標題: Titlebook: Web and Internet Economics; 9th International Co Yiling Chen,Nicole Immorlica Conference proceedings 2013 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg [打印本頁] 作者: fitful 時間: 2025-3-21 18:19
書目名稱Web and Internet Economics影響因子(影響力)
書目名稱Web and Internet Economics影響因子(影響力)學科排名
書目名稱Web and Internet Economics網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度
書目名稱Web and Internet Economics網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度學科排名
書目名稱Web and Internet Economics被引頻次
書目名稱Web and Internet Economics被引頻次學科排名
書目名稱Web and Internet Economics年度引用
書目名稱Web and Internet Economics年度引用學科排名
書目名稱Web and Internet Economics讀者反饋
書目名稱Web and Internet Economics讀者反饋學科排名
作者: confederacy 時間: 2025-3-21 23:02 作者: BRIEF 時間: 2025-3-22 04:18 作者: exclusice 時間: 2025-3-22 07:53
The Asymmetric Matrix Partition Problem, partition scheme that maximizes the resulting partition value. A partition scheme . consists of a partition . of [.] for each row . of the matrix. The partition . can be interpreted as a smoothing operator on row ., which replaces the value of each entry in that row with the expected value in the p作者: Exclaim 時間: 2025-3-22 10:04
Polylogarithmic Supports Are Required for Approximate Well-Supported Nash Equilibria below 2/3,irement that every pure strategy used with positive probability must have payoff within . of the best response payoff. Daskalakis, Mehta and Papadimitriou [8] conjectured that every win-lose bimatrix game has a .-well-supported Nash equilibrium that uses supports of cardinality at most three. Indeed作者: Adj異類的 時間: 2025-3-22 16:53 作者: 受傷 時間: 2025-3-22 19:47 作者: Assignment 時間: 2025-3-22 23:30
The Computational Complexity of Random Serial Dictatorship,n also allowing indifferences, . is a well-known generalization of random dictatorship that retains both properties. . has been particularly successful in the special domain of random assignment where indifferences are unavoidable. While . . is obviously feasible, we show that . the resulting probab作者: 軌道 時間: 2025-3-23 05:12
Incentives and Efficiency in Uncertain Collaborative Environments,dual projects according to a local sharing of the value produced. This serves as a model of online social computing systems such as online Q&A forums and of credit sharing in scientific co-authorship settings. We show that the maximum feasible produced value can be well approximated by simple local 作者: 地名表 時間: 2025-3-23 09:20
Incentives and Efficiency in Uncertain Collaborative Environments,dual projects according to a local sharing of the value produced. This serves as a model of online social computing systems such as online Q&A forums and of credit sharing in scientific co-authorship settings. We show that the maximum feasible produced value can be well approximated by simple local 作者: floaters 時間: 2025-3-23 10:35
Revenue Maximization with Nonexcludable Goods,Bayesian settings for facility location problems on graphs where no agent can be excluded from using a facility that has been constructed. We show that the optimization problem involved in implementing the revenue optimal mechanism is hard to approximate within a factor of Ω(. .) (assuming .?≠?.) ev作者: 要控制 時間: 2025-3-23 17:56
Revenue Maximization with Nonexcludable Goods,Bayesian settings for facility location problems on graphs where no agent can be excluded from using a facility that has been constructed. We show that the optimization problem involved in implementing the revenue optimal mechanism is hard to approximate within a factor of Ω(. .) (assuming .?≠?.) ev作者: 嚴峻考驗 時間: 2025-3-23 19:08 作者: 過去分詞 時間: 2025-3-24 01:18
On Lookahead Equilibria in Congestion Games,d by Mirrokni et al. [10], correspond to the natural extension of pure Nash equilibria in which the players, when making use of global information in order to predict subsequent reactions of the other ones, have computationally limited capabilities.作者: Hiatus 時間: 2025-3-24 06:01
Trading Agent Kills Market Information,rs and computer algorithms interact. Because humans and computers differ in their capabilities to emit and process complex market signals, there is a need to understand the determinants of the provision of market information. We tackle the general research question from the perspective of new electr作者: Salivary-Gland 時間: 2025-3-24 10:21
Trading Agent Kills Market Information,rs and computer algorithms interact. Because humans and computers differ in their capabilities to emit and process complex market signals, there is a need to understand the determinants of the provision of market information. We tackle the general research question from the perspective of new electr作者: Minutes 時間: 2025-3-24 11:12 作者: insurgent 時間: 2025-3-24 15:51
Designing Markets for Daily Deals,onsumers. In order to maximize consumer acquisition and retention, these platforms would like to offer deals that give good value to users. Currently, selecting such deals is done manually; however, the large number of submarkets and localities necessitates an automatic approach to selecting good de作者: defuse 時間: 2025-3-24 21:44 作者: Interim 時間: 2025-3-25 02:23
