標(biāo)題: Titlebook: Algorithmic Game Theory; 16th International S Argyrios Deligkas,Aris Filos-Ratsikas Conference proceedings 2023 The Editor(s) (if applicabl [打印本頁(yè)] 作者: Iodine 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 18:26
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory影響因子(影響力)
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory被引頻次
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory被引頻次學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory年度引用
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory年度引用學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory讀者反饋
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory讀者反饋學(xué)科排名
作者: 易怒 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 22:33
Entrepreneurship Facility-Activation Gamesactivation cost, we provide tight linear bounds for the PoA and PoS. Additionally, we analyze the computational complexity of both the social optimum and the cheapest stable solution. We distinguish between games with weighted and unweighted users, with and without symmetric strategies, and between 作者: 誘騙 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 02:26 作者: occurrence 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 07:55 作者: Minikin 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 09:38
Diversity-Seeking Jump Games in?Networks some agents are stubborn. However, in trees, our diversity-seeking jump game always admits a pure Nash equilibrium, if all agents are strategic. In regular graphs and spider graphs with a single empty node, as well as in all paths, we prove a stronger result: the game is a potential game, that is, 作者: Metastasis 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 15:38 作者: Herpetologist 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 19:39
The Price of?Equity with?Binary Valuations and?Few Agent Typesfor .-mean welfare for all .. For any fixed ., our bounds are tight up to constant factors. A useful insight of our work is to identify the . of allocations that underlie the upper (respectively, the lower) bounds . for all .-mean welfare measures, thus providing a unified structural understanding o作者: 天真 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 21:26
Der (Mehr-)Wert der Zwei-Elternteil-Familiemial time in the special case of bipartite graphs, where all priceable vertices belong to the same side of the bipartition. In this paper, we investigate . on paths and present a dynamic program with linear time and space complexity.作者: Eeg332 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 02:46 作者: semiskilled 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 06:28 作者: 不知疲倦 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 12:11 作者: Herpetologist 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 16:29 作者: PAD416 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 20:25
Zur Chemie der Ketonranzigkeit,nisms with efficacy ratio . and where no agent is more than an .?fraction worse off than they are in the fairest possible solution (given by an algorithm that does not use personal or type data). Moreover, these bicriteria guarantees are tight and apply to both the single machine case and the multip作者: 樂章 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 01:56 作者: 褻瀆 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 02:28
Stackelberg Vertex Cover on?a?Path assigned a fixed weight. The game is played in two stages. First, the leader chooses prices for the vertices under her control. Afterward, the second player, called ., selects a min weight vertex cover in the resulting weighted graph. That is, the follower selects a subset of vertices . such that e作者: sclera 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 10:27
Computational Complexity of?Decision Problems About Nash Equilibria in?Win-Lose Multi-player Gamesrties. Such problems have generally been shown to be complete for the complexity class ., that captures the complexity of the decision problem for the Existential Theory of the Reals. For most of these problems, we show that their complexity remains unchanged even when restricted to . games, where a作者: 可行 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 12:46 作者: Psa617 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 15:15
The Contest Game for?Crowdsourcing Reviewsd pays an . ., strictly increasing with .. Under . a player may opt to not write a review, paying zero effort; . does not provide this option. For her effort, she is awarded a . per her ., which is either ., like, e.g., the popular ., or .; it is . when it does not depend on the numbers of players c作者: 遺產(chǎn) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 21:03
Entrepreneurship Facility-Activation Gameseived much attention in the AGT community..We define and study an ., played by a single entrepreneur and . users. The entrepreneur may activate and close facilities, and each user should select one active facility. This setting combines a weighted singleton congestion game played by the users, with 作者: 爭(zhēng)論 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 01:13 作者: 臆斷 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 06:14
Parameterized Complexity of?Gerrymandering These representatives craft and vote on legislation, incentivizing political parties to win as many districts as possible (ideally a plurality). Gerrymandering is the process by which district boundaries are manipulated to the advantage of a desired candidate or party. We study the parameterized co作者: optional 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 10:24 作者: 調(diào)情 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 13:03
Robustness of?Participatory Budgeting Outcomes: Complexity and?Experimentsity of the #.-. problem, where given a PB instance we ask for the number of ways in which we can flip a given number of approvals in the votes, so that a specific project is selected. This problem captures computing the funding probabilities of projects in case random noise is added. Unfortunately, 作者: Genteel 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 17:43
Into the?Unknown: Assigning Reviewers to?Papers with?Uncertain Affinitiesaches estimate a real-valued . for each paper-reviewer pair that acts as a proxy for the quality of the match, and then assign reviewers to maximize the sum of affinity scores. Most affinity score estimation methods are inherently noisy: reviewers can only bid on a small number of papers, and textua作者: dearth 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 23:44
Diversity-Seeking Jump Games in?Networkslonging to . different types are placed at the nodes of a network. Agents can be either stubborn, in which case they will always choose their preferred location, or strategic, in which case they aim to maximize the fraction of agents of their own type in their neighborhood. In the so-called Schellin作者: DOTE 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 02:41
