標(biāo)題: Titlebook: Algorithmic Game Theory; 9th International Sy Martin Gairing,Rahul Savani Conference proceedings 2016 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 201 [打印本頁] 作者: 里程表 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 16:52
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory影響因子(影響力)
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory被引頻次
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory被引頻次學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory年度引用
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory年度引用學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory讀者反饋
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory讀者反饋學(xué)科排名
作者: POWER 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 20:51 作者: 紅腫 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 04:08 作者: aviator 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 08:05 作者: PET-scan 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 12:23
Dynamic Resource Allocation Gamess in practice. We study the stability of dynamic resource allocation games, where the appropriate notion of stability is that of subgame perfect equilibrium, study the inefficiency incurred due to selfish behavior, and also study problems that are particular to the dynamic setting, like constraints 作者: 打谷工具 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 13:18 作者: 毛細(xì)血管 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 19:08 作者: POINT 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 01:15 作者: 吞吞吐吐 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 03:46 作者: Biofeedback 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 07:00
,Schlusswort: Mein Weg aus der Ersch?pfung,echniques from the non-robust versions which we then use for establishing bounds on the Price of Anarchy. Moreover, we analyze the computational hardness of finding best possible strategies and investigate the game dynamics of our model.作者: 人造 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 11:24 作者: 猛然一拉 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 16:11 作者: 靦腆 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 19:37 作者: 騎師 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 01:18 作者: 背叛者 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 05:04
The Parallel Complexity of Coloring Games equilibrium in polynomial time is generally perceived as a positive result, this does not reflect well the reality of some applications where the game serves to implement distributed resource allocation algorithms, or to model the social choices of users with limited memory and computing power. As 作者: GRILL 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 08:17 作者: Terrace 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 11:31 作者: Decrepit 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 15:36
The Big Match in Small Space Match of Gillete (1957). These games may not allow . strategies but they always have .-optimal strategies. In this paper we design .-optimal strategies for Player 1 in these games that use only . space. Furthermore, we construct strategies for Player 1 that use space .(.), for an arbitrary small un作者: recession 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 22:19 作者: 寒冷 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 23:23 作者: Minutes 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 04:11
Efficiency of Equilibria in Uniform Matroid Congestion Gamesesman problem in combinatorial optimization. It is known that the price of anarchy is independent of the network topology for non-atomic congestion games. In other words, it is independent of the structure of the strategy spaces of the players, and for affine cost functions it equals 4/3. In this pa作者: Mirage 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 10:26
On the Price of Anarchy of Highly Congested Nonatomic Network Gameseases. In accordance with some empirical observations, we show that, under suitable conditions, the price of anarchy is asymptotic to one. We show with some counterexamples that this is not always the case. The counterexamples occur in simple parallel graphs.作者: Picks-Disease 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 15:27 作者: paradigm 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 16:41
On Selfish Creation of Robust Networksnt networks, most prominently the Internet, are not created and controlled by a central authority. Instead, Internet-like networks emerge from strategic decisions of many selfish agents. Interestingly, although lacking a coordinating authority, such naturally grown networks are surprisingly robust w作者: fledged 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 20:02
Dynamic Resource Allocation Games the traditional setting, the players make their choices concurrently and in one-shot. That is, a strategy for a player is a subset of the resources. We introduce and study . resource allocation games. In this setting, the game proceeds in phases. In each phase each player chooses one resource. A sc作者: 實(shí)現(xiàn) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 00:15 作者: 勤勉 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 07:03 作者: Debrief 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 09:31 作者: 美色花錢 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 13:36 作者: 釋放 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 20:22 作者: majestic 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 22:31
0302-9743 , SAGT 2016, held in Liverpool, UK, in September 2016.The 26 full papers presented together with ?2 one-page abstracts were carefully reviewed and selected from 62 submissions..The accepted submissions cover various important aspects.of algorithmic game theory such as computational aspects of games,作者: 使熄滅 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 01:30 作者: Onerous 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 06:40 作者: 親密 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 12:19
,Schlusswort: Mein Weg aus der Ersch?pfung,functions. These bounds exhibit a linear dependency on the size of the network (besides other parameters). In contrast, we show that for general multi-commodity networks an exponential dependency is inevitable. We also improve recent smoothness results to bound the Price of Risk Aversion.作者: 結(jié)束 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 14:49
Stressfaktor #8: Das Autonomiemotiv,mine more restricted problems such as deciding whether a certainly stable matching exists. We find a rich complexity landscape for these problems, indicating that the form uncertainty takes is significant.作者: plasma-cells 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 18:01 作者: Cerebrovascular 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 01:25
On the Robustness of the Approximate Price of?Anarchy in Generalized Congestion Games of anarchy of .-approximate coarse correlated equilibria still coincides with that of .-approximate pure Nash equilibria, for any .. As a byproduct of our proof, it also follows that such a value can always be determined by making use of the primal-dual method we introduced in a previous work.作者: 貞潔 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 03:38