The Exact Computational Complexity of Evolutionarily Stable Strategies,ng the exact complexity of computing an evolutionarily stable strategy has resisted solution since attention was drawn to it in 2004. In this paper, I settle this question by proving that deciding the existence of an evolutionarily stable strategy is .-complete.作者: Etching 時間: 2025-3-25 04:32 作者: guardianship 時間: 2025-3-25 10:09 作者: 星球的光亮度 時間: 2025-3-25 11:49 作者: Malleable 時間: 2025-3-25 17:03
Can Credit Increase Revenue?,rs have a private value, but can only learn this value through experimentation, a scenario that is typical in AdAuctions. We consider this question in a repeated game context, where early participation in the auction can help the bidders learn their own value. We consider what is a good bidding stra作者: 敵手 時間: 2025-3-25 21:59
Mechanism Design for Aggregating Energy Consumption and Quality of Service in Speed Scaling Scheduldeadlines. The energy consumption is then charged to the players in some way. Each player wants to minimize the sum of that charge and of their job’s deadline multiplied by a?priority weight. Two charging schemes are studied, the . which does not always admit pure Nash equilibria, and the ., which d作者: ornithology 時間: 2025-3-26 02:43 作者: 串通 時間: 2025-3-26 05:00 作者: Vo2-Max 時間: 2025-3-26 12:07 作者: Keratin 時間: 2025-3-26 16:43 作者: Cholagogue 時間: 2025-3-26 16:52 作者: osculate 時間: 2025-3-26 21:08 作者: Ceramic 時間: 2025-3-27 04:53 作者: 先兆 時間: 2025-3-27 06:44 作者: 商議 時間: 2025-3-27 12:42
,Resolving Braess’s Paradox in Random Networks,of the best subnetwork problem for the class of random . instances proven prone to Braess’s paradox by (Roughgarden and Valiant, RSA 2010) and (Chung and Young, WINE 2010). Our main contribution is a polynomial-time approximation-preserving reduction of the best subnetwork problem for such instances作者: 詼諧 時間: 2025-3-27 16:55
Truthfulness Flooded Domains and the Power of Verification for Mechanism Design,sider any possible (finite or infinite) domain and general symmetric verification. We identify a natural property, namely that the correspondence graph of a symmetric verification . is strongly connected by finite paths along which the preferences are consistent with the preferences at the endpoints作者: 首創(chuàng)精神 時間: 2025-3-27 19:12
Truthfulness Flooded Domains and the Power of Verification for Mechanism Design,sider any possible (finite or infinite) domain and general symmetric verification. We identify a natural property, namely that the correspondence graph of a symmetric verification . is strongly connected by finite paths along which the preferences are consistent with the preferences at the endpoints作者: GLIDE 時間: 2025-3-27 22:34 作者: adjacent 時間: 2025-3-28 05:11 作者: meritorious 時間: 2025-3-28 09:54 作者: Paleontology 時間: 2025-3-28 13:37
The Computational Complexity of Random Serial Dictatorship,l in the special domain of random assignment where indifferences are unavoidable. While . . is obviously feasible, we show that . the resulting probabilities is #P-complete and thus intractable, both in the context of voting and assignment.作者: 能夠支付 時間: 2025-3-28 15:51
The Computational Complexity of Random Serial Dictatorship,l in the special domain of random assignment where indifferences are unavoidable. While . . is obviously feasible, we show that . the resulting probabilities is #P-complete and thus intractable, both in the context of voting and assignment.作者: 新鮮 時間: 2025-3-28 21:18 作者: 相互影響 時間: 2025-3-29 02:16
Mechanism Design for Aggregating Energy Consumption and Quality of Service in Speed Scaling Scheduldeadline multiplied by a?priority weight. Two charging schemes are studied, the . which does not always admit pure Nash equilibria, and the ., which does always admit pure Nash equilibria, at the price of overcharging by a constant factor.作者: 改變立場 時間: 2025-3-29 03:15
0302-9743 papers were carefully reviewed and selected from 150 submissions and cover research in theoretical computer science, artificial intelligence and microeconomics.978-3-642-45045-7978-3-642-45046-4Series ISSN 0302-9743 Series E-ISSN 1611-3349 作者: exigent 時間: 2025-3-29 10:39 作者: 惡名聲 時間: 2025-3-29 13:50 作者: 甜瓜 時間: 2025-3-29 18:41
Valuation Compressions in VCG-Based Combinatorial Auctions,ions to additive bids and upper and lower bounds for restrictions to non-additive bids. These bounds show that the welfare loss increases in expressiveness. All our bounds apply to equilibrium concepts that can be computed in polynomial time as well as to learning outcomes.作者: 閃光東本 時間: 2025-3-29 22:44
A Protocol for Cutting Matroids Like Cakes,a base of the matroid. If there are up to 8 agents, we show how everyone can ensure that his worst case utility for the resulting base is the same as those given by Markakis and Psomas [18] for the fair allocation of indivisible goods, based on the guarantees of Demko and Hill [8].作者: 背信 時間: 2025-3-30 03:44
