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標(biāo)題: Titlebook: Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce V; Designing Mechanisms Peyman Faratin,David C. Parkes,William E. Walsh Conference proceedings 2004 Spri [打印本頁(yè)]

作者: 代表    時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 19:07
書(shū)目名稱(chēng)Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce V影響因子(影響力)




書(shū)目名稱(chēng)Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce V影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名




書(shū)目名稱(chēng)Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce V網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開(kāi)度




書(shū)目名稱(chēng)Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce V網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開(kāi)度學(xué)科排名




書(shū)目名稱(chēng)Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce V被引頻次




書(shū)目名稱(chēng)Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce V被引頻次學(xué)科排名




書(shū)目名稱(chēng)Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce V年度引用




書(shū)目名稱(chēng)Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce V年度引用學(xué)科排名




書(shū)目名稱(chēng)Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce V讀者反饋




書(shū)目名稱(chēng)Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce V讀者反饋學(xué)科排名





作者: Monolithic    時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 23:18

作者: 中國(guó)紀(jì)念碑    時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 03:49

作者: RECUR    時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 07:55
A Decommitment Strategy in a Competitive Multi-agent Transportation Settingr utility levels in case of negotiations with uncertainty about future prospects. In this paper, we study the decommitment concept for the novel setting of a large-scale logistics setting with multiple, competing companies. Orders for transportation of loads are acquired by agents of the (competing)
作者: Kindle    時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 12:31

作者: 才能    時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 12:56
Mechanism for Optimally Trading Off Revenue and Efficiency in Multi-unit Auctionspending on the objective of the seller, different selling mechanisms are desirable. The Vickrey auction with a truthful reserve price is optimal when the objective is efficiency – allocating the units to the parties who values them the most. The Myerson auction is optimal when the objective is the s
作者: Extricate    時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 18:53
Choosing Samples to Compute Heuristic-Strategy Nash Equilibriumtrategy space is often populated with ., such as myopic best-response to prices. Given these heuristic strategies, it can be useful to evaluate the strategies and the auction design by computing a Nash equilibrium across the restricted strategy space. First, it is necessary to compute the expected p
作者: 不適    時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 23:15

作者: Terrace    時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 03:37

作者: 占卜者    時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 08:08

作者: Dysarthria    時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 10:25
https://doi.org/10.1007/b99040Performance; agent-based negotiation; bidding strategies; e-commerce agents; e-commerce systems; electron
作者: 中世紀(jì)    時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 14:12
978-3-540-22674-1Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2004
作者: Medicaid    時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 21:26

作者: Adenoma    時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 23:59

作者: apropos    時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 06:02
Cuba and Western Intellectuals since 1959uality of the delivered goods. The advantage of the developed system is that it allows for a high degree of flexibility in the price, quality, and content of the offered bundles. The price, quality, and content of the delivered goods may, for example, differ based on daily dynamics and personal inte
作者: LIMN    時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 10:14
Cuba and Western Intellectuals since 1959interest from both the fields of computer science and of business, since it promises to provide superior ability in a trading market to any individual trader. Trading strategies have been proposed and practiced from the perspectives of Artificial Intelligence, market making, external information fee
作者: 真繁榮    時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 14:04

作者: Narcissist    時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 17:26

作者: 凈禮    時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 20:51
Cuba and Western Intellectuals since 1959nisms (English and Dutch auctions), yet, unlike them, generates close-to-optimal expected utility for the seller. We show that if each buyer receives at most one offer, each buyer’s dominant strategy is to act truthfully. In more general TLAs, the buyers’ optimal strategies are more intricate, and w
作者: palette    時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 00:09
Nicolás Prados Ortiz de Solórzanopending on the objective of the seller, different selling mechanisms are desirable. The Vickrey auction with a truthful reserve price is optimal when the objective is efficiency – allocating the units to the parties who values them the most. The Myerson auction is optimal when the objective is the s
作者: 防水    時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 03:50