The Impact of Worst-Case Deviations in Non-Atomic Network Routing Gamesfunctions. These bounds exhibit a linear dependency on the size of the network (besides other parameters). In contrast, we show that for general multi-commodity networks an exponential dependency is inevitable. We also improve recent smoothness results to bound the Price of Risk Aversion.作者: EVICT 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 09:07
Stable Matching with Uncertain Linear?Preferencesmine more restricted problems such as deciding whether a certainly stable matching exists. We find a rich complexity landscape for these problems, indicating that the form uncertainty takes is significant.作者: 可商量 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 11:50
Conference proceedings 2016ember 2016.The 26 full papers presented together with ?2 one-page abstracts were carefully reviewed and selected from 62 submissions..The accepted submissions cover various important aspects.of algorithmic game theory such as computational aspects of games, congestion?games and networks, matching an作者: 威脅你 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 15:47
,Die Fünf Elemente und ihre Wandlungsphasen, that achieves . approaching . in a . setting, where each player observes her own payoff to a query, and adjusts her behaviour independently of other players’ payoffs/actions. . rounds/queries are required. We also show how to obtain a slight improvement over ., by introducing a small amount of communication between the players.作者: Morose 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 20:48 作者: 戰(zhàn)勝 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 01:14 作者: floaters 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 04:17 作者: 排出 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 10:14
Stressfaktor #6: Der Effizienzdruck, Nash equilibrium. We thus show a separation between restricted-acyclicity and weak-acyclicity of game forms, thereby settling an open question from [.]. In addition, we refute another conjecture by showing the existence of strongly-acyclic voting rules that are not separable.作者: quiet-sleep 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 11:25
Logarithmic Query Complexity for Approximate Nash Computation in Large Games that achieves . approaching . in a . setting, where each player observes her own payoff to a query, and adjusts her behaviour independently of other players’ payoffs/actions. . rounds/queries are required. We also show how to obtain a slight improvement over ., by introducing a small amount of communication between the players.作者: 土坯 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 19:00
Complexity and Optimality of the Best Response Algorithm in Random Potential Gamesler constant. We also show that the effective number of states visited by BRA is equal to . (with .), on average. Finally, we show that BRA computes a pure Nash Equilibrium faster (in the strong stochastic order sense) than any local search algorithm over random potential games.作者: 防止 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 21:32
Deciding Maxmin Reachability in Half-Blind Stochastic Gamess, called leaktight half-blind games where the problem becomes decidable. We also show that mixed strategies in general are stronger for both players and that optimal strategies for the minimizer might require infinite-memory.作者: calorie 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 02:31
The Big Match in Small Spacee space . and it was known that no strategy can use constant space if it is .-optimal even in the limit superior sense. We also give a complementary lower bound. Furthermore, we also show that no Markov strategy, even extended with finite memory, can ensure value greater than?0 in the Big Match, answering a question posed by Neyman [.].作者: 亂砍 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 05:45
Strong and Weak Acyclicity in Iterative Voting Nash equilibrium. We thus show a separation between restricted-acyclicity and weak-acyclicity of game forms, thereby settling an open question from [.]. In addition, we refute another conjecture by showing the existence of strongly-acyclic voting rules that are not separable.作者: 燈絲 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 11:15 作者: objection 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 15:52
Der Anti-Stress-Raumanzug in 15 Sekunden,f function allows us to provide algorithms for finding approximate equilibria in these games. We begin by studying Lipschitz games, which encompass, for example, all concave games with Lipschitz continuous payoff functions. We provide an efficient algorithm for computing approximate equilibria in th作者: 北京人起源 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 16:49
Der Anti-Stress-Raumanzug in 15 Sekunden, equilibrium in polynomial time is generally perceived as a positive result, this does not reflect well the reality of some applications where the game serves to implement distributed resource allocation algorithms, or to model the social choices of users with limited memory and computing power. As 作者: 逢迎春日 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 22:43 作者: 相一致 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 00:53
Beispiele aus dem Projektmanagement-Alltag,ricted to deterministic strategies whereas the minimizer is perfectly informed. We ask the question of whether the game has maxmin value of 1 in other words we ask whether for all . there exists a deterministic strategy for the (blind) maximizer such that against all the strategies of the minimizer,作者: FLASK 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 06:43 作者: 閃光東本 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 11:35
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-17068-4ary event. A common uniform prior on . is assumed. A rumor about . meanders through the network, evolving over time. The rumor evolves, not because of ill will or noise, but because agents incorporate private signals about . before passing on the (modified) rumor. The loss to an agent is the (realiz作者: cardiovascular 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 13:42 作者: 表示問 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 20:46
Der Anti-Stress-Trainer für Sportleresman problem in combinatorial optimization. It is known that the price of anarchy is independent of the network topology for non-atomic congestion games. In other words, it is independent of the structure of the strategy spaces of the players, and for affine cost functions it equals 4/3. In this pa作者: 油膏 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 21:51 作者: 放逐某人 時(shí)間: 2025-4-1 03:32
,Schlusswort: Mein Weg aus der Ersch?pfung,bject to (bounded) deviations which are taken into account by the players. The quality deterioration caused by such deviations is assessed by the ., i.e., the worst case ratio of the cost of a Nash flow with respect to deviated latencies and the cost of a Nash flow with respect to the unaltered late作者: 得意牛 時(shí)間: 2025-4-1 08:00
,Schlusswort: Mein Weg aus der Ersch?pfung,nt networks, most prominently the Internet, are not created and controlled by a central authority. Instead, Internet-like networks emerge from strategic decisions of many selfish agents. Interestingly, although lacking a coordinating authority, such naturally grown networks are surprisingly robust w
