標(biāo)題: Titlebook: Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce. Designing Trading Agents and Mechanisms; AAMAS 2005 Workshop, Han Poutré,Norman M. Sadeh,Sverker Janson [打印本頁(yè)] 作者: Lincoln 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 18:47
書目名稱Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce. Designing Trading Agents and Mechanisms影響因子(影響力)
書目名稱Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce. Designing Trading Agents and Mechanisms影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce. Designing Trading Agents and Mechanisms網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度
書目名稱Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce. Designing Trading Agents and Mechanisms網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce. Designing Trading Agents and Mechanisms被引頻次
書目名稱Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce. Designing Trading Agents and Mechanisms被引頻次學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce. Designing Trading Agents and Mechanisms年度引用
書目名稱Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce. Designing Trading Agents and Mechanisms年度引用學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce. Designing Trading Agents and Mechanisms讀者反饋
書目名稱Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce. Designing Trading Agents and Mechanisms讀者反饋學(xué)科排名
作者: 種植,培養(yǎng) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 21:28 作者: Radiculopathy 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 03:21
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-55968-6who then determines the winning set of bids. In this paper we introduce the problem of distributed winner determination in combinatorial auctions which eliminates the centralized auctioneer. We present a set of distributed search-based algorithms for solving this problem and study their relative tradeoffs.作者: Encoding 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 05:38 作者: HEDGE 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 12:16
Breathe Easy: Digital Stories About COPD level (because this adaptivity and flexibility are the key components of its success). Specifically, we analyse our pricing model’s performance both in the actual competition and in controlled experiments. Through this evaluation, we show that SouthamptonSCM performs well across a broad range of environments.作者: mydriatic 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 14:52 作者: Phenothiazines 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 18:07 作者: Hippocampus 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 23:18
Market-Based Allocation with Indivisible Bidse demonstrate potential benefits of supporting indivisibility constraints in bidding. These benefits are highly sensitive to the form of price quote provided, indicating interesting tradeoffs in communication and allocation efficiency.作者: Concomitant 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 05:26
Designing and Evaluating an Adaptive Trading Agent for Supply Chain Management level (because this adaptivity and flexibility are the key components of its success). Specifically, we analyse our pricing model’s performance both in the actual competition and in controlled experiments. Through this evaluation, we show that SouthamptonSCM performs well across a broad range of environments.作者: Lineage 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 06:42 作者: Intend 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 12:50
Patrick Cahoon,Carol Haigh,Tony Sumnerices in the market for finished goods were the decisive difference. Our analysis shows that supply and demand were key factors in determining overall market prices, and that some agents were more adept than others at exploiting advantageous market conditions.作者: violate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 16:14 作者: 空氣 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 19:52 作者: Melodrama 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 22:32 作者: 無(wú)彈性 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 06:02
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-25713-1is modified in light of this result. Simulations reveal that trading agents which take account of the quality of the information that they receive are better able to identify the optimum price within a market.作者: 帶子 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 07:37 作者: 鬼魂 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 12:52 作者: Agility 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 18:32
Who to Listen to: Exploiting Information Quality in a ZIP-Agent Marketis modified in light of this result. Simulations reveal that trading agents which take account of the quality of the information that they receive are better able to identify the optimum price within a market.作者: FRAUD 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 22:48 作者: lambaste 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 02:01 作者: exigent 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 05:02
https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137008565objects that are exclusively either common value or private value. However, in many real-world cases an object has both features. Also, in such cases, the common value depends on how much each bidder values the object. Moreover, a bidder generally does not know the true common value (since it may no作者: 注意 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 10:15
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-55968-6arious solutions exist for solving this problem but they are all centralized. That is, they assume that all bids are sent to a centralized auctioneer who then determines the winning set of bids. In this paper we introduce the problem of distributed winner determination in combinatorial auctions whic作者: 哎呦 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 12:43
https://doi.org/10.3920/978-90-8686-720-2e on the efficiency of market-based allocation. Using a reconfigurable manufacturing scenario where agents trade large quantities of multiple goods, we demonstrate potential benefits of supporting indivisibility constraints in bidding. These benefits are highly sensitive to the form of price quote p作者: 船員 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 16:26
