 作者: MAUVE 時間: 2025-3-27 14:42
Externalities among Advertisers in Sponsored Searchaspect that has not been fully reflected in the existing models, and is known to affect the behavior of real advertisers. Our model takes into account both positive and negative correlations between any pair of advertisers, so that the click-through rate of an ad depends on the identity, relative or作者: OREX 時間: 2025-3-27 21:35 作者: DAMP 時間: 2025-3-28 01:36 作者: GIDDY 時間: 2025-3-28 02:38 作者: 過度 時間: 2025-3-28 10:13 作者: 打火石 時間: 2025-3-28 12:26
Lower Bound for Envy-Free and Truthful Makespan Approximation on Related Machinesoblem, each job . has a length .. and each machine . has a private speed ... The running time of job . on machine . is ..... We seek a mechanism that obtains speed bids of machines and then assign jobs and payments to machines so that the machines have incentive to report true speeds and the allocat作者: Osteoarthritis 時間: 2025-3-28 16:25
A Truthful Mechanism for Value-Based Scheduling in Cloud Computingunction that specifies willingness to pay as a function of job due dates. The cloud provider in response allocates a subset of these jobs, taking into advantage the . of allocating resources to jobs in the cloud environment. Focusing on social-welfare as the system objective (especially relevant for作者: CAJ 時間: 2025-3-28 19:37 作者: 努力趕上 時間: 2025-3-28 23:03
Complexity of Rational and Irrational Nash Equilibriac games. These problems ask, given a strategic game, whether or not it admits . a . Nash equilibrium where all probabilities are rational numbers, and . an . Nash equilibrium where at least one probability is irrational, respectively. We are interested here in the complexities of ?. and ?...Towards 作者: Microaneurysm 時間: 2025-3-29 03:26
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-531-90126-8of the buyers, to a solution equivalent to the minimum revenue equilibrium under the true preferences of buyers, which in turn is revenue equivalent to a VCG solution..We will also discuss other related issues as well as open problems.作者: 投射 時間: 2025-3-29 10:51
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-531-90126-8hanism is a crucial requirement for our algorithm, since it allows a payment process without any redundant relation between an auctioneer and players. An inability to resolve this problem could even prevent the application of such mechanisms in a real marketing process. We design a 6-approximation p作者: BUOY 時間: 2025-3-29 13:50
Quellen- und Literaturverzeichnis,the last ad impression. In this paper, we observe how the current method of attribution leads to inefficiency in the allocation mechanism. We develop a fairly general model to capture how a sequence of impressions can lead to a conversion, and solve the optimal ad allocation problem in this model. W作者: opalescence 時間: 2025-3-29 18:52
Antifaschistische Organisation der PDS, called ., which include the 2.-price Vickrey auction, there . exists a dissection protocol that provides a . for uniform or “almost uniform” probability distributions over inputs. To establish this result we present an interesting connection between the approximate privacy framework and basic conce作者: Longitude 時間: 2025-3-29 20:58
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-531-90126-8roduced there. While the proposed policy achieves the best possible price of anarchy with respect to a pure NE, the game induced by the proposed policy may admit no pure NE, thus the . measure reflects the worst case inefficiency better. We show that the dynamic inefficiency may be arbitrarily highe作者: nostrum 時間: 2025-3-30 01:35
Antifaschistische Strategic der PDS, it can be done in polynomial time. In addition the problem is shown to be APX-hard, since its restriction to graphs admitting a vertex cover is equivalent, from the approximability point of view, to . in general graphs.作者: Medicaid 時間: 2025-3-30 07:32 作者: 有雜色 時間: 2025-3-30 09:44
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-531-90126-8d axiomatization of the value by Pham Do Norde. In this paper, we propose a dual approach to marginality which allows us to derive the value of McQuillin. Thus, we close the picture outlined by De Clippel and Serrano.作者: Locale 時間: 2025-3-30 14:47
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-19224-2n design an . truthful-in-expectation mechanism, which significantly improves the running complexity of black-box reduction mechanisms that can be applied to the problem, thereby facilitating its implementation in real systems.作者: foppish 時間: 2025-3-30 18:22 作者: exceed 時間: 2025-3-30 23:07
Computation and Incentives of Competitive Equilibria in a Matching Marketof the buyers, to a solution equivalent to the minimum revenue equilibrium under the true preferences of buyers, which in turn is revenue equivalent to a VCG solution..We will also discuss other related issues as well as open problems.作者: JOG 時間: 2025-3-31 03:10
Prompt Mechanism for Ad Placement over Timehanism is a crucial requirement for our algorithm, since it allows a payment process without any redundant relation between an auctioneer and players. An inability to resolve this problem could even prevent the application of such mechanisms in a real marketing process. We design a 6-approximation p作者: 去掉 時間: 2025-3-31 08:35
The Multiple Attribution Problem in Pay-Per-Conversion Advertisingthe last ad impression. In this paper, we observe how the current method of attribution leads to inefficiency in the allocation mechanism. We develop a fairly general model to capture how a sequence of impressions can lead to a conversion, and solve the optimal ad allocation problem in this model. W作者: 有節(jié)制 時間: 2025-3-31 12:41 作者: 疼死我了 時間: 2025-3-31 13:20 作者: 因無茶而冷淡 時間: 2025-3-31 18:10
The Price of Optimum in a Matching Game it can be done in polynomial time. In addition the problem is shown to be APX-hard, since its restriction to graphs admitting a vertex cover is equivalent, from the approximability point of view, to . in general graphs.作者: 防御 時間: 2025-4-1 01:11
Peer Effects and Stability in Matching Marketsreference ordering. With this model and considering a weaker notion of stability, namely two-sided exchange stability, we prove that stable matchings always exist and characterize the set of stable matchings in terms of social welfare. To characterize the efficiency of matching markets with external作者: 易彎曲 時間: 2025-4-1 02:18
Steady Marginality: A Uniform Approach to Shapley Value for Games with Externalitiesd axiomatization of the value by Pham Do Norde. In this paper, we propose a dual approach to marginality which allows us to derive the value of McQuillin. Thus, we close the picture outlined by De Clippel and Serrano.作者: MOTIF 時間: 2025-4-1 07:02 作者: PAGAN 時間: 2025-4-1 11:29
Complexity of Rational and Irrational Nash Equilibria Nash equilibrium of the former game from a Nash equilibrium of the latter game; we identify a restriction of it that witnesses ?...As our main result, we provide two distinct reductions to simultaneously show that .. is co-.-hard and ?. is .-hard, and .. and ?. are .-hard, respectively. The reducti作者: 紡織品 時間: 2025-4-1 16:15
