標題: Titlebook: Algorithmic Game Theory; 15th International S Panagiotis Kanellopoulos,Maria Kyropoulou,Alexandr Conference proceedings 2022 The Editor(s) [打印本頁] 作者: 無法仿效 時間: 2025-3-21 18:02
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory影響因子(影響力)
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory影響因子(影響力)學科排名
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory網絡公開度
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory網絡公開度學科排名
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory被引頻次
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory被引頻次學科排名
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory年度引用
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory年度引用學科排名
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory讀者反饋
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory讀者反饋學科排名
作者: Dedication 時間: 2025-3-21 21:42
An Improved Bound for?the?Tree Conjecture in?Network Creation Games, and the objective of each vertex is to minimize the sum of the costs of the edges it purchases plus the sum of the distances to every other vertex in the resultant network. A long-standing conjecture states that if . then every Nash equilibrium in the game is a spanning tree. We prove the conjecture holds for any ..作者: LIEN 時間: 2025-3-22 02:51
Conference proceedings 2022n September 2022.?The 31 full papers included in this book were carefully reviewed and selected from 83 submissions. They were organized in topical sections as follows: Auctions, markets and mechanism design; computational aspects in games; congestion and network creation games; data sharing and learning; social choice and stable matchings..作者: itinerary 時間: 2025-3-22 04:57 作者: Choreography 時間: 2025-3-22 11:47
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-8349-9493-6e a decline in their overall profit compared to their total pre-merger profit. This phenomenon is more striking in small oligopolistic markets, where mergers increase market concentration and may hence trigger a substantial increase in prices. In this paper, we investigate the severity of the merger作者: 新奇 時間: 2025-3-22 14:58
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-86226-330-1l by encoding other-regarding preferences of the players into the utility functions. By doing so we leave the original domain where VCG mechanisms can be applied directly..We derive a characterization of the class of truthful mechanisms under the new model, crucially exploiting the specific form of 作者: 即席 時間: 2025-3-22 18:16
Rechtsprechende Abteilung im Patentamt,d more fair than the optimal auction. Indeed, it anonymously selects a provisional winner by a symmetric ascending-price process, and only then uses a personalized posted price. A . auction extracts at least 1/2 of the optimal revenue, even under a correlated value distribution. This bound is tight,作者: 受傷 時間: 2025-3-23 00:51 作者: GILD 時間: 2025-3-23 03:45 作者: 微塵 時間: 2025-3-23 07:56 作者: Latency 時間: 2025-3-23 10:25
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-94367-6isfy some contest-specific criterion, and the value of this prize to a winner decreases as the number of winners increases. The players produce outputs for a set of activities, and the winning criteria of the contests are based on these outputs. We consider two variations of the model: (i) players h作者: kidney 時間: 2025-3-23 15:40 作者: Demulcent 時間: 2025-3-23 19:25
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7091-5520-2es, were introduced about 10 years ago by Azrieli and Shmaya. They showed via the probabilistic method that .-player Lipschitz games with . strategies per player have . .-approximate Nash equilibria, for .. Here we provide the first hardness result for the corresponding computational problem, showin作者: 轉換 時間: 2025-3-23 23:17 作者: PANG 時間: 2025-3-24 03:50