https://doi.org/10.3920/978-90-8686-720-2rested agents. VCG mechanisms have received wide attention in the AI community because they are efficient and strategy-proof; a special case of the Groves family of mechanisms, VCG mechanisms are the . direct-revelation mechanisms that are allocatively efficient and strategy-proof. Unfortunately, VC作者: 兇兆 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 20:15
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-7984-6 unique solution, there is an element of uncertainty associated with this value. This uncertainty in the solution of a game provides an additional dimension for evaluating a player’s prospects of playing the game. Thus, players want to know not only their Shapley value for a game, but also the assoc作者: 作繭自縛 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 01:29 作者: 正面 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 06:29 作者: 露天歷史劇 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 10:35
Patrick Cahoon,Carol Haigh,Tony Sumnerer we present the Socrates trading agent and the strategies that were developed for and used in the TAC Supply Chain Management game as part of the 2004 competition. The resulting behaviour and performance in the TAC competition as well as in a series of controlled experiments are discussed.作者: alcoholism 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 14:17
Breathe Easy: Digital Stories About COPDon (TAC SCM). In particular, we focus on the way in which our agent sets its prices according to the prevailing market situation and its own inventory level (because this adaptivity and flexibility are the key components of its success). Specifically, we analyse our pricing model’s performance both 作者: mortgage 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 19:10
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-64146-1meter values. Our empirical game-theoretic analysis is facilitated by approximating games through hierarchical reduction methods. This approach generated a small set of candidates for the version to run in the TAC-05 tournament. We selected among these based on performance in preliminary rounds, ult作者: Aggregate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 21:06 作者: 慟哭 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 04:49 作者: UTTER 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 07:23
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-25713-1 characterise spatially (or temporally) segregated markets. The effect of this modification on the behaviour of a market populated by simple trading agents was examined. It was demonstrated that an agent’s ability to identify the optimum market price is positively correlated with its network connect作者: CLEAR 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 10:34 作者: GLIDE 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 16:41
Lecture Notes in Computer Sciencehttp://image.papertrans.cn/a/image/151174.jpg作者: 停止償付 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 20:26 作者: 縮減了 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 00:26
https://doi.org/10.1007/11888727Service-oriented Computing; algorithms; bidding strategies; decision making; e-commerce agents; e-commerc作者: Chagrin 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 06:06
978-3-540-46242-2Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006作者: strain 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 09:29
Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce. Designing Trading Agents and Mechanisms978-3-540-46243-9Series ISSN 0302-9743 Series E-ISSN 1611-3349 作者: Corroborate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 11:09
0302-9743 Overview: 978-3-540-46242-2978-3-540-46243-9Series ISSN 0302-9743 Series E-ISSN 1611-3349 作者: 網(wǎng)絡(luò)添麻煩 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 14:56
Patrick Cahoon,Carol Haigh,Tony Sumnerer we present the Socrates trading agent and the strategies that were developed for and used in the TAC Supply Chain Management game as part of the 2004 competition. The resulting behaviour and performance in the TAC competition as well as in a series of controlled experiments are discussed.作者: 箴言 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 19:27 作者: GIDDY 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 02:36
An Analysis of Sequential Auctions for Common and Private Value Objects in a sequence. On the basis of this equilibrium, we find the expected . and the . for each auction. We then show that even if the common and private values of objects are distributed identically across all objects, the revenue and the winner’s profit are not the same for all of them. We show that, 作者: Fluctuate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 04:36 作者: 無(wú)王時(shí)期, 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 10:15 作者: 他去就結(jié)束 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 11:33
Scaling Up the Sample Average Approximation Method for Stochastic Optimization with Applications to ing the number of scenarios yields the best solution, while in the latter problem, it is necessary to evaluate multiple candidate solutions to find the best solution, since increasing the number of scenarios becomes expensive very quickly.作者: 健壯 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 19:24 作者: ostrish 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 20:25 作者: 最初 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 02:44
https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137008565 in a sequence. On the basis of this equilibrium, we find the expected . and the . for each auction. We then show that even if the common and private values of objects are distributed identically across all objects, the revenue and the winner’s profit are not the same for all of them. We show that, 作者: restrain 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 04:42 作者: 空氣 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 09:03 作者: 貪心 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 14:57 作者: Indurate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 19:58
Theano S. Terkenli,Nikolaos Skoutelisusted third-party. Second, it enables the provably correct execution of . mechanisms (which is not the case in the centralized model). We furthermore point out how untruthful and multi-step mechanisms can improve privacy. In particular, we show that the fully private emulation of a preference elicit作者: decode 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 21:25
Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce. Designing Trading Agents and MechanismsAAMAS 2005 Workshop,作者: 使長(zhǎng)胖 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 01:30
