標(biāo)題: Titlebook: Web and Internet Economics; 13th International C Nikhil R. Devanur,Pinyan Lu Conference proceedings 2017 Springer International Publishing [打印本頁] 作者: Aggrief 時間: 2025-3-21 19:06
書目名稱Web and Internet Economics影響因子(影響力)
書目名稱Web and Internet Economics影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Web and Internet Economics網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度
書目名稱Web and Internet Economics網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Web and Internet Economics被引頻次
書目名稱Web and Internet Economics被引頻次學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Web and Internet Economics年度引用
書目名稱Web and Internet Economics年度引用學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Web and Internet Economics讀者反饋
書目名稱Web and Internet Economics讀者反饋學(xué)科排名
作者: Condense 時間: 2025-3-21 22:48 作者: Spongy-Bone 時間: 2025-3-22 04:00 作者: Keratectomy 時間: 2025-3-22 04:38
,Don’t Be Greedy: Leveraging Community Structure to Find High Quality Seed Sets for Influence Maximihe study of network cascades. The majority of existing work on this problem, formally referred to as the ., is designed for submodular cascades. Despite the empirical evidence that many cascades are non-submodular, little work has been done focusing on non-submodular influence maximization..We propo作者: callous 時間: 2025-3-22 10:57 作者: Annotate 時間: 2025-3-22 13:11
Information Retention in Heterogeneous Majority Dynamics,tem also after several rounds of the dynamics. Information retention has been studied for the function that returns the majority of the states in systems in which players have states in . and the system evolves according to the majority dynamics: each player repeatedly updates its state to match the作者: 黃油沒有 時間: 2025-3-22 20:03 作者: 舊病復(fù)發(fā) 時間: 2025-3-23 01:00
The Strategy of Experts for Repeated Predictions,andom variable will be realized. A public prediction gradually converges to the outcome, and an expert has access to a more accurate prediction. We study when the expert should reveal his information, when his reward is based on a proper scoring rule (e.g., is proportional to the change in log-likel作者: CAMP 時間: 2025-3-23 02:15
Shapley Facility Location Games,Hotelling. Spatial facility location models have successfully predicted the outcome of competition in a variety of scenarios. In a typical facility location game, users/customers/voters are mapped to a metric space representing their preferences, and each player picks a point (facility) in that spac作者: extinguish 時間: 2025-3-23 05:46
Shapley Facility Location Games,Hotelling. Spatial facility location models have successfully predicted the outcome of competition in a variety of scenarios. In a typical facility location game, users/customers/voters are mapped to a metric space representing their preferences, and each player picks a point (facility) in that spac作者: 共和國 時間: 2025-3-23 13:05 作者: Adulterate 時間: 2025-3-23 16:24
Coordination Mechanisms, Cost-Sharing, and Approximation Algorithms for Scheduling,t three coordination mechanisms from the recent literature as Shapley-value-based cost-sharing protocols, thus providing a unifying justification regarding why these mechanisms induce potential games. More importantly, this connection provides a template for designing novel coordination mechanisms, 作者: 生來 時間: 2025-3-23 20:22
A Dynamics for Advertising on Networks,ng products? Broadly, there are two primary modes of advertising: (.) the equivalent of billboards in the real-world and (search or display) ads online that convert a percentage of the population that sees them, and (.) social campaigns where the goal is to select a set of initial adopters who influ作者: 包庇 時間: 2025-3-24 01:26 作者: 小樣他閑聊 時間: 2025-3-24 06:06 作者: Locale 時間: 2025-3-24 08:50
,Limiting User’s Sybil Attack in Resource Sharing,terested in the robustness of the market equilibrium mechanism in withstanding such an attack, in terms of the incentive ratio to measure how much one could gain by splitting its identity and reconstructing its communication connections with others. On one hand, weshow that no player can increase mo作者: CAND 時間: 2025-3-24 13:09 作者: PALSY 時間: 2025-3-24 15:16 作者: 尖叫 時間: 2025-3-24 19:14
The Asymptotic Behavior of the Price of Anarchy,ation (O/D) pairs. Empirical studies in real-world networks show that the price of anarchy is close to 1 in both light and heavy traffic, thus raising the question: can these observations be justified theoretically? We first show that this is not always the case: the price of anarchy may remain boun作者: 錯誤 時間: 2025-3-25 01:02 作者: FADE 時間: 2025-3-25 03:21 作者: 服從 時間: 2025-3-25 09:03
Fixed Price Approximability of the Optimal Gain from Trade, from publicly known distributions. It was recently shown that the only mechanisms that are simultaneously dominant strategy incentive compatible, strongly budget balanced, and ex-post individually rational, are . mechanisms, i.e., mechanisms that are parametrised by a price ., and trade occurs if a作者: LARK 時間: 2025-3-25 15:08
On Strong Equilibria and Improvement Dynamics in Network Creation Games,buying edges to their neighbors at a cost of a fixed parameter .. The cost of a player is defined to be the cost of the bought edges plus the sum of distances to all the players in the resulting graph. We identify and characterize various structural properties of strong equilibria, which lead to a c作者: Ventricle 時間: 2025-3-25 15:52 作者: 縮減了 時間: 2025-3-25 22:19