Maximin Fair Allocation of?Indivisible Items Under Cost Utilitiesheir .—the value they are guaranteed if they divide the goods into as many bundles as there are agents, and receive their lowest valued bundle. An . is one where every agent receives at least their maximin fair share. We examine the existence of such allocations when agents have .. In this setting, 作者: shrill 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 07:48 作者: Defiance 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 09:05
EFX Allocations for?Indivisible Chores: Matching-Based Approachions is a standing open problem for both goods and chores, the understanding of the existence of EFX allocations for chores is less established compared to goods. We study the existence of EFX allocation for chores under the assumption that all agent’s cost functions are additive. Specifically, we s作者: STELL 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 13:34 作者: athlete’s-foot 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 17:06 作者: 精致 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 21:51
Conference proceedings 2023tember 2023.?.The 26 full papers included in this book were carefully reviewed and selected from 59 submissions. They were organized in topical sections as follows:??computational aspects and efficiency in games; computational social choice; fair division; matching and mechanism design..作者: Sciatica 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 02:18 作者: 不安 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 07:43 作者: collagen 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 12:33 作者: 徹底檢查 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 17:11 作者: 航海太平洋 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 19:14 作者: aerobic 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 22:44
Coordinating Monetary Contributions in?Participatory Budgetingypassed if we consider some natural restricted valuations, namely laminar single-minded valuations and symmetric valuations. Our analysis for the former restriction leads to the discovery of a new class of tractable instances for the . problem, a classical problem in combinatorial optimization.作者: 大都市 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 03:57
Robustness of?Participatory Budgeting Outcomes: Complexity and?Experiments the Method of Equal Shares) on real-world instances from Pabulib. Using sampling, we quantify the extent to which simple, greedy PB rules are more robust than proportional ones, and we identify three types of (very) non-robust projects in real-world PB instances.作者: 犬儒主義者 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 08:50
EFX Allocations for?Indivisible Chores: Matching-Based Approachtions of all agents except for one are identical ordering, and (iii) the number of agents is three and each agent has a personalized bi-valued cost function. Furthermore, we provide a polynomial time algorithm to find an EFX allocation for each case.作者: FRONT 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 11:23 作者: 安裝 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 18:33
Beteiligung ohne soziale Exklusion,ricts .. Moreover, we show that . remains W[2]-hard in trees with . leaves with respect to the combined parameter .. In contrast, Gupta et al. (SAGT 2021) give an FPT algorithm for paths with respect to .. To complement our results and fill this gap, we provide an algorithm to solve . that is FPT in . when . is a fixed constant.作者: 抱狗不敢前 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 19:04 作者: semiskilled 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 23:21 作者: Myosin 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 04:03
Parameterized Complexity of?Gerrymanderingricts .. Moreover, we show that . remains W[2]-hard in trees with . leaves with respect to the combined parameter .. In contrast, Gupta et al. (SAGT 2021) give an FPT algorithm for paths with respect to .. To complement our results and fill this gap, we provide an algorithm to solve . that is FPT in . when . is a fixed constant.作者: 百靈鳥 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 10:28 作者: alcohol-abuse 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 14:01 作者: Ingenuity 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 16:07
Computational Complexity of?Decision Problems About Nash Equilibria in?Win-Lose Multi-player Gamesrties. Such problems have generally been shown to be complete for the complexity class ., that captures the complexity of the decision problem for the Existential Theory of the Reals. For most of these problems, we show that their complexity remains unchanged even when restricted to . games, where all utilities are either?0 or?1.作者: 愛花花兒憤怒 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 21:36
Conference proceedings 2023tember 2023.?.The 26 full papers included in this book were carefully reviewed and selected from 59 submissions. They were organized in topical sections as follows:??computational aspects and efficiency in games; computational social choice; fair division; matching and mechanism design..作者: comely 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 00:09
Der (Mehr-)Wert der Zwei-Elternteil-Familie assigned a fixed weight. The game is played in two stages. First, the leader chooses prices for the vertices under her control. Afterward, the second player, called ., selects a min weight vertex cover in the resulting weighted graph. That is, the follower selects a subset of vertices . such that e作者: kyphoplasty 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 05:00
Der (Mehr-)Wert der Zwei-Elternteil-Familierties. Such problems have generally been shown to be complete for the complexity class ., that captures the complexity of the decision problem for the Existential Theory of the Reals. For most of these problems, we show that their complexity remains unchanged even when restricted to . games, where a作者: humectant 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 08:56
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-27945-5ined by a cost-sharing protocol. Arbitrary cost-sharing has been studied in various contexts, such as congestion games, network design games, and scheduling games. The natural counterpart of arbitrary cost-sharing in the context of a utility game is ., meaning that each player will request a certain作者: electrolyte 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 12:39
Beratung als Verbindungsarbeit,d pays an . ., strictly increasing with .. Under . a player may opt to not write a review, paying zero effort; . does not provide this option. For her effort, she is awarded a . per her ., which is either ., like, e.g., the popular ., or .; it is . when it does not depend on the numbers of players c作者: 聽寫 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 20:30 作者: 刀鋒 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 23:49
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-29184-9agents of different types each strategically select a node on a given graph that models the residential area to maximize their individual utility. The latter solely depends on the types of the agents on neighboring nodes and it has been a standard assumption to consider utility functions that are mo