Wer arbeitet mit dem Anti-Bias-Ansatz,f the literature. The main computational challenge in this context is the clearing problem, a fixed point search problem that essentially determines insolvent firms and their exposure to systemic risk, technically known as recovery rates. When Credit Default Swaps, a derivative connected to the 2008作者: 水獺 時間: 2025-3-24 06:36 作者: Guileless 時間: 2025-3-24 11:51 作者: Anticoagulant 時間: 2025-3-24 17:23 作者: 山間窄路 時間: 2025-3-24 21:43 作者: Notorious 時間: 2025-3-25 00:21 作者: 傾聽 時間: 2025-3-25 07:00 作者: TATE 時間: 2025-3-25 08:06 作者: 友好 時間: 2025-3-25 11:52 作者: STYX 時間: 2025-3-25 17:45
How Bad is the?Merger Paradox?e a decline in their overall profit compared to their total pre-merger profit. This phenomenon is more striking in small oligopolistic markets, where mergers increase market concentration and may hence trigger a substantial increase in prices. In this paper, we investigate the severity of the merger作者: 晚間 時間: 2025-3-25 21:49 作者: 用手捏 時間: 2025-3-26 02:16
Lookahead Auctions with?Poolingd more fair than the optimal auction. Indeed, it anonymously selects a provisional winner by a symmetric ascending-price process, and only then uses a personalized posted price. A . auction extracts at least 1/2 of the optimal revenue, even under a correlated value distribution. This bound is tight,作者: 高貴領導 時間: 2025-3-26 05:43
Budget Feasible Mechanisms for?Procurement Auctions with?Divisible Agentsed fractionally, there exists an optimal mechanism with approximation guarantee . under the small bidder assumption. We study the divisible case without the small bidder assumption, but assume that the true costs of the agents are bounded by the budget. This setting lends itself to modeling economic作者: 我要威脅 時間: 2025-3-26 09:34 作者: 執(zhí)拗 時間: 2025-3-26 16:22 作者: 增減字母法 時間: 2025-3-26 20:02
Simultaneous Contests with?Equal Sharing Allocation of?Prizes: Computational Complexity and?Price ofisfy some contest-specific criterion, and the value of this prize to a winner decreases as the number of winners increases. The players produce outputs for a set of activities, and the winning criteria of the contests are based on these outputs. We consider two variations of the model: (i) players h作者: Toxoid-Vaccines 時間: 2025-3-26 23:22 作者: SNEER 時間: 2025-3-27 02:35 作者: VALID 時間: 2025-3-27 06:52 作者: IST 時間: 2025-3-27 12:01
Financial Networks with?Singleton Liability Prioritiesf the literature. The main computational challenge in this context is the clearing problem, a fixed point search problem that essentially determines insolvent firms and their exposure to systemic risk, technically known as recovery rates. When Credit Default Swaps, a derivative connected to the 2008作者: projectile 時間: 2025-3-27 15:32
Automated Equilibrium Analysis of , Gamesials, which makes it challenging to compute. This paper presents an algorithm that computes this set for the simplest game with more than two players with arbitrary (possibly non-generic) payoffs, which has not been done before. We give new elegant formulas for completely mixed equilibria, and compu作者: 粘 時間: 2025-3-27 19:55 作者: MITE 時間: 2025-3-28 00:47
A Common Generalization of?Budget Games and?Congestion Gameslems. Budget games have several similarities to congestion games, one of which is that the matroid structure of the strategy space is essential for the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium (PNE). Despite these similarities, however, the theoretical relation between budget games and congestion games 作者: ANN 時間: 2025-3-28 05:07 作者: Prognosis 時間: 2025-3-28 10:10
Greater Flexibility in?Mechanism Design Through Altruisms that can redistribute the payments among the players. Also here, it turns out that altruism has a positive effect in the sense that the payments needed to guarantee truthfulness can be further reduced..Finally, we illustrate our theoretical results by applying them to well-studied mechanism design作者: ACTIN 時間: 2025-3-28 12:48 作者: 落葉劑 時間: 2025-3-28 16:59
On Improved Interval Cover Mechanisms for?Crowdsourcing Marketsasks, for which we provide a truthful FPTAS. Finally, we also highlight connections of our problem with other well-studied optimization problems, out of which, we infer further conclusions on its (in)approximability.作者: 包租車船 時間: 2025-3-28 18:44