Sequential Deliberation for Social Choice, too large or complex for ordinal voting, standard voting methods may be impractical. How then can we design a protocol - preferably decentralized, simple, scalable, and not requiring any special knowledge of the decision space - to reach consensus? We propose sequential deliberation as a natural so作者: 虛情假意 時間: 2025-3-26 01:16
Sequential Deliberation for Social Choice, too large or complex for ordinal voting, standard voting methods may be impractical. How then can we design a protocol - preferably decentralized, simple, scalable, and not requiring any special knowledge of the decision space - to reach consensus? We propose sequential deliberation as a natural so作者: overhaul 時間: 2025-3-26 08:10 作者: Glucose 時間: 2025-3-26 12:17 作者: 邪惡的你 時間: 2025-3-26 16:00 作者: 包庇 時間: 2025-3-26 17:52
Socially Optimal Mining Pools,. where they jointly mine for Bitcoins. Whenever some pool participant is successful, the earned rewards are appropriately split among all pool participants. Currently a dozen of different pooling strategies are in use for Bitcoin mining. We here propose a formal model of utility and social optimali作者: Herpetologist 時間: 2025-3-27 00:25
Design of an Optimal Frequency Reward Program in the Face of Competition,rational economic terms. We assume two kinds of customers: myopic and strategic [.]. Every customer has a prior loyalty bias [.] toward the reward program merchant, a parameter drawn from a known distribution, indicating an additional probability of choosing the reward program merchant over the trad作者: 否認(rèn) 時間: 2025-3-27 02:02 作者: commute 時間: 2025-3-27 09:07
Design of an Optimal Frequency Reward Program in the Face of Competition,rational economic terms. We assume two kinds of customers: myopic and strategic [.]. Every customer has a prior loyalty bias [.] toward the reward program merchant, a parameter drawn from a known distribution, indicating an additional probability of choosing the reward program merchant over the trad作者: 戲法 時間: 2025-3-27 11:59
A Characterization of Undirected Graphs Admitting Optimal Cost Shares,ash equilibrium of an induced cost-sharing game. One of the most intriguing open problems to date is to understand the power of budget-balanced and separable cost sharing protocols in order to induce low-cost Steiner forests..In this work, we focus on . networks and analyze topological properties of作者: GEST 時間: 2025-3-27 16:02 作者: 紅潤 時間: 2025-3-27 18:46
Routing Games over Time with FIFO Policy,up in a . queue and may wait: an edge is associated with a capacity, which defines how many agents-per-time-step can pop from the queue’s head and enter the edge, to transit for a fixed delay. We show that the best-response optimization problem is not approximable, and that deciding the existence of作者: Popcorn 時間: 2025-3-28 00:13
Approximate Efficiency in Matching Markets,ely efficient if there is no alternate lottery in which each agent’s ex-ante expected utility increases by an . factor. A mechanism is .-approximately efficient if every lottery produced in equilibrium is .-approximately efficient. We argue this is the natural extension of approximate efficiency in 作者: GENRE 時間: 2025-3-28 03:00 作者: Notify 時間: 2025-3-28 09:05 作者: 佛刊 時間: 2025-3-28 11:24
,Limiting User’s Sybil Attack in Resource Sharing,re than . times of their original share from the market equilibrium solution, by characterizing the worst case under which strategic agent can obtain the maximum utility gain after manipulation. On the other hand, such a bound of . is proved to be tight by constructing a proper instance, for which this bound is reached.作者: MORPH 時間: 2025-3-28 16:38 作者: Foolproof 時間: 2025-3-28 21:51 作者: 等級的上升 時間: 2025-3-28 23:09
Mechanism Design with Efficiency and Equality Considerations, optimal allocation rule. Based on the characterizations, we show the optimal allocation and corresponding truthful payments can be computed in polynomial time, which means the truthful mechanism is computationally feasible.作者: ascend 時間: 2025-3-29 06:34 作者: 手術(shù)刀 時間: 2025-3-29 07:41 作者: 不朽中國 時間: 2025-3-29 13:24
0302-9743 Internet Economics, WINE 2017, held in Bangalore, India, in December 2017.. The 28 full and 6 short papers presented were carefully reviewed and selected from 89 submissions. The papers reflect the work of researchers in theoretical computer science, artificial intelligence, and microeconomics who h作者: STIT 時間: 2025-3-29 17:41
Conference proceedings 2017 the work of researchers in theoretical computer science, artificial intelligence, and microeconomics who have joined forces to tackle problems at the intersection of computation, game theory and economics.??.作者: Costume 時間: 2025-3-29 22:04
0302-9743 ted from 89 submissions. The papers reflect the work of researchers in theoretical computer science, artificial intelligence, and microeconomics who have joined forces to tackle problems at the intersection of computation, game theory and economics.??.978-3-319-71923-8978-3-319-71924-5Series ISSN 0302-9743 Series E-ISSN 1611-3349 作者: 誓言 時間: 2025-3-30 03:25 作者: Ceremony 時間: 2025-3-30 05:47 作者: Fester 時間: 2025-3-30 08:52 作者: 真繁榮 時間: 2025-3-30 14:44