作者: Dedication    時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 11:05
Obstacles to Breaking the US—Cuban Deadlock, the topography of this space is often nonstationary, due to the interactive dynamics of multiple producers changing their positions as they try to learn the distribution of consumer preferences and other features of the problem’s economic structure. This presents a producer or its agent with a dif
作者: 搜集    時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 15:34
Archibald R. M. Ritter,John M. KirkWhen resource consumers select among competing providers based on delayed information, inefficient oscillations in resource utilization can emerge. This paper describes an approach, based on selective stochastic resource request rejection, for dealing with this emergent dysfunction.
作者: faddish    時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 16:20

作者: 泥瓦匠    時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 21:08
https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230618299 companies by bidding in online auctions. We find significant increases in profit when the agents can decommit and postpone the transportation of a load to a more suitable time. Furthermore, we analyze the circumstances for which decommitment has a positive impact if agents are capable of handling multiple contracts simultaneously.
作者: MUT    時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 03:54

作者: 輕快帶來(lái)危險(xiǎn)    時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 07:26

作者: Hdl348    時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 09:26

作者: Costume    時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 12:59
Automated Negotiation and Bundling of Information Goodsese Pareto search strategies will result in very efficient bargaining outcomes. Moreover, the system is set up such that it is actually in the best interest of the customer to have their agent adhere to this approach of disentangling the bargaining strategy.
作者: 遺產(chǎn)    時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 19:12

作者: Modify    時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 23:31

作者: mighty    時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 02:57
Mechanism for Optimally Trading Off Revenue and Efficiency in Multi-unit Auctionsnt strategy auction mechanism that maximizes expected social welfare subject to a minimum constraint on the seller’s expected utility. This way the seller can maximize social welfare subject to doing well enough for himself.
作者: Repatriate    時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 06:25
Choosing Samples to Compute Heuristic-Strategy Nash Equilibriummputed Nash equilibrium as samples are performed at faster rates than naive uniform sampling. The second, faster method, has a lower metadeliberation cost and better scaling properties. We discuss how our sampling methodology could be used within . mechanism design.
作者: Vertical    時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 09:26
Improving Learning Performance by Applying Economic Knowledgen this solution. We show how a modest amount of economic knowledge about the problem can make it much easier, either by reducing the search space, starting in a useful area of the space, or introducing a gradient. These experiments support the hypothesis that a producer using some knowledge of a pro
作者: PSA-velocity    時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 15:06
Cuba and Western Intellectuals since 1959ese Pareto search strategies will result in very efficient bargaining outcomes. Moreover, the system is set up such that it is actually in the best interest of the customer to have their agent adhere to this approach of disentangling the bargaining strategy.
作者: 比賽用背帶    時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 18:18
Cuba and Western Intellectuals since 1959the rise and sell when it’s on the decline, but the second agent does exactly the opposite. As a result, we call it the . strategy. The strategies used by both agents are adapted for automated trading. Both agents performed well in a PLAT live competition. In this paper, we analyze the performance o
作者: 遭遇    時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 01:00
Cuba and Western Intellectuals since 1959cted utility increases, and becomes increasingly (but not monotonically) more competitive with Myerson’s expected utility maximizing auction. Myerson’s uses full valuation revelation and is arguably impractical because its rules are unintuitive, unlike ours.
作者: Confidential    時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 04:43
Nicolás Prados Ortiz de Solórzanont strategy auction mechanism that maximizes expected social welfare subject to a minimum constraint on the seller’s expected utility. This way the seller can maximize social welfare subject to doing well enough for himself.
作者: hermitage    時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 06:22

作者: 蘑菇    時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 12:56
Obstacles to Breaking the US—Cuban Deadlockn this solution. We show how a modest amount of economic knowledge about the problem can make it much easier, either by reducing the search space, starting in a useful area of the space, or introducing a gradient. These experiments support the hypothesis that a producer using some knowledge of a pro
作者: Hemodialysis    時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 17:45
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作者: 招惹    時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 20:28
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作者: 填滿(mǎn)    時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 00:21
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