標題: Titlebook: Algorithmic Game Theory; 8th International Sy Martin Hoefer Conference proceedings 2015 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015 Social netwo [打印本頁] 作者: 欺騙某人 時間: 2025-3-21 16:35
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory影響因子(影響力)
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory影響因子(影響力)學科排名
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory網(wǎng)絡公開度
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory網(wǎng)絡公開度學科排名
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory被引頻次
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory被引頻次學科排名
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory年度引用
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory年度引用學科排名
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory讀者反饋
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory讀者反饋學科排名
作者: extinct 時間: 2025-3-21 23:53
Further Results on Capacitated Network Design Games, and this bound is tight. Furthermore, we show that the price of stability for asymmetric games can be ., matching the previously known upper bound. We also prove that the convergence time of best response dynamics cannot be bounded by any function of?..作者: 偏離 時間: 2025-3-22 00:55 作者: OCTO 時間: 2025-3-22 08:00 作者: 修飾 時間: 2025-3-22 09:15 作者: Fortuitous 時間: 2025-3-22 12:58 作者: 缺乏 時間: 2025-3-22 20:43 作者: 過分自信 時間: 2025-3-22 21:24 作者: MAOIS 時間: 2025-3-23 03:46 作者: 售穴 時間: 2025-3-23 07:43
Pareto Optimal Matchings in Many-to-Many Markets with Tiesess only for certain such orderings. This shortcoming is not specific to our mechanism; we show that any mechanism generating all POMs in our setting is prone to strategic manipulation. This is in contrast to the one-to-one case (with or without ties), for which truthful mechanisms generating all POMs do exist.作者: 牽連 時間: 2025-3-23 13:26 作者: 難管 時間: 2025-3-23 17:20
0302-9743 ry, SAGT 2015, held in Saarbrücken, Germany, in September 2015...The 22 full papers presented together with one extended abstract and 6 brief announcements were carefully reviewed and selected from 63 submissions. They cover various important aspects of algorithmic game theory, such as matching unde作者: 儀式 時間: 2025-3-23 19:16 作者: motor-unit 時間: 2025-3-24 00:46 作者: COLON 時間: 2025-3-24 03:21 作者: 貪心 時間: 2025-3-24 07:13
Cost-Sharing Models in Participatory Sensingdge that can be exploited by innovative applications and data analytics services. A key aspect in all such platforms is that sensor information is not free but comes at a cost. As a result, these platforms may suffer due to insufficient sensor information made publicly available if applications do n作者: SNEER 時間: 2025-3-24 11:45
Further Results on Capacitated Network Design Gamesplayers using the edge. Every edge has a finite capacity that limits the number of players using the edge. We study the price of stability for such games with respect to the max-cost objective, i.e., the maximum cost paid by any player. We show that the price of stability is .(.) for symmetric games作者: Conduit 時間: 2025-3-24 15:39
Cost-Sharing Scheduling Games on Restricted Unrelated Machinesthe job strategies. An edge connecting a job and a machine specifies that the job may choose the machine; edge weights correspond to processing times. Each machine has an activation cost that needs to be covered by the job assigned to it. Jobs assigned to a particular machine share its cost proporti作者: Wordlist 時間: 2025-3-24 22:09 作者: Armory 時間: 2025-3-25 02:46
Towards More Practical Linear Programming-Based Techniques for Algorithmic Mechanism Designed approximation algorithms. Due to the use of the Ellipsoid method, a direct implementation of the method is unlikely to be efficient in practice. We propose to use the much simpler and usually faster multiplicative weights update method instead. The simplification comes at the cost of slightly wea作者: 浪費物質 時間: 2025-3-25 04:27 作者: 使腐爛 時間: 2025-3-25 07:54
The Combinatorial World (of Auctions) According to GARP mechanism design to encourage truthful behaviour in applications such as combinatorial auctions. In the auction setting, we present an efficient combinatorial algorithm to find a virtual valuation function with the optimal (additive) rationality guarantee. Moreover, we show that there exists such a作者: dowagers-hump 時間: 2025-3-25 12:39 作者: 細查 時間: 2025-3-25 19:26
Algorithmic Signaling of Features in Auction Designwer on a web page, has numerous features describing the viewer’s demographics, browsing history, temporal aspects, etc. In these markets, an auctioneer must select a few key features to signal to bidders. These features should be selected such that the bidder with the highest value for the product c作者: 強壯 時間: 2025-3-25 23:09 作者: enlist 時間: 2025-3-26 00:14 作者: Urea508 時間: 2025-3-26 05:01
Algorithmic Game Theory978-3-662-48433-3Series ISSN 0302-9743 Series E-ISSN 1611-3349 作者: 商談 時間: 2025-3-26 12:09
