標(biāo)題: Titlebook: Algorithmic Game Theory; 12th International S Dimitris Fotakis,Evangelos Markakis Conference proceedings 2019 Springer Nature Switzerland A [打印本頁] 作者: 使作嘔 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 17:24
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory影響因子(影響力)
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory被引頻次
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory被引頻次學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory年度引用
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory年度引用學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory讀者反饋
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory讀者反饋學(xué)科排名
作者: apiary 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 20:24
Kleine Stresskunde: Das Adrenalinzeitalter,minates the random dictator mechanism in terms of utilitarian social welfare. We further improve the upper bound for three agents on a circle to . (whereas random dictator obtains .); and provide the first lower bounds for randomized strategyproof facility location in any metric space, using linear programming.作者: biopsy 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 00:58 作者: 胰島素 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 04:40 作者: bisphosphonate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 12:07
Sharing Information with Competitorsand each agent is interested in learning as much as possible while maintaining exclusivity for information. Our high level question is how to design mechanisms that motivate all the agents (even those with high-quality inputs) to participate in the computation; we formally study problems such as set union, intersection, and average.作者: 發(fā)炎 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 13:23
Conference proceedings 2019September/October 2019...The 25 full papers presented together with 3 invited talks and one abstract paper were?carefully reviewed and selected from 55 submissions.. The papers are organized in topical sections named: Algorithmic Mechanism Design; Auctions and Markets; Computational Aspects of Games作者: 開頭 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 18:12
Der Anti-Stress-Trainer für Assistenzenacterize the form of the optimal mechanism and reduce the on-line version of the verification problem with identical distributions to an instance of the secretary problem with one fewer secretary and a modified value distribution. This reduction also allows us to derive a prophet inequality for the on-line version of the verification problem.作者: 皺痕 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 23:23
Optimal On-Line Allocation Rules with Verificationacterize the form of the optimal mechanism and reduce the on-line version of the verification problem with identical distributions to an instance of the secretary problem with one fewer secretary and a modified value distribution. This reduction also allows us to derive a prophet inequality for the on-line version of the verification problem.作者: 單純 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 04:06 作者: Lipoprotein(A) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 08:05
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-15955-9ayers (i.e. ones who seek to maximise the social welfare). This phenomenon is observed under a variety of equilibrium concepts. In each instance, we present upper bounds on the Price of Tribalism that match the lower bounds established by our example.作者: 外科醫(yī)生 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 12:06
Obvious Strategyproofness, Bounded Rationality and Approximationproblem, “good” approximations are possible if and only if the agents’ rationality allows for a significant number of contingencies to be considered, thus showing that OSP is not too restrictive a notion of bounded rationality from the point of view of approximation.作者: Expand 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 17:03
The Impact of Tribalism on Social Welfareayers (i.e. ones who seek to maximise the social welfare). This phenomenon is observed under a variety of equilibrium concepts. In each instance, we present upper bounds on the Price of Tribalism that match the lower bounds established by our example.作者: Lament 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 20:49 作者: FLIP 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 01:56
0302-9743 ted from 55 submissions.. The papers are organized in topical sections named: Algorithmic Mechanism Design; Auctions and Markets; Computational Aspects of Games; Network Games and Congestion Games; Social Choice; and Matchings and Fair Division..978-3-030-30472-0978-3-030-30473-7Series ISSN 0302-9743 Series E-ISSN 1611-3349 作者: 健談的人 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 02:58
Optimal On-Line Allocation Rules with Verificationct than not. Each agent has access to private information about the principal’s payoff if he receives the object. The decision to allocate the object to an agent must be made upon arrival of an agent and is irreversible. There are no monetary transfers but the principal can verify agents’ reports at作者: Graphite 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 07:44 作者: Spartan 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 12:22 作者: 失誤 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 14:52
Mechanism Design for Locating a Facility Under Partial Informatione unable to fully specify where their preferred location lies, and instead only provide coarse information—namely, that their preferred location lies in some interval. Given such partial preference information, we explore the design of . deterministic mechanisms, where by . mechanisms we mean ones t作者: Fraudulent 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 19:39 作者: 得意人 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 02:23
Obvious Strategyproofness, Bounded Rationality and Approximation specific form of bounded rationality, i.e., those who have . contingent reasoning skill whatsoever. We here want to study the relationship between the approximation guarantee of incentive-compatible mechanisms and the . of rationality of the agents, intuitively measured in terms of the number of co作者: osteopath 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 07:21 作者: 要控制 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 07:37
The Declining Price Anomaly Is Not Universal in Multi-buyer Sequential Auctions (But Almost Is)en observed in a plethora of practical applications. On the theoretical side, Gale and Stegeman?[.] proved that the anomaly is guaranteed to hold in full information sequential auctions with exactly two buyers. We prove that the declining price anomaly is . guaranteed in full information sequential 作者: 加強(qiáng)防衛(wèi) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 14:11
Risk-Free Bidding in Complement-Free Combinatorial Auctionse (subadditive) bidder can guarantee in an auction against individually rational bidders? Suppose there are . bidders and . is the value bidder . has for the entire set of items. We study the above problem from the perspective of the first bidder, Bidder?1. In this setting, the worst case profit gua作者: 有惡意 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 18:48 作者: 松軟 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 21:54 作者: Seminar 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 00:37 作者: 愛哭 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 07:21 作者: FICE 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 11:48
