標(biāo)題: Titlebook: After Apollo?; Richard Nixon and th John M. Logsdon Book 2015 The Author(s) 2015 moon.Richard Nixon.USA [打印本頁(yè)] 作者: raff淫雨霏霏 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 17:30
書(shū)目名稱(chēng)After Apollo?影響因子(影響力)
作者: Critical 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 00:06
Palgrave Studies in the History of Science and Technologyhttp://image.papertrans.cn/a/image/150911.jpg作者: CREEK 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 01:32 作者: MEEK 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 08:30
Book 2015Once the United States landed on the moon in July 1969, it was up to President Nixon to decide what to do in space after Apollo. This book chronicles the decisions he made, including ending space exploration and approving the space shuttle. Those decisions determined the character of the?US human space flight program for the next forty years.作者: 吞噬 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 09:47 作者: 石墨 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 14:58
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56227-4on the Moon. The success of the . mission satisfied the goal that had been set by President John F. Kennedy jus over eight years earlier—“before this decade is out, landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to earth.”1 Inevitably, it also raised the question “What do you do next, after land作者: recede 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 19:26
Crime Prevention in the 21st Centuryns aboard. . sent Frank Borman, Jim Lovell, and Bill Anders into orbit around the Moon on December 24. In his ., Nixon recalled that on that Christmas Eve, he “was a happy man.” At his retreat on Key Biscayne, Florida, “a wreath hung on the front door and a beautifully trimmed Christmas tree stood i作者: 孵卵器 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 00:21 作者: pancreas 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 05:07 作者: GNAW 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 08:43
Crime Mapping and Spatial Analysis could be followed at several levels of investment. Like any other sales prospectus, it made the most positive case possible for investing in its proposed activities, withou comparing that investment to alternative uses of available funds. The issue facing the Nixon administration in fall 1969 was h作者: 無(wú)政府主義者 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 11:40
Benoit Leclerc,Ernesto U. Savonae was the need to fit spending on space within the very tight constraints on discretionary government spending if the overall federal budget were to be in balance with expected revenues. This meant determining how the civilian space program would fit within the Nixon administration’s overall priorit作者: Emg827 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 14:36
Marie Rosenkrantz Lindegaard,Wim Bernascocument, calling the program that the president had announced “bold, diversified, very wide ranging.” But Paine in a rare note of realism did recognize the challenge of reorienting NASA to new objectives, saying “what we are really faced here in this change as President Nixon’s space program replaces作者: 食物 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 19:47 作者: 火海 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 22:43 作者: 發(fā)微光 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 05:10 作者: 青少年 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 09:08 作者: fertilizer 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 11:41
https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230298996 the program of the 1960s to the programs of the 1970s. This was indeed the case, as the budget request formalized canceling two Apollo missions and deferring space station development, and suggested that at least in principle the Nixon administration intended to move forward with a spaceshuttle pro作者: floaters 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 17:22
Priyanka Chhabra,Kajol Bhati,Sneha Yadavtle design that would both fit within the anticipated budget during the 1970s and that NASA’s engineers were confident could be successfully developed. This realization put the space agency in a rather difficult position. A year had been spent studying shuttle designs that turned out to be neither p作者: 鋪?zhàn)?nbsp; 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 20:02 作者: 遷移 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 00:11 作者: 招人嫉妒 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 06:56
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-04867-9cutive Office officials. They told Cap Weinberger on December 22 that NASA was “not yet in the position to respond to Don Rice’s request of December 11.” NASA’s human space flight element was still resisting serious analysis of the OMB-suggested shuttle design. The Weinberger meeting “was followed b作者: 后退 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 07:59
Wider Benefits and Future Development Needs,ctor of the space shuttle program, sent a message to shuttle program manager Robert Thompson at the Manned Spacecraft Center, saying “NASA will proceed with the development of the space shuttle. The shuttle orbiter is expected to have a 15 × 60 foot payload bay, and a 65,000 pound payload capability作者: Eclampsia 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 14:00
Overtureon the Moon. The success of the . mission satisfied the goal that had been set by President John F. Kennedy jus over eight years earlier—“before this decade is out, landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to earth.”1 Inevitably, it also raised the question “What do you do next, after land作者: Carcinogenesis 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 18:49 作者: calorie 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 21:44 作者: 改進(jìn) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 01:16 作者: seruting 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 05:27
Space and National Priorities could be followed at several levels of investment. Like any other sales prospectus, it made the most positive case possible for investing in its proposed activities, withou comparing that investment to alternative uses of available funds. The issue facing the Nixon administration in fall 1969 was h作者: 乞丐 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 10:03
The Nixon Space Doctrinee was the need to fit spending on space within the very tight constraints on discretionary government spending if the overall federal budget were to be in balance with expected revenues. This meant determining how the civilian space program would fit within the Nixon administration’s overall priorit作者: AVID 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 14:11 作者: 碎片 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 20:39 作者: Ordnance 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 00:38
A New Cast of Charactershe White House and at NASA. The White House framework for making space policy decisions was changed by creating two new structures—the Domestic Council and the Office of Management and Budget—to oversee the development of policy and budget options for presidential decision. This meant that the heads作者: Insatiable 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 02:58 作者: 愉快嗎 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 07:42