Prasanta Pattanaik,Yongsheng Xuints for hospitals are generalized to matroid constraints. By generalizing the algorithms of O’Malley for the hospitals/residents problem with ties and master lists, we give polynomial-time algorithms for deciding whether there exist a super-stable matching and a strongly stable matching in our model, and finding such matchings if they exist.作者: FIG 時間: 2025-3-26 13:14
Monocular and Binocular Cooperation,ed approximation algorithms. Due to the use of the Ellipsoid method, a direct implementation of the method is unlikely to be efficient in practice. We propose to use the much simpler and usually faster multiplicative weights update method instead. The simplification comes at the cost of slightly weaker approximation and truthfulness guarantees.作者: GRATE 時間: 2025-3-26 18:18 作者: 全等 時間: 2025-3-26 22:52 作者: 粗野 時間: 2025-3-27 01:56 作者: 似少年 時間: 2025-3-27 08:59
Deprivation, Inequality and Polarizationdge that can be exploited by innovative applications and data analytics services. A key aspect in all such platforms is that sensor information is not free but comes at a cost. As a result, these platforms may suffer due to insufficient sensor information made publicly available if applications do n作者: 孤獨無助 時間: 2025-3-27 11:00
Deprofessionalisierung der Pflegeplayers using the edge. Every edge has a finite capacity that limits the number of players using the edge. We study the price of stability for such games with respect to the max-cost objective, i.e., the maximum cost paid by any player. We show that the price of stability is .(.) for symmetric games作者: 心胸狹窄 時間: 2025-3-27 15:02
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-37623-9the job strategies. An edge connecting a job and a machine specifies that the job may choose the machine; edge weights correspond to processing times. Each machine has an activation cost that needs to be covered by the job assigned to it. Jobs assigned to a particular machine share its cost proporti作者: 不易燃 時間: 2025-3-27 18:36 作者: 夾克怕包裹 時間: 2025-3-28 00:36
Monocular and Binocular Cooperation,ed approximation algorithms. Due to the use of the Ellipsoid method, a direct implementation of the method is unlikely to be efficient in practice. We propose to use the much simpler and usually faster multiplicative weights update method instead. The simplification comes at the cost of slightly wea作者: Freeze 時間: 2025-3-28 02:46
Lecture Notes in Biomathematicsondary preferences, governing their behavior when their vote cannot affect the election outcome. Specifically, we study two models that have been recently considered in the literature: . voters, who prefer to abstain when they are not pivotal, and . voters, who prefer to vote truthfully when they ar作者: 笨重 時間: 2025-3-28 06:50 作者: brachial-plexus 時間: 2025-3-28 13:24 作者: 孵卵器 時間: 2025-3-28 17:31 作者: auxiliary 時間: 2025-3-28 18:48
Die Ostdeutschen in ausgew?hlten Karikaturenes a fraction proportional to her bids. We quantify the inefficiency of Nash equilibria by studying the Price of Anarchy (PoA) of the induced game under complete and incomplete information. When agents’ valuations are concave, we show that the Bayesian Nash equilibria can be arbitrarily inefficient,作者: 熱烈的歡迎 時間: 2025-3-29 01:18 作者: Cholecystokinin 時間: 2025-3-29 04:59
Martin HoeferIncludes supplementary material: 作者: Morose 時間: 2025-3-29 09:23
Lecture Notes in Computer Sciencehttp://image.papertrans.cn/a/image/152942.jpg作者: Osteoarthritis 時間: 2025-3-29 11:26 作者: fulcrum 時間: 2025-3-29 18:15 作者: Bureaucracy 時間: 2025-3-29 22:49
Stable Matchings with Ties, Master Preference Lists, and Matroid Constraintsints for hospitals are generalized to matroid constraints. By generalizing the algorithms of O’Malley for the hospitals/residents problem with ties and master lists, we give polynomial-time algorithms for deciding whether there exist a super-stable matching and a strongly stable matching in our model, and finding such matchings if they exist.作者: maintenance 時間: 2025-3-30 01:00 作者: N斯巴達人 時間: 2025-3-30 05:31
Deprivation, Inequality and Polarizationand satisfies all constraints on restricted pairs, there are two ways of relaxing the constraints by permitting a solution to: (1)?be blocked by as few as possible pairs, or (2)?violate as few as possible constraints on restricted pairs..Our main theorems prove that for the (bipartite) stable marria作者: Aerate 時間: 2025-3-30 10:26 作者: 寒冷 時間: 2025-3-30 15:56
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-37623-9on-cost. Games with unit-cost machines are potential games, and every instance has an optimal solution which is also a pure Nash equilibrium (PNE). On the other hand, with arbitrary-cost machines, a PNE is guaranteed to exist only for very limited instances, and the price of stability is linear in t作者: incision 時間: 2025-3-30 19:06 作者: Obscure 時間: 2025-3-31 00:36 作者: Autobiography 時間: 2025-3-31 04:44
Thomas Cattoi,David M. Odorisions for many buyers, again in the context of a revenue target. For ., we provide a FPTAS to compute the optimal posted prices for a given sequence of buyers. For ., we apply the results of?[.] on sparse covers of distributions to obtain a PTAS in a setting where the seller has a constraint on discrim
