標(biāo)題: Titlebook: Algorithmic Game Theory; Second International Marios Mavronicolas,Vicky G. Papadopoulou Conference proceedings 2009 Springer-Verlag Berlin [打印本頁] 作者: whiplash 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 17:32
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory影響因子(影響力)
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory被引頻次
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory被引頻次學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory年度引用
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory年度引用學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory讀者反饋
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory讀者反饋學(xué)科排名
作者: myopia 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 00:11
M. Wolfersdorf,AK-Depressionsstationen buyer is a monotonicity domain if every finite-valued monotone randomized allocation rule defined on it is implementable, in the sense that there exists a randomized truth-telling direct mechanism, which implements this allocation rule. The domain is a weak monotonicity domain if every deterministi作者: 胡言亂語 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 03:20 作者: Little 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 06:26 作者: aspect 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 10:40 作者: 黃油沒有 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 14:52 作者: 施魔法 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 20:56
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-77105-7 coalitions, and only deviations by the prescribed coalitions are considered. This is in difference to the classical concept of strong equilibrium according to which any subset of the agents may deviate. In resource selection games, each agent selects a resource from a set of resources, and its payo作者: Detonate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 21:28 作者: 爆米花 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 04:55 作者: 和平 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 08:52
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-211-79278-0g variants of feasible Groves mechanisms (termed as ‘redistribution of VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves) payments’) that generate reduced deficit. With this in mind, we study sequential mechanisms and consider optimal strategies that could reduce the deficit resulting under the simultaneous mechanism. We 作者: Minatory 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 12:22 作者: OPINE 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 14:40
Was ist zu tun: Interventionen,ombination of agents’ actions, which are not directly observable by the principal. In [1] we suggest and study a basic “combinatorial agency” model for this setting. In this paper we expose a somewhat surprising phenomenon found in this setting: cases where the principal can gain by asking agents to作者: pester 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 22:02
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-68327-8ubgroup of players has an incentive to deviate. However, some coalitional games have empty cores, and any outcome in such a game is unstable..In this paper, we investigate the possibility of stabilizing a coalitional game by using external payments. We consider a scenario where an external party, wh作者: 新義 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 22:29 作者: 厚顏 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 02:36
Was wir nicht wissen: offene Fragen,ation in online auctions, where an auctioneer is selling a collection of identical items to anonymous unit-demand bidders. The auctioneer has the full knowledge of bidders’ private valuations for the items and tries to maximize his profit. Compared with the profit of fixed price schemes, the competi作者: Radiculopathy 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 07:45
Was wir nicht wissen: offene Fragen,ring stable matchings with socially optimal ones, as well as studying the convergence of various natural algorithms to stable matchings. Our main goal is to design mechanisms that incentivize agents to participate in matchings that are socially desirable. We show that theoretically, the loss in soci作者: cipher 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 11:47
Was ist zu tun: Interventionen, to its destination as soon as possible. Such flows have been well studied in time-invariant networks in the last few years. A key observation that must be taken into account in defining and studying selfish flow, however, is that a flow can take a non-negligible amount of time to travel across the 作者: Inexorable 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 18:49
Was wir nicht wissen: offene Fragen,ts from the queues of these routers so that network endpoints will be inclined to share router capacity fairly and minimize the overflow of packets trying to enter the queues. We study just how effective some of these queuing policies are when each network endpoint is a self-interested player with n作者: Cubicle 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 19:28 作者: Basal-Ganglia 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 03:08
Der Blick voraus: Verlauf und Prognose,l, players attempt to connect to a common source node in a network by purchasing edges, and sharing their costs with other players. We introduce the . version of this game, where each player desires 2 edge-disjoint connections between her pair of nodes instead of just a single connecting path, and a作者: 突襲 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 05:36
,A Modular Approach to Roberts’ Theorem,e VCG mechanism termed affine maximizers. Roberts’ proof is somewhat “magical” and we provide a new “modular” proof. We hope that this proof will help in future efforts to extend the theorem to non-full domains such as combinatorial auctions or scheduling.作者: 仔細(xì)檢查 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 11:19 作者: tinnitus 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 12:51
978-3-642-04644-5Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009作者: 完成才會(huì)征服 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 18:29
Algorithmic Game Theory978-3-642-04645-2Series ISSN 0302-9743 Series E-ISSN 1611-3349 作者: 槍支 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 21:16
M. Wolfersdorf,AK-Depressionsstationene VCG mechanism termed affine maximizers. Roberts’ proof is somewhat “magical” and we provide a new “modular” proof. We hope that this proof will help in future efforts to extend the theorem to non-full domains such as combinatorial auctions or scheduling.作者: 群居男女 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 00:49
Monotonicity in Mechanism Design, buyer is a monotonicity domain if every finite-valued monotone randomized allocation rule defined on it is implementable, in the sense that there exists a randomized truth-telling direct mechanism, which implements this allocation rule. The domain is a weak monotonicity domain if every deterministi作者: Overdose 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 07:05 作者: 漸強(qiáng) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 08:56
,A Modular Approach to Roberts’ Theorem,e VCG mechanism termed affine maximizers. Roberts’ proof is somewhat “magical” and we provide a new “modular” proof. We hope that this proof will help in future efforts to extend the theorem to non-full domains such as combinatorial auctions or scheduling.作者: GROG 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 13:21