The Online Best Reply Algorithm for Resource Allocation Problemsn problem, we are given a set of resources and a set of requests that arrive in an online manner. Each request consists of a set of feasible allocations and an allocation is a set of resources. The total cost of an allocation vector is given by the sum of the resources’ costs, where each resource’s 作者: 奇思怪想 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 16:42 作者: 分開如此和諧 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 18:37
Algorithmic Game Theory978-3-030-30473-7Series ISSN 0302-9743 Series E-ISSN 1611-3349 作者: CLAMP 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 21:53 作者: 改革運(yùn)動(dòng) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 02:04 作者: 改正 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 08:58
978-3-030-30472-0Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019作者: STALE 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 09:55
Der Anti-Stress-Trainer für Assistenzenct than not. Each agent has access to private information about the principal’s payoff if he receives the object. The decision to allocate the object to an agent must be made upon arrival of an agent and is irreversible. There are no monetary transfers but the principal can verify agents’ reports at作者: Ascribe 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 16:39
Kleine Stresskunde: Das Adrenalinzeitalter,h agent with probability proportional to the distance between the other two agents results in a mechanism that is strategyproof in expectation, and dominates the random dictator mechanism in terms of utilitarian social welfare. We further improve the upper bound for three agents on a circle to . (wh作者: 被詛咒的人 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 18:17
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-16157-6n secure multiparty computation. Specifically, we consider the setting of a joint computation where different agents have inputs of different quality and each agent is interested in learning as much as possible while maintaining exclusivity for information. Our high level question is how to design m作者: 易怒 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 01:10
Stressor: Eltern und Vorgesetzte,e unable to fully specify where their preferred location lies, and instead only provide coarse information—namely, that their preferred location lies in some interval. Given such partial preference information, we explore the design of . deterministic mechanisms, where by . mechanisms we mean ones t作者: Neutral-Spine 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 05:51 作者: 稀釋前 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 08:21 作者: slow-wave-sleep 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 12:07 作者: Monotonous 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 14:37 作者: Bernstein-test 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 19:09
,T?glich was Neues – ?Büro“-kratie,e (subadditive) bidder can guarantee in an auction against individually rational bidders? Suppose there are . bidders and . is the value bidder . has for the entire set of items. We study the above problem from the perspective of the first bidder, Bidder?1. In this setting, the worst case profit gua作者: Foreknowledge 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 01:22 作者: 豐富 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 04:58
Kleine Stresskunde: Das Adrenalinzeitalter,be computationally equivalent to the decision problem for the existential theory of the reals, or stated in terms of complexity classes, .-complete, when .. We show that, unless they turn into trivial problems, they are .-hard even for 3-player . games..We also obtain new results about several other作者: Mnemonics 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 08:17
Der Anti-Stress-Trainer für Juristenollowers are exponentially large in a natural representation of the problem..In . games, the notion of a Stackelberg equilibrium coincides with the notion of a .?(Korzhyk et al. .). Finding these equilibrium concepts in zero-sum games can be efficiently done when the players have polynomially many p作者: Outspoken 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 12:00
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-15955-9games upon the quality of equilibria attained. To this end, we introduce the notion of a . of an arbitrary strategic game, in which players’ subjective cost functions are updated to reflect this, and the associated ., which is the ratio of the social welfare of the worst Nash equilibrium of the trib作者: BET 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 17:27
Stresskunde: Das Adrenalinzeitalter,n problem, we are given a set of resources and a set of requests that arrive in an online manner. Each request consists of a set of feasible allocations and an allocation is a set of resources. The total cost of an allocation vector is given by the sum of the resources’ costs, where each resource’s 作者: Infusion 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 23:42
Der Anti-Stress-Trainer für Medizinerfender chooses, probabilistically as well, a connected induced subgraph of the network of . nodes to scan and clean. Each attacker wishes to maximize the probability of escaping her cleaning by the defender. On the other hand, the goal of the defender is to maximize the expected number of attackers 作者: Angiogenesis 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 00:59 作者: 間諜活動(dòng) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 04:22 作者: brother 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 11:24
Der Anti-Stress-Trainer für FührungsfrauenTherefore, giving the seller absolute freedom over the design space results in absurd conclusions; competing with the optimal mechanism is hopeless. Instead, in this paper we study four broad classes of mechanisms, each characterized by a distinct use of randomness. Our goal is twofold: to explore t作者: elucidate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 13:17 作者: Aspiration 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 20:30 作者: 不能妥協(xié) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 23:16
Kleine Stresskunde: Das Adrenalinzeitalter,how that if players can use arbitrary Turing machines to compute their strategies, then every computational game has an .-Nash equilibrium. These results may shed light on competitive settings where the availability of more running time or faster algorithms can lead to a “computational arms race”, p作者: 誹謗 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 04:14
Kleine Stresskunde: Das Adrenalinzeitalter,ng if a game has a rational valued Nash equilibrium. These results also hold for 3-player zero-sum games..Our proof methodology applies to corresponding decision problems about symmetric Nash equilibria in symmetric games as well, and in particular our new results carry over to the symmetric setting作者: 下垂 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 05:18
Der Anti-Stress-Trainer für Juristenes where the Stackelberg Equilibria can be computed efficiently if the Nash equilibrium in its zero-sum form could be computed efficiently, in general, structural properties that allow for efficient computation of Nash equilibrium in zero-sum games are not sufficient for computing Stackelberg equili作者: Urologist 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 09:17 作者: Living-Will 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 16:41 作者: Axillary 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 19:59