National Security Requirements Drive Shuttle Design it was responding to pressure from the budget office to demonstrate that the combination of the costs of developing and operating the reusable shuttle would, over the period of shuttle use, produce a cost savings over the use of existing or new expendable launch vehicles to launch the same missions作者: Spinous-Process 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 12:08
A Time of Transitions the program of the 1960s to the programs of the 1970s. This was indeed the case, as the budget request formalized canceling two Apollo missions and deferring space station development, and suggested that at least in principle the Nixon administration intended to move forward with a spaceshuttle pro作者: 刺激 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 15:32
A Confused Path Forwardtle design that would both fit within the anticipated budget during the 1970s and that NASA’s engineers were confident could be successfully developed. This realization put the space agency in a rather difficult position. A year had been spent studying shuttle designs that turned out to be neither p作者: 健忘癥 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 19:22 作者: 單挑 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 01:52 作者: 微不足道 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 05:30 作者: confide 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 09:04 作者: 行業(yè) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 11:04 作者: 有斑點(diǎn) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 16:43
https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137316059ted issues. There was a proposal to eliminate the National Aeronautics and Space Council and its staff; while this proposal was not acted on, the council staff were not able during 1970–1971 to become significant actors in the policymaking process, although the council’s executive secretary, Bill An作者: Grievance 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 21:05 作者: REP 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 02:46 作者: 容易懂得 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 05:02 作者: Occlusion 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 09:40
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-04867-9etcher and Low learned “that there indeed was a Presidential decision to go ahead with the Shuttle; that the issue of size was not really raised as a major one with the President; but that David and Rice, and to a lesser extent, Flanigan, felt that the 15 × 60′ 65,000 pound shuttle proposed by NASA 作者: cyanosis 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 13:35
The Nixon Space Doctrined in the FY1971 budget decisions. The other influence was the rather ad hoc policy framework President Richard Nixon and his policy advisers used to evaluate the recommendations of the Space Task Group (STG) and the NASA budget proposal based on those recommendations. The White House had not articul作者: 征服 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 18:22 作者: 鴿子 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 21:44
The Space Shuttle Takes Center Stageechnology (OST); they would push NASA over the remainder of 1970 and particularly during 1971 to come up with alternative human space flight proposals or, at a minimum, alternatives to NASA’s preferred shuttle design. These two organizations operated under the premise that President Nixon did not wa作者: 朋黨派系 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 01:18 作者: 享樂(lè)主義者 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 06:42 作者: 蘆筍 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 08:25
A “Space Clipper”etcher and Low learned “that there indeed was a Presidential decision to go ahead with the Shuttle; that the issue of size was not really raised as a major one with the President; but that David and Rice, and to a lesser extent, Flanigan, felt that the 15 × 60′ 65,000 pound shuttle proposed by NASA 作者: Tractable 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 13:47
Overtureing on the Moon?” It fell to President Richard M. Nixon, sworn into office exactly six months before Armstrong’s historic moonwalk, to answer this question. The following account traces in detail how Nixon and his associates in the 1969–1972 period went about developing their response. The decisions made then have defined the U.S.作者: GLUT 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 19:38
Richard Nixon and n the living room . . . Far out in space Apollo VIII orbited the moon while astronaut Frank Borman read the story of the Creation from the Book of Genesis.* Those days were rich with happiness and full of anticipation and hope.”1作者: Diluge 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 22:38
Space and National Prioritiesow to react to the report’s recommendations.To make that judgment,the administration, and ultimately President Richard Nixon, would have to decide where the post-Apollo space program fit into overall national priorities.作者: set598 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 04:09
The End of the Apollo Era the old space program of the 60’s is we are essentially taking a $3.5 billion enterprise which has been going in one direction, a very singleminded purpose, and completely changing it around and moving in a new direction. That is a tough job.”1作者: 爆米花 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 09:03 作者: 古董 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 11:29
Debating a Shuttle Decisionwould allow the beginning of space shuttle development andPresident Nixon had indicated “I agree with Cap,” that news had not been communicated to lower levels in the White House or to NASA. The result was a fragmented and contentious debate over shuttle approval.作者: 粗鄙的人 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 13:49
Which Shuttle to Approve?he context of a different program of human space flight than what NASA was proposing. Rice was convinced that the shuttle NASA preferred was “a huge overinvestment for what the country needs,” and believed it was his responsibility as a steward of the federal budget to help protect the president from making that overinvestment.作者: 新手 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 17:41
Crime Prevention in the 21st Centurye program of space development and exploration. The confused process of reaching this outcome is described in this and the following four chapters, which together constitute the first act of the post-Apollo drama.作者: Constant 時(shí)間: 2025-4-1 00:32
Social Network Analysis and Crime Preventionpace choices in terms of U.S.-Soviet competition was rather tone deaf on Paine’s part, a characteristic that was to persist through his time at NASA. Richard Nixon during his campaign and then in his inaugural address had made it clear that he was seeking areas of cooperation, not competition,with the Soviet Union.作者: Legion 時(shí)間: 2025-4-1 03:45
Setting the Post-Apollo Stagee program of space development and exploration. The confused process of reaching this outcome is described in this and the following four chapters, which together constitute the first act of the post-Apollo drama.作者: 不幸的人 時(shí)間: 2025-4-1 08:44