Characterizing Incentive Compatibility for Convex Valuations,arbitrary, valuations for outcomes are convex functions in the type, and utilities over outcomes and payments are quasi-linear. Archer and Kleinberg?[1] have proven that in case of valuation functions that are linear in the type monotonicity in combination with a local integrability condition are eq作者: 陰謀 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 20:36
Truthful Mechanisms for Selfish Routing and Two-Parameter Agents, the setting where each edge of the network is controlled by a different selfish agent, who incurs costs proportional to the usage of her edge. Moreover, we consider a mechanism design setting with ., which generalizes the well-known setting of one-parameter agents by allowing a fixed cost component作者: SPER 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 23:51
Partition Equilibrium, coalitions, and only deviations by the prescribed coalitions are considered. This is in difference to the classical concept of strong equilibrium according to which any subset of the agents may deviate. In resource selection games, each agent selects a resource from a set of resources, and its payo作者: 思考才皺眉 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 03:27
Better with Byzantine: Manipulation-Optimal Mechanisms, that can be accomplished by a manipulable mechanism can also be accomplished with a truthful mechanism. Yet agents often fail to play their optimal manipulations due to computational limitations or various flavors of incompetence and cognitive biases. Thus, manipulable mechanisms in particular shou作者: Odyssey 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 07:54 作者: Heart-Attack 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 11:01
Sequential Pivotal Mechanisms for Public Project Problems,g variants of feasible Groves mechanisms (termed as ‘redistribution of VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves) payments’) that generate reduced deficit. With this in mind, we study sequential mechanisms and consider optimal strategies that could reduce the deficit resulting under the simultaneous mechanism. We 作者: Palpitation 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 14:48 作者: 抱怨 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 21:25 作者: 改變立場(chǎng) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 23:23 作者: 想象 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 05:20 作者: Anticonvulsants 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 06:22
The Balloon Popping Problem Revisited: Lower and Upper Bounds,ation in online auctions, where an auctioneer is selling a collection of identical items to anonymous unit-demand bidders. The auctioneer has the full knowledge of bidders’ private valuations for the items and tries to maximize his profit. Compared with the profit of fixed price schemes, the competi作者: allergen 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 12:20 作者: 蚊帳 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 16:48
Equilibria in Dynamic Selfish Routing, to its destination as soon as possible. Such flows have been well studied in time-invariant networks in the last few years. A key observation that must be taken into account in defining and studying selfish flow, however, is that a flow can take a non-negligible amount of time to travel across the 作者: 悄悄移動(dòng) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 18:43
Stochastic Stability in Internet Router Congestion Games,ts from the queues of these routers so that network endpoints will be inclined to share router capacity fairly and minimize the overflow of packets trying to enter the queues. We study just how effective some of these queuing policies are when each network endpoint is a self-interested player with n作者: flutter 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 02:45
Nash Dynamics in Constant Player and Bounded Jump Congestion Games,. It was shown by Ackermann and Skopalik [2] that even 3-player congestion games are .-complete. We design an FPTAS for congestion games with constant number of players. In particular, for any .>?0, we establish a stronger result, namely, any sequence of (1?+?.)-greedy improvement steps converges to作者: 個(gè)人長(zhǎng)篇演說 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 04:34 作者: 上坡 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 08:22 作者: airborne 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 11:58 作者: 貪婪性 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 18:29 作者: 隱士 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 22:54
Advance in Diagnosis of Depressive Disorder,he concept which have the impression of broadly limiting possibility. These results are largely in line with the revelation principle, although the considerations are more subtle and the impossibility not universal.作者: concentrate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 01:39
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-68327-8provide general bounds on the cost of stability in several classes of games, and explore its algorithmic properties. To develop a better intuition for the concepts we introduce, we provide a detailed algorithmic study of the cost of stability in weighted voting games, a simple but expressive class o作者: 保守 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 07:34 作者: 閑聊 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 08:56 作者: milligram 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 15:28 作者: 蔓藤圖飾 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 16:45 作者: Daily-Value 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 20:42 作者: intoxicate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 03:21
Characterizing Incentive Compatibility for Convex Valuations,y alone is sufficient for implementability. Later Archer and Kleinberg?[1], Monderer?[6] and Vohra?[10] have given alternative proofs for the same theorem. Using our characterization, we show that the Saks and Yu theorem generalizes to convex valuations. Again, decomposition monotonicity has to be a作者: FER 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 08:35 作者: myopia 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 13:06
Better with Byzantine: Manipulation-Optimal Mechanisms,he concept which have the impression of broadly limiting possibility. These results are largely in line with the revelation principle, although the considerations are more subtle and the impossibility not universal.作者: 宣稱 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 14:45 作者: deface 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 19:30 作者: 冷漠 時(shí)間: 2025-4-1 00:25 作者: febrile 時(shí)間: 2025-4-1 02:48
Equilibria in Dynamic Selfish Routing,quilibria in dynamic flows, and prove various bounds about their quality, as well as give algorithms on how to compute them. In general, we show that unlike in static flows, Nash equilibria may not exist, and the price of anarchy can be extremely high. If the system obeys FIFO (first-in first-out), 作者: restrain 時(shí)間: 2025-4-1 08:00
Nash Dynamics in Constant Player and Bounded Jump Congestion Games,on games [2]..For bounded jump games, where jumps in the delay functions of resources are bounded by ., we show that there exists a game with an exponentially long sequence of .-greedy best response steps that does not converge to an .-approximate equilibrium, for all .?≤?.., where . is the number o作者: 歡笑 時(shí)間: 2025-4-1 12:03
0302-9743 pects of distributed computing and the internet, congestion, routing and network design and formation games and game-theoretic approaches to networking problems.978-3-642-04644-5978-3-642-04645-2Series ISSN 0302-9743 Series E-ISSN 1611-3349
