標(biāo)題: Titlebook: Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce. Designing Trading Strategies and Mechanisms for Electronic Marke; AMEC 2011, Taipei, T Esther David,Val [打印本頁(yè)] 作者: 變更 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 16:31
書(shū)目名稱(chēng)Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce. Designing Trading Strategies and Mechanisms for Electronic Marke影響因子(影響力)
書(shū)目名稱(chēng)Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce. Designing Trading Strategies and Mechanisms for Electronic Marke影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名
書(shū)目名稱(chēng)Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce. Designing Trading Strategies and Mechanisms for Electronic Marke網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開(kāi)度
書(shū)目名稱(chēng)Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce. Designing Trading Strategies and Mechanisms for Electronic Marke網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開(kāi)度學(xué)科排名
書(shū)目名稱(chēng)Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce. Designing Trading Strategies and Mechanisms for Electronic Marke被引頻次
書(shū)目名稱(chēng)Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce. Designing Trading Strategies and Mechanisms for Electronic Marke被引頻次學(xué)科排名
書(shū)目名稱(chēng)Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce. Designing Trading Strategies and Mechanisms for Electronic Marke年度引用
書(shū)目名稱(chēng)Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce. Designing Trading Strategies and Mechanisms for Electronic Marke年度引用學(xué)科排名
書(shū)目名稱(chēng)Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce. Designing Trading Strategies and Mechanisms for Electronic Marke讀者反饋
書(shū)目名稱(chēng)Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce. Designing Trading Strategies and Mechanisms for Electronic Marke讀者反饋學(xué)科排名
作者: 護(hù)航艦 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 23:17 作者: Gorilla 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 02:52 作者: Substance 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 05:23 作者: 男生如果明白 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 11:38
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-34889-1SCM; e-auctions; e-business; e-commerce; e-negotiations; multi-agent systems; supply chain management; trad作者: 喚起 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 15:59
978-3-642-34888-4Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013作者: LAITY 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 17:55
Esther David,Valentin Robu,Andreas SymeonidisFast track proceedings作者: defibrillator 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 01:06
Lecture Notes in Business Information Processinghttp://image.papertrans.cn/a/image/151179.jpg作者: ETHER 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 01:43
Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce. Designing Trading Strategies and Mechanisms for Electronic Marke978-3-642-34889-1Series ISSN 1865-1348 Series E-ISSN 1865-1356 作者: Fabric 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 06:12
Cultural Capital and Parental Involvementn problem and no algorithm addressing uncertainty over multiple parameters is known. We provide an algorithm to solve bargaining with any kind of one–sided uncertainty. Our algorithm reduces a bargaining problem to a finite game, solves this last game, and then maps its strategies with the original 作者: chemoprevention 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 12:06
Rethinking Culture and Development,e Trading Agent Competition (TAC) Ad Auctions tournament is one of the first attempts to study the competition among advertisers for their placement in sponsored positions along with organic search engine results. In this paper, we describe agent Mertacor, a simulation-based game theoretic agent cou作者: Liberate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 17:54 作者: oblique 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 19:59 作者: 網(wǎng)絡(luò)添麻煩 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 01:14 作者: 誹謗 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 04:40
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-63197-0ferent formats of unit price auctions to sell advertising slots. In the Trading Agent Competition Ad Auctions (TAC/AA) game, intelligent software agents represent a publisher which conduct keyword auctions and advertisers which participate in those auctions. The publisher is designed by game creator作者: 撤退 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 08:30 作者: 抵制 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 12:47 作者: 一回合 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 15:05 作者: deviate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 20:48
,Non–cooperative Bargaining with Arbitrary One–Sided Uncertainty,n problem and no algorithm addressing uncertainty over multiple parameters is known. We provide an algorithm to solve bargaining with any kind of one–sided uncertainty. Our algorithm reduces a bargaining problem to a finite game, solves this last game, and then maps its strategies with the original 作者: 領(lǐng)袖氣質(zhì) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 23:31
An Adaptive Proportional Value-per-Click Agent for Bidding in Ad Auctions,e Trading Agent Competition (TAC) Ad Auctions tournament is one of the first attempts to study the competition among advertisers for their placement in sponsored positions along with organic search engine results. In this paper, we describe agent Mertacor, a simulation-based game theoretic agent cou作者: 搏斗 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 05:44
Improving Prediction in TAC SCM by Integrating Multivariate and Temporal Aspects via PLS Regression to leverage information contained in the movements of all variables in recent observations. This improved data extraction is then used with a common multivariate regression technique: Partial Least Squares (PLS) regression. We experimentally validate this combined data extraction and modeling with 作者: 高興一回 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 07:52 作者: 羅盤(pán) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 12:55 作者: 魯莽 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 18:26 作者: aviator 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 23:01