The Asymptotic Behavior of the Price of Anarchy, hand, for a large class of cost functions (including all polynomials), the price of anarchy . converge to 1 in both heavy and light traffic conditions, and irrespective of the network topology and the number of O/D pairs in the network.作者: 緊張過度 時間: 2025-3-30 18:09 作者: 殺子女者 時間: 2025-3-30 23:51
Approximate Efficiency in Matching Markets,f the so-called . and the recently-proposed . over the .. Furthermore, we provide the first formal statement and analysis of the ., which is conceptually simpler than the Boston mechanism and has a comparable efficiency guarantee.作者: 果核 時間: 2025-3-31 03:54
A Characterization of Undirected Graphs Admitting Optimal Cost Shares,rk design games: an undirected graph is efficient if and only if it does not contain (at least) one out of .. Our characterization implies that several graph classes are efficient: generalized series-parallel graphs, fan and wheel graphs and graphs with small cycles.作者: Intervention 時間: 2025-3-31 06:12
A Characterization of Undirected Graphs Admitting Optimal Cost Shares,rk design games: an undirected graph is efficient if and only if it does not contain (at least) one out of .. Our characterization implies that several graph classes are efficient: generalized series-parallel graphs, fan and wheel graphs and graphs with small cycles.作者: 勤勞 時間: 2025-3-31 10:33 作者: 昏迷狀態(tài) 時間: 2025-3-31 17:15 作者: 神圣不可 時間: 2025-3-31 18:05
,Don’t Be Greedy: Leveraging Community Structure to Find High Quality Seed Sets for Influence Maximieverage the relation between the spread of cascades and the community structure of social networks. We present “worst-case” theoretical results proving that in certain settings our algorithm outputs seed sets that are a factor of . more influential than those of the greedy algorithm, where . is the 作者: 虛假 時間: 2025-4-1 00:44
,Don’t Be Greedy: Leveraging Community Structure to Find High Quality Seed Sets for Influence Maximieverage the relation between the spread of cascades and the community structure of social networks. We present “worst-case” theoretical results proving that in certain settings our algorithm outputs seed sets that are a factor of . more influential than those of the greedy algorithm, where . is the 作者: 特別容易碎 時間: 2025-4-1 05:29 作者: 頭盔 時間: 2025-4-1 08:42
Information Retention in Heterogeneous Majority Dynamics,ll . majority dynamics. Here, each player . changes its state from the initial state . to the opposite state . only if there is a surplus greater than . of neighbors that express that opinion. The non-negative player-dependent parameter . is called the . of .. We call . the players which never chang作者: Modicum 時間: 2025-4-1 11:32
Shapley Facility Location Games,economics literature on choice prediction. Given this model, our first main result is that Shapley facility location games are potential games; hence, they possess pure Nash equilibrium. Moreover, the latter is true for any compact user space, any user distribution over that space, and any number of作者: 彎曲道理 時間: 2025-4-1 14:51 作者: 斗爭 時間: 2025-4-1 19:32
Coordination Mechanisms, Cost-Sharing, and Approximation Algorithms for Scheduling, minimizing the total weighted completion time for unrelated machines. To the best of our knowledge, this is the best approximation guarantee among combinatorial polynomial-time algorithms for this problem.作者: 食料 時間: 2025-4-1 23:05 作者: endarterectomy 時間: 2025-4-2 06:28
A Dynamics for Advertising on Networks,al network, and (3) the relative quality of the competing products. This model allows us to study the evolution of market share of multiple products with different qualities competing for the same set of users, and the effect that different advertising campaigns can have on the market share. We pres作者: 生命 時間: 2025-4-2 07:54 作者: Commemorate 時間: 2025-4-2 12:00 作者: 得罪 時間: 2025-4-2 17:37
Fixed Price Approximability of the Optimal Gain from Trade,mes the optimum, where . is the probability that the seller’s valuation does not exceed that of the buyer’s valuation. This extends a previous result by McAfee. Subsequently, we improve this approximation factor in an asymptotic sense, by showing that a more sophisticated rule for setting the fixed 作者: chiropractor 時間: 2025-4-2 22:07 作者: Delude 時間: 2025-4-3 01:37 作者: Flatus 時間: 2025-4-3 06:21
Sequential Deliberation for Social Choice,pler classes of mechanisms to justify our design choices. We further show that sequential deliberation is ex-post Pareto efficient and has truthful reporting as an equilibrium of the induced extensive form game. Finally, we prove that for general metric spaces, the first and second moment of the dis作者: Gene408 時間: 2025-4-3 07:59 作者: ANA 時間: 2025-4-3 15:36
Computing Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Shapley Value Weighted Congestion Games,tting. We present a novel relation that approximates the Shapley value of a player by her proportional share and vice versa. As side results, we upper bound the approximate price of anarchy of such games and significantly improve the best known factor for computing approximate pure Nash equilibria i
