派博傳思國際中心

標題: Titlebook: Agency, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility; Andrei Buckareff,Carlos Moya,Sergi Rosell Book 2015 The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Autho [打印本頁]

作者: 諷刺文章    時間: 2025-3-21 17:01
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作者: 微生物    時間: 2025-3-22 00:03

作者: sulcus    時間: 2025-3-22 00:45

作者: Frisky    時間: 2025-3-22 05:31

作者: Needlework    時間: 2025-3-22 10:53

作者: 愉快嗎    時間: 2025-3-22 16:13
Moral Luck and True Desert equally at fault or makes the same mistake, will be normally judged with more leniency and won’t be responsible for killing anybody. Certainly, they are equally negligent or reckless, but the question here is whether actual consequences can add something to their culpability and then make a moral d
作者: 做作    時間: 2025-3-22 18:16

作者: Enervate    時間: 2025-3-22 21:35

作者: OGLE    時間: 2025-3-23 02:52
focus, with the first of the two containing chapters examining issues related to responsible agency and blame and the chapters in the final section examine responsibility and relationships. This book will be of interest to researchers and students interested in both metaphysical and normative issues related to human agency.978-1-137-41495-3
作者: 結合    時間: 2025-3-23 05:49

作者: 暫時別動    時間: 2025-3-23 10:55

作者: Lacerate    時間: 2025-3-23 14:43
Introductiont been impaired, providing that they satisfy other criteria when they act, as responsible agents. And most regard the potential status of human agents as responsible agents as sufficient to make them the possible candidates of ascriptions of moral blame and praise for how they conduct themselves.
作者: CRACK    時間: 2025-3-23 18:31
Classical Compatibilism and Temporal Ontologysions of contemporary compatibilism are not tenable under the assumption of an eternalist conception of time: the eternalist’s idea that our future decisions and actions exist and are as real as presently existing events is thought to be incompatible with the openness of the future that freedom seems to require.
作者: Needlework    時間: 2025-3-23 23:24

作者: 一再遛    時間: 2025-3-24 06:07

作者: Grating    時間: 2025-3-24 08:04

作者: TOXIN    時間: 2025-3-24 13:30
Moral Responsibility Skepticism: Meeting McKenna’s Challenge12) issues a powerful challenge to the skeptic. McKenna argues that blame is non-instrumentally good, or, at minimum, not bad, and suggests that skepticism has been motivated in important part by a confusion between blame and punishment. Punishment may be very severe, but blame need not. In this paper, I reply to McKenna on behalf of the skeptic.
作者: 厚顏無恥    時間: 2025-3-24 15:13
In Defense of a Challenge to Moral Responsibility Skepticism: A Reply to Levye ambit of justified blame. Second, with one crucial caveat aside, I argued that blame . be justified. And I defended grounds for doing so that appealed both to considerations of basic desert and as well to considerations that can be deployed independently of any commitment to basic desert.
作者: 我不怕犧牲    時間: 2025-3-24 22:35

作者: BAN    時間: 2025-3-25 00:39

作者: Glossy    時間: 2025-3-25 04:38
Michal Jan Rozbicki,George O. Ndegee opportunity to exert my swimming abilities. If I am tied to a pole, then I have the ability but not the opportunity to put this ability to use and, so it is believed, it is not the case that I ought to save the child.
作者: agitate    時間: 2025-3-25 09:02

作者: 共同生活    時間: 2025-3-25 12:41
Michal Jan Rozbicki,George O. Ndegeally responsible in all of these various respects, but that countervailing intuitions can be accommodated by noting that our practice involves different senses of responsibility, a number of which don’t involve desert. I contend that the senses that don’t involve desert should predominate in the kinds of circumstances under consideration.
作者: 脖子    時間: 2025-3-25 19:32
A New Form of Moral Luck? in the law, and the third is an example that concerns degrees of moral responsibility. I discuss the puzzles to which those examples give rise, and I critically examine the alternatives that we face in each case. My main goal, however, is not to provide a resolution of the puzzles, but only to draw attention to this interesting phenomenon.
作者: cumber    時間: 2025-3-25 20:19

作者: MANIA    時間: 2025-3-26 00:33

作者: 痛苦一生    時間: 2025-3-26 08:19
A Gradualist Metaphysics of Agency You know that the corner store has a good selection of beers, so you walk to the store to get some. At the same time that you finish your meal, your cat finishes eating. Being in the habit of cleaning himself after eating, he looks for a comfortable place and gets to work cleaning his face. Both yo
作者: 疲勞    時間: 2025-3-26 11:15
Classical Compatibilism and Temporal Ontologyte. In fact, it has been argued that much of our difficulty in understanding how freedom and determinism may be compatible with each other arise from the assumption of controversial views about the nature of time. For instance, Hoefer (2001) argues that it is the ‘unholy marriage’ of determinism and
作者: 呼吸    時間: 2025-3-26 13:13