Dealing with Trust and Reputation in Unreliable Multi-agent Trading Environments, to achieve their individual goals. Numerous research efforts exist, attempting to define protocols, rules and interfaces for agents to abide by and ensure trustworthy exchange of information. Auction environments and e-commerce platforms are such paradigms, where trust and reputation are vital fact作者: 無(wú)能力 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 01:41
Analysis of Stable Prices in Non-Decreasing Sponsored Search Auction,earch engine provider (SEP). In this paper, we propose non-decreasing Sponsored Search Auction (NDSSA) to guarantee SEP’s revenue. Each advertiser’s bid increment is restricted by minimum increase price (MIP) in NDSSA. The MIP determination strategy influences bid convergence speed and SEP’s revenue作者: cushion 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 06:54
Acceptance Strategies for Maximizing Agent Profits in Online Scheduling,lection decision with little knowledge about future jobs; the goal is to maximize the profit. We study this online decision problem of acceptance of unit length jobs with time constraints, which involves online scheduling. We present theoretically optimal acceptance strategies for a fundamental case作者: Irritate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 12:09 作者: LATE 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 14:42
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-63197-0te are able to reproduce the long memory phenomena. We demonstrate that a model which incorporates contrarian trading strategies results in more dynamic behaviour in steady state, and hence is able to produce more realistic results.作者: 高原 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 19:41
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-63197-0cumulated user data to augment the KB weights through item based and collaborative elements. This paper details the algorithms used to create the hybrid recommender, and details its initial pilot in recommending alternative products in an online shopping environment.作者: Abutment 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 21:50 作者: aerial 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 05:06
Testing Adaptive Expectations Models of a Continuous Double Auction Market against Empirical Facts,te are able to reproduce the long memory phenomena. We demonstrate that a model which incorporates contrarian trading strategies results in more dynamic behaviour in steady state, and hence is able to produce more realistic results.作者: 瑪瑙 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 06:04 作者: convulsion 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 09:35
Acceptance Strategies for Maximizing Agent Profits in Online Scheduling,ults achieved by our online solutions to those generated by the optimal offline solutions; the average-case performance ratios are about 1.1. We also analyze the impact of the ratio between the number of slots and the number of jobs on the difficulty of decisions and the performance of our solutions.作者: ACTIN 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 16:15
1865-1348 ading agents and mechanisms for agent-mediated e-commerce. They were originally presented at the 13th International Workshop on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce (AMEC 2011), collocated with AAMAS 2011 in Taipei, Taiwan, or at the 2011 Workshop on Trading Agent Design and Analysis (TADA 2011), coll作者: 階層 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 18:54 作者: 過(guò)去分詞 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 00:52
,Non–cooperative Bargaining with Arbitrary One–Sided Uncertainty,sided uncertainty. Our algorithm reduces a bargaining problem to a finite game, solves this last game, and then maps its strategies with the original continuous game. Computational complexity is polynomial with two types, while with more types the problem is hard and only small settings can be solved in exact way.作者: engagement 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 02:44 作者: 消毒 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 09:47
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-63197-0s paper. For the convergence speed analysis, fixed MIP strategy converges faster than AIME in most instances. For SEP’s revenue, AIMD assists SEP to gain more revenue than fixed MIP strategy by experiments. Simultaneously, SEP’s revenue in Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auction (VCG) is the lower bound of that in AIMD.作者: Enrage 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 11:51 作者: profligate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 18:01 作者: Intuitive 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 21:45 作者: Oration 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 02:18
Cultural Change and Persistencedata from a competitive multi-agent supply chain setting, the Trading Agent Competition for Supply Chain Management (TAC SCM). Our method achieves competitive (and often superior) performance compared to the state-of-the-art domain-specific prediction techniques used in the 2008 Prediction Challenge competition.作者: arrogant 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 04:56
Conference proceedings 2013agent-mediated e-commerce. They were originally presented at the 13th International Workshop on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce (AMEC 2011), collocated with AAMAS 2011 in Taipei, Taiwan, or at the 2011 Workshop on Trading Agent Design and Analysis (TADA 2011), collocated with IJCAI 2011 in Barcel作者: ethnology 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 08:07 作者: PATHY 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 13:23