Simultaneous Contests with?Equal Sharing Allocation of?Prizes: Computational Complexity and?Price ofputing a best response is NP-hard. For natural restricted versions where best response is easy to compute, we show that finding a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is PLS-complete, and finding a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium is (PPAD.PLS)-complete. On the other hand, an approximate pure-strategy Nash作者: 合同 時間: 2025-3-28 23:30 作者: 易達到 時間: 2025-3-29 03:06 作者: ACTIN 時間: 2025-3-29 08:00 作者: 陳腐思想 時間: 2025-3-29 15:08
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-8349-9493-6s with affine demand two firms can never lose more than 1/9 of their profit when merging, and this bound is tight. We also study the asymptotic loss in larger markets, where it is easy to show that the profit loss can be arbitrarily large when multiple firms merge; we give bounds that characterize t作者: 溫室 時間: 2025-3-29 18:57 作者: 謊言 時間: 2025-3-29 20:17 作者: 粗魯性質 時間: 2025-3-30 03:35
Durchsetzung auf nationaler Ebeneasks, for which we provide a truthful FPTAS. Finally, we also highlight connections of our problem with other well-studied optimization problems, out of which, we infer further conclusions on its (in)approximability.作者: 信條 時間: 2025-3-30 05:23 作者: Rinne-Test 時間: 2025-3-30 09:46 作者: 珠寶 時間: 2025-3-30 14:06
Wer arbeitet mit dem Anti-Bias-Ansatz,udied from a game-theoretic standpoint. We explicitly study the clearing problem whenever the firms pay according to a singleton liability priority list and prove that it is .-complete. Finally, we provide a host of .-hardness results for the computation of priority lists that optimise specific obje作者: 手勢 時間: 2025-3-30 18:57
Was ist Stressregulierung genau?,t games by Drees, Feldotto, Riechers, and Skopalik (2019). We then prove that every matroid g-budget game has a PNE, which extends the result for budget games. We finally present a linear-time procedure to find a PNE in a certain class of singleton g-budget games.作者: BAIT 時間: 2025-3-30 22:57
Panagiotis Kanellopoulos,Maria Kyropoulou,Alexandr作者: 嘮叨 時間: 2025-3-31 02:23
Conference proceedings 2022n September 2022.?The 31 full papers included in this book were carefully reviewed and selected from 83 submissions. They were organized in topical sections as follows: Auctions, markets and mechanism design; computational aspects in games; congestion and network creation games; data sharing and lea作者: Hallmark 時間: 2025-3-31 06:17 作者: Dysplasia 時間: 2025-3-31 11:18
Rechtsprechende Abteilung im Patentamt,ess of .. Our main result is that this simple pooling operation improves the revenue guarantees for independent buyers from 1/2 to 4/7 of the optimal revenue. We also give a complementary negative result, showing that for arbitrary correlated priors . cannot do better than 1/2 approximation.作者: euphoria 時間: 2025-3-31 14:41
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7091-5520-2trix games) and the proof of containment in . (by derandomizing the selection of a pure equilibrium from a mixed one). In fact, our approach implies containment in . for any class of Lipschitz games where payoffs from mixed-strategy profiles can be deterministically computed.作者: MOAT 時間: 2025-3-31 17:49 作者: venous-leak 時間: 2025-3-31 22:11
PPAD-Complete Pure Approximate Nash Equilibria in Lipschitz Gamestrix games) and the proof of containment in . (by derandomizing the selection of a pure equilibrium from a mixed one). In fact, our approach implies containment in . for any class of Lipschitz games where payoffs from mixed-strategy profiles can be deterministically computed.作者: Organonitrile 時間: 2025-4-1 03:08 作者: BAIL 時間: 2025-4-1 07:38
Finanzwirtschaftlicher Modellrahmen,i) tokenomics, (iii) decentralized service provision, and (iv) rewards sharing. We explore these characteristics, identify design goals and challenges and investigate some crucial game theoretic aspects of reward sharing that can be decisive for their effective operation.作者: 不開心 時間: 2025-4-1 10:44