A Protocol for Cutting Matroids Like Cakes,a base of the matroid. If there are up to 8 agents, we show how everyone can ensure that his worst case utility for the resulting base is the same as those given by Markakis and Psomas [18] for the fair allocation of indivisible goods, based on the guarantees of Demko and Hill [8].作者: SEEK 時間: 2025-3-30 07:28 作者: chapel 時間: 2025-3-30 10:21 作者: Individual 時間: 2025-3-30 16:25
Revenue Maximization with Nonexcludable Goods,igating nonexcludability by collecting tolls for using the facilities. We show that such “posted-price” mechanisms obtain significantly higher revenue, and often approach the optimal revenue obtainable with full excludability.作者: 疏遠天際 時間: 2025-3-30 19:25 作者: Suppository 時間: 2025-3-30 21:04
Trading Agent Kills Market Information,ng agent shifts the dynamics of information revelation from a high-effort norm to a low-effort information equilibrium. We test our hypothesis with a natural experiment on Smava.de and find strong support for our proposition.作者: 傻 時間: 2025-3-31 03:30
Trading Agent Kills Market Information,ng agent shifts the dynamics of information revelation from a high-effort norm to a low-effort information equilibrium. We test our hypothesis with a natural experiment on Smava.de and find strong support for our proposition.作者: 動作謎 時間: 2025-3-31 08:48
,Resolving Braess’s Paradox in Random Networks,most (1?+?.). .?+?., where . . is the equilibrium latency of the best subnetwork. Our approximation scheme runs in polynomial time if the random network has average degree .(poly(ln .)) and the traffic rate is .(poly(ln ln .)), and in quasipolynomial time for average degrees up to .(.) and traffic rates of .(poly(ln .)).作者: GLOSS 時間: 2025-3-31 11:55 作者: PACK 時間: 2025-3-31 14:00
The Asymmetric Matrix Partition Problem,employ an identical partition for all rows, and prove that it is essentially trivial. Our matrix partition problem draws its interest from several applications like broad matching in sponsored search advertising and information revelation in market settings. We conclude by discussing the latter appl作者: 易怒 時間: 2025-3-31 19:14 作者: wall-stress 時間: 2025-4-1 00:16
Polylogarithmic Supports Are Required for Approximate Well-Supported Nash Equilibria below 2/3,igraph variant of the well-known Caccetta-H?ggkvist conjecture [4]. A probabilistic argument [13] shows that there exist .-well-supported equilibria with supports of cardinality ., for any .?>?0; thus, the polylogarithmic cardinality bound presented cannot be greatly improved. We also show that for 作者: inchoate 時間: 2025-4-1 05:51 作者: sinoatrial-node 時間: 2025-4-1 06:47
Designing Markets for Daily Deals,y (the consumer), despite the asymmetry of information about this consumer benefit. We design auctions that truthfully elicit this information from the merchants and maximize the social welfare objective, and we characterize the consumer welfare functions for which this objective is truthfully imple作者: 伴隨而來 時間: 2025-4-1 11:43 作者: 退潮 時間: 2025-4-1 15:37
The Price of Anarchy of the Proportional Allocation Mechanism Revisited, precisely the same geometric quantity. We also present a new variational inequality characterization of Nash equilibria in this setting, which enables us to extend the price-of-anarchy analysis to important classes of utility functions that are not necessarily concave.作者: FLAT 時間: 2025-4-1 19:01 作者: Gnrh670 時間: 2025-4-2 02:37 作者: 座右銘 時間: 2025-4-2 04:44
Limits of Efficiency in Sequential Auctions,ns with gross substitute valuations, capacitated valuations, budget-additive valuations, and additive valuations with hard budget constraints on the payments. For capacitated valuations, our results imply a lower bound that equals the maximum capacity of any bidder, which is tight following the uppe作者: fidelity 時間: 2025-4-2 07:38 作者: 落葉劑 時間: 2025-4-2 11:31 作者: 松軟無力 時間: 2025-4-2 19:11
Truthfulness Flooded Domains and the Power of Verification for Mechanism Design,ng whether truthful implementation can take advantage of any symmetric verification scheme in any domain. Since the simplest case of symmetric verification is local verification, our results imply, as a special case, the equivalence of local truthfulness and global truthfulness in the setting withou作者: colony 時間: 2025-4-2 20:45
Truthfulness Flooded Domains and the Power of Verification for Mechanism Design,ng whether truthful implementation can take advantage of any symmetric verification scheme in any domain. Since the simplest case of symmetric verification is local verification, our results imply, as a special case, the equivalence of local truthfulness and global truthfulness in the setting withou作者: 咽下 時間: 2025-4-3 01:12
Noga Alon,Michal Feldman,Iftah Gamzu,Moshe Tennenholtz389479.jpg作者: enormous 時間: 2025-4-3 04:13
Yogesh Anbalagan,Sergey Norin,Rahul Savani,Adrian Vetta389480.jpg作者: grotto 時間: 2025-4-3 08:36 作者: Highbrow 時間: 2025-4-3 13:36