作者: 檢查    時間: 2025-3-26 20:33
Moral Luck and True Deserty for things beyond their control, and what seems to be our ordinary practice of judging people differently regarding what actually happens. This is a famous example (adapted from Nagel 1979). Two people, after having some after-work beers in a pub, decide to drive back home. On the way Driver A los
作者: 皮薩    時間: 2025-3-27 01:01

作者: 減少    時間: 2025-3-27 02:53
Helping Itassignment of blameworthiness2 to agents. On the one hand, it is asked how it could possibly be fair to blame an agent for something manifestly not under his control? Surely what is beyond our control is also not our fault? On the other hand, it is pointed out that there do seem to be numerous sorts
作者: 無辜    時間: 2025-3-27 06:31
Ought without Abilityto perform it, where ‘be able to’ is understood to mean not only having the ability to perform that particular action, but also the opportunity to do so. If a child is drowning in a lake, it is not enough that I know how to swim; if I ought to save the child then it has to be the case that I have th
作者: definition    時間: 2025-3-27 12:55
Omissions and Different Senses of Responsibilitye responsible for decisions not to act. But can we also be responsible for failing to decide to act? Take as given that we can be responsible for the outcomes of decision and of failing to decide. Can we similarly be responsible for the outcomes of decisions not to act and for the outcomes of failur
作者: 多節(jié)    時間: 2025-3-27 16:32
Moral Responsibility Skepticism: Meeting McKenna’s Challengerves to be blamed or punished, praised or rewarded, just on the basis of actions they have performed. In his landmark recent book, Michael McKenna (2012) issues a powerful challenge to the skeptic. McKenna argues that blame is non-instrumentally good, or, at minimum, not bad, and suggests that skept
作者: 中和    時間: 2025-3-27 19:35

作者: engrossed    時間: 2025-3-27 23:32

作者: Urologist    時間: 2025-3-28 03:27

作者: Axon895    時間: 2025-3-28 09:35

作者: 旁觀者    時間: 2025-3-28 14:07

作者: 任命    時間: 2025-3-28 15:39

作者: 預感    時間: 2025-3-28 21:28
On the Luck Objection to LibertarianismLibertarians typically believe that we are morally responsible for the decisions (or choices) we make . those decisions are free, and our decisions are free . they are neither deterministically caused nor nomically necessitated by antecedent events. A well-known objection to their view is what we may call ‘The Randomness Objection’:
作者: 商品    時間: 2025-3-29 00:19

作者: 把手    時間: 2025-3-29 06:30
Marzanna Farnicka,Margarida Pocinhootivational states (Bekoff 1999) and responses to features of their external environments (Clock 2009). But unlike other animals, human agents are thought to possess capacities necessary for responsible agency that are not possessed, or at least not possessed to the same degree, by most other animal
作者: critic    時間: 2025-3-29 09:10
https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230598003 You know that the corner store has a good selection of beers, so you walk to the store to get some. At the same time that you finish your meal, your cat finishes eating. Being in the habit of cleaning himself after eating, he looks for a comfortable place and gets to work cleaning his face. Both yo
作者: LIEN    時間: 2025-3-29 11:28
Kelly Kar Yue Chan,Chi Sum Garfield Laute. In fact, it has been argued that much of our difficulty in understanding how freedom and determinism may be compatible with each other arise from the assumption of controversial views about the nature of time. For instance, Hoefer (2001) argues that it is the ‘unholy marriage’ of determinism and
作者: Gnrh670    時間: 2025-3-29 17:17
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-8375-6t common to all of them is the view that most adult human beings have, and sometimes exercise, free will and that free will and its exercise are incompatible with determinism. Therefore, libertarians consider indeterminism as a necessary condition of free will.
作者: Intersect    時間: 2025-3-29 23:36
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-8375-6y for things beyond their control, and what seems to be our ordinary practice of judging people differently regarding what actually happens. This is a famous example (adapted from Nagel 1979). Two people, after having some after-work beers in a pub, decide to drive back home. On the way Driver A los
作者: 先行    時間: 2025-3-30 01:16
Encounter with Canadian Schools,n of moral luck that has been overlooked in the literature, and that seems especially puzzling. It’s a form of luck illustrated by cases where our responsibility appears to depend exclusively on whether . are present and what their contributions are. In this paper I discuss this phenomenon, by appea
作者: WAG    時間: 2025-3-30 07:40

作者: Little    時間: 2025-3-30 08:19

作者: 協(xié)定    時間: 2025-3-30 13:14
Michal Jan Rozbicki,George O. Ndegee responsible for decisions not to act. But can we also be responsible for failing to decide to act? Take as given that we can be responsible for the outcomes of decision and of failing to decide. Can we similarly be responsible for the outcomes of decisions not to act and for the outcomes of failur
作者: evince    時間: 2025-3-30 19:46





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